Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion WW-0668
Re: Taxability for inheritance Austin 11, Texas purposes of proceeds of National Service Life ,n- surance Policies and proper method of taxing partner- ship interest subject to a buy, and sell agreement be-
Cites: CV §801, CV §et, CV §816, CV §4543, CV §411, CV §22
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THEATTORNEY
GENERAL
OF
TEXAS
Honorable Robert S. Calvert
Opinion No. ~~-668
Comptroller of Pubiic Accounts
Capitol Station
Re: Taxability for inheritance
Austin 11, Texas
purposes of proceeds of
National Service Life ,n-
surance Policies and proper
method of taxing partner-
ship interest subject to a
buy, and sell agreement be-
Dear Mr. Calvert:
tween the partners.
You have requested that we advise you as to the
taxability for inheritance tax purposes of two National Service
Life Insurance policies on the life of Alex Goldstein, herein-
after referred to as the Decedent, in the total amount of
$10,000, pay~able to his sister. The p.ertinent part of Article
7117, Vernon's Civil Statutes, which levies the inheritance tax
is the following:
"All property withih the jurisdyiction
of this
State,. . . including the proceeds of li,,fe
insurance
to the extent of the amount receivable iby,
the exoc-
utor or ad:ministrator
as insurance under policies
t&en out by the decedent upon his own life, and to
the extent of the excess over Party Thousand Dollars
($40,000) of the amount receivable by, all other
beneficiaries as insurance under policies tnken out
by the decedent upon his own life,. y .shall, upon
passing.
.be subject to a tax for the benefit of
the State's ;eneral Revenue Fund. . . *"
The insurance in-solved is authorized by the National
Service Life Insurance Act. 38 C.S.C.A., Sec. 801, et seq. At
the time of the death of the Decedent, August 7, 1957, Section
816 of the Act made Sec,kion k5Ga of the same Title (World War
Veters.nsL Act, 192il)
appl~icable
to National Service Li,fe Insur-
ance. The pertinent portion of Section 4543. is the followings
"Payments of benefits due or to become due shall
not be assignable, and such payments made to, or
on account of, a beneficiary under any of the laws
relating .to veterans shall be exempt from taxation,
shall be exempt from the claims of creditors, and
shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure
Hon. Robe,rt S. Calvert,'Page 2 (Opinion No. WW-668)
by o&under any'legal or equitable process whatever,
either before or after receipt by the, beneficiary.
Such provisions shall not attach.to,claims of the
'United States arising,under such laws nor shall the
exemption herein.contained &sto taxation extend to,
any: property purchasedGin part or wholly'out of
such payments."., '.
In'the brief which has been submitted in connection
with your request, the attorneys ~for the estate take the posi-
tion that this.exemption provlsion effectuates anexemption
from State inheritance taxes. They cite the cases footnoted
below in support of their position.1
'The War Risk Insurance Act of September 2, 1914, and
its amending acts provided for the insuranc,e by the United
States of Ame,rican vessels, their cargoe's, and crews.against
the risks of war. This Act was subsequently amended; and the
Act of June 7,
192,4, known as the World War Veterans' Act of
1924, made a new codificatio~n abolishing and repealing the
previous acts,,with certain exceptions. There is a great body
of case law involving the construction ~and:application of the
old War Risk Insurance and the World War Veterans' Acts. As
stated in 147 A.L.R:1185, in an Annotation entitled "National
Service Life Insurance Act": "Because of the similarity in
many~ respects between the older act's and the New National Ser-,
vice Life Insurance Act, much,of this earlier case law is per-.
tinent and valuable authority in the construction of the new
act."
The Federal exemption provision previou$'ly quoted was
not incorporated into the World War Veterans' Act until 1935.
However, under similar exemp,tion
provisions, even prior to the
enactment of the Act of 1935, veterans' benefits had been held
1109); Watkins v. Hali,
2 Wash.
5iliii&.
ISee 108
; 876 (1929). See Rem Cram
469, 267 P. 4ifr
(1929), overruled on other
A.L.R. 1110); Re Verchot, 4 Wash 2d 574,
104 P. 2d-(1940);
Sorensonv. Security Bank, 121 Neb. 521, 237: N.W. 620 (1931),
overruled on other grounds; Sorenson v. Horace State Ba~nk, 125
Neb. 638, 251 N,.W. 119 (1933).
