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Attorney General Opinion KP-0363
Issued March 16, 2021 · request RQ0401KP
Re: Whether under the Utilities Code the Public Utility Commission has the legal authority to issue orders affecting pricing for the wholesale electricity market and ancillary services
Cites: UT §39.001, UT §39.151, UT §3, UT §87th, UT §5, CN §1.17, CN §1.16
The Attorney General's page · official PDF
KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
March 17, 2021
The Honorable Dan Patrick
Lieutenant Governor of Texas
Post Office Box 12068
Austin, Texas 78711-2068
Opinion No. KP-0363
Re: Whether under the Utilities Code the Public Utility Commission has the legal authority
to issue orders affecting pricing for the wholesale electricity market and ancillary services
(RQ-0401-KP)
Dear Lieutenant Governor Patrick:
Due to the circumstances surrounding the electricity market in the State of Texas as a result
of Winter Storm Uri (the “2021 Winter Emergency”) and its economic effects, you ask whether
the Utilities Code authorizes the Public Utility Commission of Texas (the “Commission”) to issue
orders affecting pricing for the wholesale electricity market and ancillary services.1
In response to the 2021 Winter Emergency, you state that the Texas Senate passed Senate
Bill 2142 to correct the pricing of wholesale electricity and ancillary services during the period
beginning at 11:55 PM on February 17, 2021, and ending at 9:00 AM on February 19, 2021 (the
“Correction Period”). Request Letter at 1. You inquire whether the Commission has the authority
to issue orders correcting the pricing of certain aspects of the Texas electricity market during the
Correction Period. Id. While the question presented generally speaks to authority under the
Utilities Code, we note that your specific question relates to the electricity market, thus we limit
our opinion to the relevant title of the Utilities Code (Title 2, also known as the Public Utility
Regulatory Act (“PURA”), and subtitle B of such Act as it relates to electric utilities) and the
constitutional issues presented by your question.2
1See Letter from Honorable Dan Patrick, Lt. Gov. of the State of Tex., to Honorable Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y
Gen. at 1 (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/rq/2021/pdf/
RQ0401KP.pdf (“Request Letter”).
2We note that the Utilities Code was enacted prior to deregulation of the electricity market in the early 2000s
so that many of the legacy provisions contained therein no longer apply. That said, we primarily limit this opinion to
consideration of subsection 39.151(d) of the Utilities Code, which was added by the Legislature in 1999 and amended
several times thereafter, and which continues to apply to the Commission even after deregulation was completed.
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Background
There are three principal components to the electric industry: generation of power,
transmission and distribution of power, and sale and marketing of power to the end-user.
Historically, the electric industry has been regulated as a monopoly. However, from enactment of
the Utilities Code to the deregulation efforts in the early 2000s (and until now), the Texas
Legislature has adopted a more deregulated approach to the State’s electricity industry. But
portions of the market retain vestiges of the older, monopoly-based system with respect to
transmission and distribution.
More than two decades after deregulation commenced in Texas, there is now a myriad of
players in the Texas electricity market (i.e., market participants), including publicly traded for-
profit corporations, municipality-owned utilities,3 cooperative-owned generators and others. In
addition to the direct market participants, many parties also trade indirectly on, and in connection
with, the Texas electricity market (whether in the form of spot or futures contracts, derivatives,
hedging or otherwise) and the public exchanges that foster such trades.
Foundation of the Utilities Code and the Commission’s Authority
The Legislature enacted the Utilities Code to authorize the Commission to regulate and
oversee the market participants, namely by oversight of the independent system operator, which
for the majority of Texans is the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).4 In restructuring
the electricity markets in favor of competition (for some portions of the market) and retaining
monopoly control (to other portions), the Legislature created a hybrid by design, and authorized
the Commission to, inter alia, ensure that market conditions were met and that consumers were
protected. See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.001.
The Utilities Code vests the Commission with broad authority to oversee and supervise the
Texas electricity market. Subsection 39.151(d) requires the Commission to adopt and enforce
rules relating to the reliability of the regional electric network in the State of Texas and the
accounting for the production and delivery of electricity among generators and all other market
participants. See id. § 39.151(d). The Commission “may delegate to an independent organization
responsibilities for establishing or enforcing such rules ;”5 provided, however, that any such
actions taken by the independent organization remain “subject to [C]ommission oversight and
review.” Id.
3For clarity, see section 39.002 of Utilities Code regarding which sections of the chapter apply to
municipality-owned utilities and cooperatives.
