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Attorney General Opinion KP-0421
Issued April 28, 2022 · request RQ0456KP
Re: Qualifications for a retired judge’s appointment as a visiting judge to a constitutional county court under section 26.023 of the Government Code
Cites: GV §26.023, GV §1, GV §21.009, GV §16, GV §26.001, GV §26.353, GV §26.021, GV §74.041
The Attorney General's page · official PDF
October 25, 2022
The Honorable John K. Greenwood
Lampasas County Attorney
409 South Pecan, Suite 203
Lampasas, Texas 76550
Opinion No. KP-0421
Re: Qualifications for a retired judge’s appointment as a visiting judge to a constitutional
county court under section 26.023 of the Government Code (RQ-0456-KP)
Dear Mr. Greenwood:
You ask whether a former constitutional county judge who does not meet the definition of
a retired judge under Government Code subsection 74.041(6) may be appointed as a visiting judge
under Government Code section 26.023.1 You tell us the need for a visiting judge arises, because
the elected county judge may be absent from the county or absent because of physical incapacity.
See Request Letter at 1. You state that chapter 26 of the Government Code permits the
appointment of a visiting judge in those circumstances but that it is difficult to secure the services
of eligible judges. Id.; see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 26.023(a).
Government Code, Chapter 26
Texas law establishes both constitutional and statutory county courts. See TEX. CONST. art.
V, §§ 1 (authorizing the Legislature to establish other courts as it deems necessary), 15
(establishing a county court for each county); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 21.009(1) (defining
“county court” as the court created under article V, section 15), (2) (defining “statutory county
court” as a county court created by the Legislature under article V, section 1). Constitutional
county courts are presided over by the county judge and have jurisdiction “as provided by law.”
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 16; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 21.009(3) (defining “county judge” as the
judge of the county court).
Government Code chapter 26 governs constitutional county courts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE
§§ 26.001–.353. Chapter 26, subchapter B contains provisions for the appointment of a visiting
judge in specified circumstances as a general matter, but subchapter C’s provisions for the
appointment of a visiting judge apply to only particular counties. Id. § 26.021 (providing
1See Letter from Honorable John K. Greenwood, Lampasas Cnty. Att’y, to Honorable Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y
Gen.
at
1
(Apr.
28,
2022),
https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/request-files/request/2022/
RQ0456KP.pdf (“Request Letter”).
The Honorable John K. Greenwood - Page 2
subchapter C applies to counties “in which there is no statutory county court at law or statutory
probate court [and the] duties of the county court devolve on the county judge”). You tell us that
Lampasas County is subject to subchapter C. Request Letter at 1.
Within subchapter C, subsection 26.023(a) provides that “[t]he county judge may appoint
a retired judge or a constitutional county judge from another county as a visiting judge when the
county judge is absent from the county or absent because of physical incapacity.” TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 26.023(a). You tell us the person the Lampasas County judge would like to appoint is a
former constitutional county court judge who retired under the Texas County and District
Retirement System (TCDRS) and who is “highly experienced in county court judicial matters,”
but who is not a “retired judge” under Government Code subsection 74.041(6). Request Letter
at 2. Subsection 26.023(a) does not provide for the appointment of a former constitutional county
judge, so under the plain language of the statute this person is eligible for appointment in the
circumstances you describe only if he or she is a retired judge. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 26.023(a).
You suggest that section 74.041’s language “In this chapter” precludes the use of the definition of
“retired judge” for other purposes.2 See Request Letter at 2.
Analysis
A court’s primary objective when construing a statute is to determine the Legislature’s
intent, which, when possible, it discerns from the plain meaning of the words chosen. See Maxim
Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex. 2022); see also City of
LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. 1995) (“Legislative intent remains the polestar of
statutory construction.”). “‘Ordinarily, the truest manifestation of what legislators intended is what
lawmakers enacted, the literal text they voted on.’” Maxim Crane Works, L.P., 642 S.W.3d at 557
(quoting Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tex. 2006)). When
a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court will apply its words according to their common meaning
without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids. Id. Moreover, courts “‘use definitions
prescribed by the Legislature and any technical or particular meaning the words have acquired.’”
Id. (quoting City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625–26 (Tex. 2008)).