.
,,
Hon. Robert S. Calvert, Page 3
(Opinion No. WW-568)
exempt, under the Pederai statutes, from taxation. See
..' Kimbrough ,and IGlen on American Law of Veterans, 2d Ed., 1954,
596, Sec. %kOl ?;r this reason, and for the reason stated in
the A.L.R. Annotation above referred to, we recognize the per-
tinence of the decisions cited in the brief submitted in con-
nection ,with .this request. There is, however ,, authori,ty to
the contrary.
The attorneys for ~the estate recognize that certain
New. York cases ,denied an exemption for inheritance taxes.*
They also recognize that the United States Supreme Court has
held that the above
quoted
exemption does not preclude the
;
inclusion of the proceeds of a War Risk Insurance policy in
the deceased veteran's gross estate for estate tax purposes.
United States Trust Co. v. Relvering, 307 U.S. 57. (Decided
April 1/ 1939 : This case is still controlling for Pederal
estate tkx purposes. See American Law of Veterans3 supra;
*
Rev. Rul. 55-622. However,' they urge that the difference in.
the nature of inheritance taxes
and, estate taxes justifies a
different result under irheritance tax statutes. We cannot
agree since we regard the Helvering case as controlling for
Texas inheritance tax purposes~.
In the Relvering case, the sole question was whether
prrceeds of a War
Risksurance
policy payable to a deceased
vetieran's widow were properly included in his gross estate
fcr Federal esta+;o tax purposes.
Sectinn 32 (g) Reva.nue Act of [Februa,ry 262.1926,
as.amended, 26 U,S.C,A, Sec. 411 included in a decsdc<ntb
s
gross esta.ie the amount In ,excess of $4.0,000 received by
"beneficiaries [other ;than his estate1 as insurance under
policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life." lh.e
vetersn"s total life insurance for; beneficiaries stker than
his estate excee,led at death the statutory~ exemption 0:'
$4C,OOO iE his Whr Risk insursance
policy, WB.S i.n~l~ded. The
Commissicner assessed an es~ta?.he
t;ax meas?ured by this excess.
The decedent:s executor contended the War Risk Insurance pol-
, icy should riot b9? .inc.luded
!.n the esi,ate because ?f Section
22'of the Ws~ld War 7eteran:s ,A& /-;une 73, '1923, providing
tkLat " such. irmdi 3n.e
Ron. Robert S. Calv,ert, Page 4
(Opinion No. W-668)
%
The court reasoned that the proceeds of the War Risk
Insurance policy should be.included in the decedent!s estate
for the following reasons:
The Revenue Acts from 1918 to 1934, the date of the
veteran's death, manifest a consistent policy to tax the pro-
ceeds of all life insurance (not payable to an insured's es-
tate) in excess of $40,000; and the Treasury Regulations ex-
pressly stated that the term
"insurance" as used in the
.
statute refers to life insurance of every’ description.
~With regard to the exemption provision, the court
stated that the statutory immunity, of War Risk Insurance from
taxation cloes not includy an immunity from excises upon the
occasion oft shifts of economic interests brought about by the
death of an insured. The court regarded as analogous the
cases in which Federal bonds~ exempt by statute from all taxa-
tion have been subjected to both State and Federal death
taxes. tiurdock v. Ward, 178 U.S. 139 (1900); Elummer v.
Coler, l'(o U.S. 115 (1500).
With the exception of Re Verchot, supra., all of the
cases cited in footnote 1, as according exemption from death
taxes, were decided prior to the decision in the Helvering
case. Whether 'the jurisdictions in which these cases were
decided would reach the same results in view of the Helvering
decision is immaterial since we are bound to follow that case
by, the decision in Blackman v. Hansen, ,140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.
2d 962 (1943).