4Portions of the Texas market in the eastern and western boundaries of the State (e.g., El Paso, Beaumont,
etc.) fall outside of the ERCOT power region, and come under the control of the interstate electricity grids (and under
the regulation of the federal government). For purposes of this opinion, we focus solely on the ERCOT power region
and the Commission’s oversight of ERCOT.
5For purposes of this opinion, the “independent organization” refers to ERCOT.
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Further, the independent organization certified by the Commission is directly responsible
and accountable to it. The Commission has:
complete authority to oversee and investigate the organization’s
finances, budget, and operations as necessary to ensure the
organization’s accountability and to ensure that the organization
adequately performs the organization’s functions and duties.
Id. § 39.151(d) (emphasis added).
In addition, the independent organization “shall fully cooperate with the [C]ommission in
the [C]ommission’s oversight and investigatory functions.” Id. If the independent organization
does not (i) adequately perform the organization’s functions or duties or (ii) comply with the
Commission’s directives, the Commission is expressly authorized to take any appropriate action,
including decertifying the organization or assessing an administrative penalty against the
organization. Id.
The only restriction on the Commission’s express authority is that it may not implement,
by order or by rule, a requirement that is contrary to an applicable federal law or rule. Id. This
opinion analyzes only the constitutional issues and certain federal regulations from the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, codified at 106 Stat. 2776, Public Law 102-486.
The Commission’s authority over market participants and ERCOT has been challenged in
the past, and the Third Court of Appeals has held that the Commission has broad oversight
authority regarding its rules relating to reliability and accounting in subsection 39.151(d). See
TXU Generation Co., L.P. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 165 S.W.3d 821, 831–32 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2005, pet. denied) (determining that Commission rule did not overstep Commission’s role
of oversight and review or assume powers delegated to ERCOT, and that ERCOT’s procedures
are to be made consistent with the Commission’s rules).6
Commission’s Authority to Issue Orders affecting the Wholesale Electricity Market
and Ancillary Services
We note that the Senate passed Senate Bill 2142 on March 15, 2021, which specifically
orders the Commission to direct ERCOT to correct prices for wholesale electricity and ancillary
services during the Correction Period. See Tex. S.B. 2142, § 3, 87th Leg., R.S. (2021). Upon
passage by the House of Representatives and the Governor signing the bill, such authorization
would have immediate lawful effect if the requisite two-thirds of each House approve the Bill.7
See id. § 5.
6An amendment to subsection 39.151(d) of the Utilities Code made after this 2005 ruling now expressly
allows the Commission to delegate authority to ERCOT.
7Senate Bill 2142 includes language whereby the law becomes effective immediately upon the Governor’s
signature if two-thirds of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives approves the bill.
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In short, nothing in the Utilities Code prevents the Commission from acting, nor does
anything require such specific action be taken. We note that prior to this proposed legislation, no
specific authority required the Commission to take the actions contained in Senate Bill 2142 as
they relate to the 2021 Winter Emergency. As discussed above, the Commission has general
authority to take actions in furtherance of its statutory authority and as otherwise permitted by law
(namely the Utilities Code).
That said, ample prior action illustrates the Commission’s use of its general authority to
take similar actions as the ones contemplated by Senate Bill 2142.8 In the above-mentioned TXU
Generation case, the Third Court of Appeals stated that the Commission had broad authority to
create rules governing the conduct of market participants. Specifically, the court held that
subsection 35.004(e) of the Utilities Code empowers the Commission to “ensure that ancillary
services necessary to facilitate the transmission of electric energy are available at reasonable prices
with terms and conditions that are not unreasonably preferential, prejudicial, discriminatory,
predatory, or anticompetitive.” TXU Generation Co., L.P., 165 S.W.3d at 834.
The Commission has also exercised its statutory authority to affect prices for both
wholesale electricity and ancillary services during the 2021 Winter Emergency on several
occasions, including the passing of the following orders: (i) the first Order Directing ERCOT to
Take Action and Granting Exception to Commission Rules, dated February 15, 2021 (the “First
Order”)9; (ii) the second Order Directing ERCOT to Take Action and Granting Exception to
Commission Rules, dated February 16, 2021 (the “Second Order”); (iii) the third Order Directing
ERCOT to Take Action and Granting Exception to ERCOT Protocols, dated February 21, 2021
(the “Third Order”); and (iv) the Second Order Addressing Ancillary Services, dated March 12,
2021 (the “Second Ancillary Services Order”).10
Because the applicability of the statute as to the above-mentioned Commission orders will
depend on the particular facts concerning the compelling public interest and a review of the
Commission’s actions in meeting said circumstances, we cannot resolve issues requiring the
consideration of specific facts. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0309 (2020) at 4 (stating that the
opinion process cannot resolve issues requiring the consideration of specific facts).