As Government Code chapter 26 does not define the term “retired judge,” we first consider
its common meaning. Id. “Retired” commonly means “having left one’s job and ceased to work.”
NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1491 (3d ed. 2010). A “judge” is “a public official
appointed or elected to hear and decide legal matters in court; a judicial officer who has the
authority to administer justice.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 968 (10th ed. 2014). Pursuant to
these definitions, a “retired judge” is a public official appointed or elected to hear and decide legal
matters or administer justice in court who has left the job and ceased to work.
At the same time, the Code Construction Act directs that where an undefined term has
acquired a technical or particular meaning, it shall be construed to have that meaning. See TEX.
2Government Code subsection 74.041(6) defines a “retired judge” to mean a retiree or a “person who served
as an active judge for at least 96 months in a statutory probate or statutory county court and has retired under the Texas
County and District Retirement System.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 74.041(6); see also id. § 74.041(3) (defining “retiree”
by reference to specific judicial retirement systems that are not one under which the former constitutional county judge
retired).
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GOV’T CODE § 311.011(b) (providing that “[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or
particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed
accordingly”). In instances when the “legislature has used a word in a statute in one sense and
with one meaning, and subsequently uses the same word in legislating on the same subject-matter,
its meaning in the subsequent statute will ordinarily be the same.” Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC,
601 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tex. 2020) (internal citations omitted). In the greater context of
appointment of visiting judges, to the extent the term retired judge has acquired a particular
meaning it is likely the one provided in subsection 74.041(6). The one judicial opinion we find
that considers the meaning of retired judge under section 26.023 relies on the definition in
subsection 74.041(6).
See Lackey v. State, 322 S.W.3d 863, 867 n.8 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2010), aff’d, 364 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
In Lackey, the constitutional county judge appointed a local, practicing attorney to preside
over her bench in her absence. See id. at 864. The court determined that the appointed attorney
was neither a retired judge nor a constitutional county judge from another county, and thus was
not qualified to be appointed as a visiting judge under subsection 26.023(a). See id. at 869. As a
result, the actions and orders of the acting judge were not “merely voidable” but were void, as
“[t]he actions of a judge without authority are void if the judge is either disqualified, or is not
qualified.” Id. The court reached its determination by looking to the definition of retired judge
from Government Code subsection 74.041(6). See id. at 867 n.8. While there is a potential textual
argument that similar provisions expressly incorporate specific provisions for the appointment of
visiting judges, so that section 26.023’s lack of such provision means that it should be construed
with the common meaning, we cannot ignore the court’s analytical approach of defining the term
pursuant to subsection 74.041(6). See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 26.012 (providing that “a
visiting judge shall be assigned in accordance with Section 25.0022(h)”), 26.011 (providing that
the “presiding judge shall appoint a visiting judge to hear [certain cases] in accordance with
Subchapter C, Chapter 74”).
“[A] judgment rendered by a special judge who had not been appointed or selected in
accordance with the constitutional and statutory requirements governing such matters is an
absolute nullity.” Saylors v. State, 836 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992, pet. ref’d).
Given the Lackey opinion’s reliance on the definition in Government Code subsection 74.041(6),
a court addressing your question today would likely conclude that the term “retired judge” should
be defined by reference to Government Code subsection 74.041(6). Accordingly, a former
constitutional county judge who does not otherwise satisfy the definition in Government Code
subsection 74.041(6) is not a retired judge eligible to be appointed as a visiting judge under
Government Code subsection 26.023(a), and any actions that judge takes or orders that judge
enters would likely be void or at least subject to attack on that basis.
The Honorable John K. Greenwood - Page 4
S U M M A R Y
A court would likely define the term “retired judge” for
purposes of Government Code subsection 26.023(a) by reference to
its definition in Government Code subsection 74.041(6). Under that
construction, a former constitutional county judge who does not
otherwise satisfy subsection 74.041(6) is not eligible to be appointed
as a visiting judge under Government Code subsection 26.023(a).
Very truly yours,
K E N P A X T O N
Attorney General of Texas
BRENT E. WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General
LESLEY FRENCH
Chief of Staff
D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
CHARLOTTE M. HARPER
Acting Chair, Opinion Committee
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.