In the Rlackmsn case i,t was held that where community~
funds were used to pay premiums on a deceased~ husband's life
t
insurance policies only~ one half of the proceeds in excess of
the $40,000, exemption were subject to inheritance taxes. The
court pointd'ed
out that prior to 1939, proceeds of life instir-
ante payable to named beneficiaries were no 3 subject to a
Texas inheritance tax. The 1939 amendement taxing such in-
surance proceeds was almost identical with the Federal statute
taxing such proceeds. The court said that since the Texas
Statute was literally taken from the Federal statute, the pre-
sumption is that the Texas Legisl,ature knew of the $onstruction
given such statute at the time of its adoption and intended to
adopt such statut,e as construed, by, the .Federal courts. Such
statute, therefore, is to be considered by the cou~rts of this
-
-,- ,-
3 H.B. 990,~ Acts 1939, 46th Leg., p. 646, was passed by, the
House Mayo 9, 1939; by the Senate June 20, 1939, with amendments;
the House concurred in Senate amendments June 20, 1939. H.B.
990 became effective ninety days after addournme'nt.
.;
I
Hon. Robert S.'Calvert, Page 5
(Opinion Nq. W-668)
.
state In ?;he light of’ suck c3t?StluCtlon~.
Since the United
Sttates 32premc3 Co7Jr-t
had he13 that under the same fact situa-
tion as presented by, the B;a.o1nnon
cese only rne half of tne
proceeds of the insurance poiicy was includible in the deced
dent's, gross estate'fr~: estate tar purposes, Lang v.C%!mis7
sioner, 304 3.~~. 264 (1938), the %xas Slupreme court reached
the conclusion above stated.
~/:
In the instant case; the same principles are appli-
cable; and it must therefone be presumed that the Legislature
intended to .adopt the construction which had been placed upon
the E'ederal statute ir? the Xelvering case. This being so,
the pr'oceeds of the War Risk Insurance polibies..are not ex-
'empt from inclusion, within Article 7117, V.C;S., for the pur-
pose of,calculating inheritance taxes.
You have also requeated'that we-advise you as to the
,proper valtiition to be placed upon'the interest which Dece-
dent had in a partnership at the time
of ,hls death. The
Decedent and C. M, McElhannon were partners fin a business
known as the Bonded Warehouse Company~. In February of 1956,
the partners entered into a contract and agreement which pe-
cited that they' were equal partners in said business, that
the value of said partnership was largely dependent upon their
individual efforts, and that it was "the desire,,of the parties
hereto,that in ~the event of the death of either of such part-,
ners.
. . the survivor succeed the partnershIp Csic_jf,in the
ownership and operation of said business and relieve the es-
tate of deceased of the hazards of the operation of such
business and~leave unto the es tate of the deceased a sum
certain." The remaining portion of the agreement reads as
follows:
"NOW, 33RE%ORZ, in consideration of the
mutual benerits, covenants, promises and agree-
ments of t'he parties hereto, to bfi kept and
performed, the pz..r,t,ies
hereto agree as fellows:
*.
"(1) That the survivor of said partners?J.p
will within 3. ::?:;!sonable
time zfte:r;
the death of
first dece?sed pay to t;he estate of deceased the
full sum of Twenty-five Thousand,Dollars ($;S,OOO)
cash, less all debts or overdrafts cf deceesc.1 due
to partnership, an&assume e.11 pa,rtnership indebt-
edness of any ar.d all zature whatsoever.
"(2) I2 consideration of performance by suy-
vivor; of t'he cond,itions o,? paragraph (1) hereof,
each of
the'partiea
hereto
does by these p:&sents
bind the!,r heirs; assigns, execrators,
adminlstra-
Hon.. Roberta S. Calvert, Page 6
(Opinion No. WW-668)
tors and estates, that in the event he should
tors and estates, that in the event he should
prior decease the,other partner, that his execu-
prior decease the,other partner, that his execu-
tors, administrators and estate will pass full
tors, administrators and estate will pass full
legal title to all of the assets of said partner-
legal title to all of the assets of said partner-
ship to the survivor.
ship to the survivor.
"(3)~ All expenses in connection with the
transfers and assignments described in paragraphs
(I) and (2) hereof shall be borne and paid by the
survivor.
"(4) Inthe.ev,ent of decease of survivor
prior to full payment and performance of condi-
tions of paragraph (1) hereof, the assets of said
partnership shall pass share and share alike to
the estate of said partner."