8The enactment of the ERCOT protocols and the contested decision administrative process provided by the
Commission, and the direct appeal of the Commission’s competition rules, are evidence that the Commission has (and
has exercised its) broad authority as it relates to the entirety of the Texas electricity market. Specific examples include
the recently concluded proceedings between Aspire Commodities LLC and ERCOT regarding a short price fluctuation
due to a market participant’s employee error – for which the Commission dismissed the action, but did not raise any
threshold jurisdictional objections to its ability to reprice the past errors if it so desired. See Order of Commission,
Aspire Commodities LLC v. ERCOT, dated September 11, 2020.
9This first Commission order was incorrectly dated as February 15, 2020 upon its publication and was later
rescinded by the second Commission order a day later. However, this first Commission order contained retroactive
language, which was superseded by the second Commission order (with a dissent as to that portion of the second order
by then-Commissioner Shelly Botkin).
10The first Order Addressing Ancillary Services, dated March 3, 2021, was withdrawn by the Commission
by its Second Ancillary Order.
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In consideration of the foregoing, we conclude that the Commission has the general
authority to act under the Utilities Code to take the actions set out in the above-mentioned orders
during the 2021 Winter Emergency for the reasons stated above and, additionally, on the basis that
(i) the 2021 Winter Emergency conditions presented a “compelling public interest” to so act; (ii)
the Governor declared a disaster under Chapter 418 of the Texas Government Code with respect
to the 2021 Winter Emergency; and (iii) PUC directed ERCOT to ensure that firm load that was
being shed was accounted for in ERCOT’s pricing signals during the 2021 Winter Emergency (as
a result of the scarcity conditions in the market for the applicable period thereto).
Constitutional Law Concerns of the Commission Taking Action
In addition to the statutory analysis of the Commission’s authority to issue orders affecting
pricing, a constitutional analysis is required. The takings clause encapsulated in article 1, section
17 of the Texas Constitution applies when the State acts in its sovereign capacity—that is, when it
uses its eminent-domain or police powers. See Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co.,
39 S.W.3d 591, 598 (Tex. 2001). “However, the State does not have the requisite intent under
constitutional-takings jurisprudence when it withholds property or money from an entity in a
contract dispute.” Id. at 598–99. Here, if the Commission (through ERCOT) was acting as a price
regulator, any repricing might be found by a Court to be an exercise of the police power. To the
extent ERCOT set prices when acting as a counterparty during clearance or in the course of
providing settlement services, including with respect to a market participant agreement, a court
may find that ERCOT is repricing under the terms of a contract. A detailed analysis of the facts
of specific contracts would need to be considered further and exceeds the scope of this expedited
opinion process. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0309 (2020) at 4.
We have considered one potential issue as it relates to subsection 17(b) of the Texas
Constitution: “‘public use’ does not include the taking of property under subsection (a) of this
section for transfer to a private entity for the primary purpose of economic development or
enhancement of tax revenues.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(b). There is little caselaw respecting this
provision. In one case, however, a colorable argument was made that a requirement that a
generator return money to a counterparty to undo economic harm would constitute a transfer to a
private entity for economic-development purposes. See Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury
Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 195 (Tex. 2012) (“The overarching constitutional rule
controls: no taking of property for private use.”).
That case has limited applicability, however, because of the antecedent issue—whether the
generators’ right to the proceeds from the energy sales is sufficiently vested to constitute
“property” within the meaning of the Takings Clause. See City of Austin v. Whittington, 384
S.W.3d 766, 790 (Tex. 2012) (“[V]ested rights . . . are property rights that the Constitution protects
like any other property.”).
It is likely that they are not.
“A ‘vested right’ implies an
immediate right or entitlement—it is not an expectation or a contingency. When the authority
granting the right has the power and discretion to take that right away – as the Commission does,
per the authorities cited above, it cannot be said to be a vested right. “Engrained in the concept of
vested rights is the idea of certainty. When a lawmaking power can declare that a right does not
exist, the right is not ‘fixed or vested.’” Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co.,
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798 S.W.2d 580, 589 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied). The rights here are not
vested. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
For similar reasons, a price correction would not be the kind of retroactive law prohibited
by article 1, section 16 of the Texas Constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. I § 16. That is because
“[t]he constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws” only “protects settled expectations.”
Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126, 145 (Tex. 2010). Thus, if generators were
aware prices were subject to future modification, the generators cannot be said to have a settled
expectation in those prices. Cf. id. at 140 (noting “that permit holders could reasonably expect
enforcement of the conditions inherently attached to their permit, and that a permit included no
right to be forever free of a remedy to enforce those conditions” (quotation marks omitted)).
Additionally, and irrespective of the settled nature of the generators’ expectations, “[a] valid
exercise of the police power by the Legislature to safeguard the public safety and welfare can
prevail over a finding that a law is unconstitutionally retroactive.” Id. at 144. That includes
instances where the retroactive legislation contained legislative findings that the law was “vital to
the general economy and welfare of this state.” Id. at 144–45.
ERCOT has thirty days to alter prices (after notifying market participants) if they are in
need of a correction. See ERCOT Protocol 6.3(6). To the extent that ERCOT’s thirty-two-hour
long mis-pricing violated Commission rules or ERCOT protocols, language within the ERCOT
Protocols appears to allow certain violations to be corrected within the thirty-day window (and
possibly in some cases even after the thirty-day window has expired under the ERCOT Protocols),
accompanied by a good-cause exception to the surge pricing caps. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 25.3(b). In other words, until at least the close of the thirty-day window, the Commission and
ERCOT retain the power to alter prices. Until that window closes, there is only an expectation of
receiving the full cleared price, not a settled expectation or immediate entitlement.
Federal government (through FERC) Does Not Have Rate-setting Jurisdiction over
the Texas ERCOT Market
Finally, as subsection 39.151(d) prevents the Commission from implementing an action
contrary to applicable federal law or rule, we are not aware of any federal requirements that would
prevent the Commission from correcting prices under the Commission’s rate-setting jurisdiction.
The federal government has historically maintained that Texas’s operation of the wholly-intrastate
ERCOT power region is not overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) –
except for reliability issues and other limited areas that do not apply here. Specifically, through
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (“EPA”), FERC does not exercise jurisdiction as to rate-setting in
the ERCOT region and effectively concedes jurisdiction over rate-setting to the Commission.11
The EPA (and corresponding regulations) expressly provide that:
any order…. requiring provision of transmission services in whole
or in part within ERCOT shall provide that any ERCOT utility
which is not a public utility and the transmission facilities of which
11See Fleisher, Jared, ERCOT’s Jurisdictional Status: A Legal History and Contemporary Appraisal, 3 TEX.
J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 4 (describing the history of federal jurisdiction over the Texas electricity market).
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are actually used for such transmission service is entitled to receive
compensation based, insofar as practicable and consistent with
subsection (a), on the transmission ratemaking methodology used
by the Public Utility Commission of Texas.
16 U.S.C § 824k(k)(1).
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S U M M A R Y
The Utilities Code gives “complete authority” to the Public
Utility Commission to adopt and enforce rules relating to reliability
and accounting for the production and delivery of electricity among
market participants.
Specifically, subsection 39.151(d) of the
Utilities Code authorizes the Public Utility Commission to oversee
and investigate the independent organization (ERCOT) as necessary
to ensure ERCOT’s accountability and to ensure that it adequately
performs its functions and duties. Within the regulatory timelines,
ERCOT can also revise pricing on the wholesale electricity market
if certain events occur.
Under the plain language of subsection 39.151(d), the Public
Utility Commission has complete authority to act to ensure that
ERCOT has accurately accounted for electricity production and
delivery among market participants in the region. Such authority
likely could be interpreted to allow the Public Utility Commission
to order ERCOT to correct prices for wholesale electricity and
ancillary services during a specific timeframe.
A court would likely find that such corrective action by the
Public Utility Commission under subsection 39.151(d) does not
raise constitutional concerns, namely under article 1, sections 16 and
17 of the Texas Constitution, provided that such regulatory action
furthers a compelling public interest.
Very truly yours,
K E N P A X T O N
Attorney General of Texas
BRENT E. WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General
LESLEY FRENCH
Chief of Staff
MURTAZA F. SUTARWALLA
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
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VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER
Chair, Opinion Committee
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.