In an affidavit submitted by, Clifford M. McElhannon
in connection with the inheritance tax return, he states that
he.and the deceased partner had entered into a verbal agree-
ment that each partner would take out life insurance on his
own life making the, co-partner the beneficiary. The amount of
life insurance was to be increased from time
to time according
to the mutyal. desires of the partners, with the amount of in-
surance payable to each partner remaining at all times
sub-,
stantially the same. It was further orally agreed between.the
partners that no change would be made in such life insurance
without the, consent of the partner named as beneficiary,. Pre-
miums on these policies were paid for by check issued on the
partnership account.
Subsequent to the death of the Decedent, Mr. McElhannon
received $30,226.91 as beneficiary under various policies taken
out by the Decedent,pursuant to the foregoing agreement.~ At
the date of Decedent's death, the value of his partnership in-
terest was $33,521.40.
The attorneys for the estate have not reported the
value~of thepartnership assets"but have 'repor,ted~
$25,00Cworth
of insurance as the value of an asset which replaced it and are
claiming
a pro rata share of the $40,000 exemption! You ask
whether the partnership interest should be reported as an in-
tangible asset of the estate.
The )attorneys for.the estate take the position that
the Decedent's partnership interest should be,taxed in .accord-
ante with the Federal rule which has been stated as follows:
"Where the, stock of the,decedent in a close carp-
oration or his interest in a business as partner
.
.
I
.Hon. Robert S. Calvert, Page 7
(Opinion No. WW-665)
is subject at his death to an zgreemen~
cf
sale
sir
to anotherm's legally binding option to purchase at
a fixed pr'ice, the fair market vai,ue for Pederal
tax purposes is Ilimited to such price, provided the
price was f'ai.r
nt the tim'e It was established and
the decedent couid no t have disposed ,of the pro,;
perty~ at any time prior to his death: Iielvering v.
Sa.lv;?.ge,
297 V.S. 106 156 S.ct. 375. 8~ L.Ed.
(1935); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682' dCA-2,
Lcmb
v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (CCA-2 193 !; Claire C.
Ho:fman, 2UT.;:: 115C (1943 ;‘Estate of iames H.
Matthews, :3 T.C. 525 11944. ."
I
1 Polisher, Estate
Planning and Estate Tax Saving, 311.
We agree With
the attorneys for the estate that the
buy and sell agreement in this case was a valii! and enforce-
able one. We think that the consideration was adequate and
that the agreement was no,t intended asa substitute for tes-
tamentary dispositionor as a device to avoid estate taxes,
The partners are unrelatezd,
and there would have been no
reason to consider either a natural object of the other's
bounty. Even though the agreement does not specifically pro-
hibit either partner selling his interest in the partnership
prior to his death.'.we think that such prohibition should be
implied In view ofthe forma lity of the agreement and the
absolute natu?e,cf its provisions: See "Estate Tax Conse-
quences of Agreements for the Sale of 3 Partnership Interest
Effective at the Partner's Death--An Appraisal of the Law" by
Wright Katthew3, 26 T.L.R. 729, for a discussion of the var-
.*
ious tests whi-'3 the cocrts have applied in determining the
validity, and. effect of such partnership agreements.
&& is -?his apeement binding on the State ',n deter-
mining the value of the ~decsd~ent's
partnership interest at
his dea.th? We think.nct. The transaction is ens which comes
squarely,
wi?;hin the provision of Artic,le 7177, ';,S.S., which
imposes a t,ax upon transfers "by deed, grant, sale,- o'r gift
made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoy~ment a5
or after the death of the grantor or donor, . . .' (%lPh~3SiS
supplied.) ConsiderTng the transfer in question as a b?ria
fide sale of ,t?e pa rtnership interest, nevertheless, the pre-
viously stated, f'a.8zt.s
p>sveal th.at it '~3s a sale for less t?ia~!l
the full vaius of such il-iterest
at the Decedent's death and
does not reflect the true amount which the surviv,ing
partner
received~ 'by virl~~~.z
of t;ie sale intended~ to take effect at the
deaths of the Decedent.
The ba.si: distinction between a tax in the natv;::e
of
an inheritance ta,x and a tax in the nature of an estate tax
Hon. Robert S. Calve&, Page 8
(Opinion No. m-668)
necessitates a,dif'ferent conclusion from that reached by the'
Federal courts. 'The Federal rule is obviously' sound because
the Federal tax is based upon the net taxable estate of the
decedent at his death..~ Therefore, where the estate receives
less than the full value of the partnership interest under a
bona fide sales agreement,,only the amount actually received
should be included in computing the estate tax. But our
inheritance tax,statute looks not to,the net estate of a
decedent but to the amount received by an individual by
virtue of a taxable transfer.
,4
In Schroeder v. Zink, 7l'A.2d 321, the court in
considerine: a similar fact situation reached the same result
that we he:e reach. In this case the court pointed out,that
in determining whether, a particular transfer is intended to
take effect at, or after'the transferor's death, the important
question is whether the vesting of possession and enjoyment
is dependent upon the settler's death. There can be no doubt
that the transfer of~the Dscedent's partnership interest took
effect in possessionand enjoyment at or after the deceased
partner's death.:
The court also stated ,that obviously it was only
when there was an adequate consideration substantially equal
to the value ,of the property that sales intended to take
effect at death are not taxable and that therefore to~the ex-
tent that consideratio? paid was inadequate,in value as com-
pared to the value received, it is tantamount to a gift. It
is, in effect, a substitute for a testamentary disposition,
and taxable.
Ar~ticle 713d,'V.C.S., provides for the appraisal of
property for inheritance tax purposes '. . . at its actual
market -value if it has a market value, and in case it has
none, then its zeal value at the time
of the death of the
decedent, . . .
In Calvert v. Kattar, 301 S.W.2d 318 (Tex.
Civ.App., error ref., n.r.e.), the court held that market
value for inheritance tax purposes was the following accepted
definition as approved by the Supreme Court in Sta.te v.
Carpenter;.'126
Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 979 (1936): ". . . The
price the property will bring when offered for sale by one
4 Cited and followed in Minoff v. Margetts, 81 A. 2d 369
(Superior Ct,..
of N. J., ~mlj;, See In re Cowles' Estate,
219 p. 2d '964 (Wash.Sup., 1950) for a discussion of the
conf1icting solutions of the problem.
.
t.
.
,.
.
Hon. Robert S. Calvert, Page 9
(Opinion No. WW-668)
who desires to sell, but is not obligated to sell, and is
bought by one who desires to buy,
of buying."
but is under no necessity
.
The New Jersey statu%e in the Schroeder case re-
quired an aopraisal at "fair market value," which term had
been defined in the same terms
as the above quoted defini-
tion. At page 327, the court states:
"To ascord a binW.ng effect to the ante mortem
value, set in.the agreement before u=ur
necessarily oust the tax appraiser of his stat-
utory duty to appraise the property transferred
at its 'fair market value', R. S. 54:34-g,
N.J.S.A. Such construction would open the. door
to tax evasion and frustration of the clear
legislative mandate. Cf. In re Hartford's
Estate, supra,
300."
122 N.J. Eq. at page 498, 194 A.
You are therefore advised that all the insurance
received by the surviving partner should be taxed as in-
surance and accorded ,its pro rata share of,the allowable
insurance exemption. You are further advised that the
surviving partner owes, an additional tax on the value of
the partnership assets as such in excess of the contract
price.
The proceeds of National Service
Life Insurance policies are subject to,.
inheritance taxes ,under Article 7117, V.C.
S. Where partners entered.into agreement
which provided that survivor would pur-
chase deceased partner's interest for
$25,000 and further verbally agreed that
each partner would take out life insur -
l
ante on his own life naming co-partner as
beneficiary,, the proceeds of all life in-
surance policies received bye the surviving
partner are taxable as insurance and enti-
tled to their pro rata share of exemption
from inheritance taxes. The surviving
partner also owes an ideritance tax on
the value of the partnership assets to
Hon. Robert .S. Calvert, Page 10
(Opinion No., W-668)
the extentof,the value,in, excess of the
c~cntra.ct
price.
:
Verytruly yours,
:'
WILL-WILSON
.
: Attorney'GenerBl
*,
,
.,
-i
Assistant
MMP:bct ::
APPROVED:.
OPINION~COMMITTEE:
I?organ Nesbitt, Chairman
',
Tom L.' l%Farlin'g'
Howard Mays
Lawrence Jones
REVIEWED FOR TXE ATTORNEY GENERAL
By: W. V. Geppert
. .
.
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.