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Attorney General Opinion KP-0361
Issued September 24, 2020 · request RQ0380KP
Re: Whether article III, section 53 of the Texas Constitution prohibits a one-time bonus for the administrative staff of the county’s justices of the peace
Cites: CN §3.53
The Attorney General's page · official PDF
KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
March 5, 2021
Ms. Jennifer D. Robison, CPA
Brown County Auditor
200 South Broadway
Brownwood, Texas 76801
Opinion No. KP-0361
Re: Whether article III, section 53 of the Texas Constitution prohibits a one-time bonus
for the administrative staff of the county’s justices of the peace (RQ-0380-KP)
Dear Ms. Robison:
You ask whether article III, section 53 of the Texas Constitution prohibits the payment of
a one-time bonus for the administrative staff of the county’s justices of the peace.1 According to
documents submitted with your letter, the four justices of the peace for Brown County proposed
“a special, one-time $1,000 payment to each of the three clerks” who serve the justice courts, to
be paid out of the justice court technology fund. Attachment (Justice of the Peace statement) at 2.
In their approval request to the commissioners court, the justices of the peace stated that the
coronavirus pandemic caused an increased workload for the clerks due to the need for rescheduling
of proceedings and “expand[ing] their knowledge base to accommodate video hearings and
telephonic appearances of participants.” Attachment (Justice of the Peace statement) at 1. The
justices added that the clerks had “gone above and beyond, to maintain the schedules for all four
courts” and that the clerks also worked some Saturdays on their own initiative to keep up with the
workload. Id. You question whether article III, section 53 of the Texas Constitution prohibits this
payment. Request Letter at 1. Whether a particular payment is constitutional under article III,
section 53 involves factual determinations and cannot be resolved as a matter of law in an attorney
general opinion, but we can provide general advice on article III, section 53. See Tex. Att’y Gen.
Op. No. KP-0315 (2020) at 2.
Article III, section 53 of the Texas Constitution, in relevant part, prohibits the Legislature
from authorizing a county “to grant . . . any extra compensation, fee or allowance to a public
officer, agent, servant or contractor, after service has been rendered.” TEX. CONST. art. III, § 53.
The provision is intended to prevent counties “from freely giving away public moneys for services
previously rendered or for which no valid legal authorization existed and for which the public
1See Letter from Ms. Jennifer D. Robison, Brown Cnty. Auditor, to Honorable Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen. at 1
(Sept. 14, 2020), https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/rq/2020/pdf/RQ0380KP.pdf
(“Request Letter”), and Attachments (on file with the Op. Comm.) (“Attachments”).
Ms. Jennifer D. Robison, CPA - Page 2
would receive no return.” Lee v. El Paso Cnty., 965 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998,
pet. denied). The provision does not necessarily prohibit “any compensation” for services
provided but instead concerns “granting extra compensation.” City of Denton v. Rushing, 521
S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017) (emphasis omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 570
S.W.3d 708, 709 (Tex. 2019). The distinction, as a court explained, is that payment for services
outside the work contracted for “is not . . . extra compensation because the City [has] not already
paid” for those services. Id. at 97; see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0315 (2020) at 2
(explaining that the prohibition potentially arises when performance is already required by an
existing employment arrangement). Thus, whether the one-time bonus at issue triggers analysis
under this constitutional prohibition depends on whether the services rendered come within the
scope of the original employment contract or arrangement such that the payment constitutes “extra
compensation.”
To the extent the bonus constitutes extra compensation, article III, section 53 prohibits the
county from granting it to a public servant “after service has been rendered.” TEX. CONST. art. III,
§ 53. As this office previously concluded, “an increase in benefits approved after the work has
been performed may not be applied retroactively to work that has already been performed.” Tex.
Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0123 (1999) at 2; see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0376 (concluding
that a one-time salary bonus to court personnel for work already done would violate article III,
section 53 but that a prospective increase in compensation or benefits would not).
The
commissioners court could, however, approve a bonus plan that ties compensation to performance
for services rendered after the approval of the plan.2 See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0368 (2005)
at 2.
2You ask only about the constitutionality of granting a one-time bonus payment as requested by the justices
of the peace and not about their proposal to utilize funds from the justice court technology fund pursuant to recent
legislative amendments. See Request Letter at 1; Attachment (Justice of the Peace statement) at 1 (referencing Senate
Bill 1840, but not Senate Bill 346, from the 86th legislative session). “[I]f amendments to the same statute are enacted
at the same session of the legislature, one amendment without reference to another, the amendments shall be
harmonized, if possible, so that effect may be given to each. If the amendments are irreconcilable, the latest in date
of enactment prevails.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.025(b). “[T]he date of enactment is the date on which the last
legislative vote is taken on the bill enacting the statute.” Id. § 311.025(d).
Ms. Jennifer D. Robison, CPA - Page 3
S U M M A R Y
To
the
extent
one-time
bonuses
constitute
extra
compensation for certain work performed by justice court clerks,
article III, section 53 of the Texas Constitution prohibits the
payment of the bonuses retroactively. A prospective bonus
approved prior to the rendering of services would not run afoul of
article III, section 53.
Very truly yours,
K E N P A X T O N
Attorney General of Texas
BRENT E. WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General
LESLEY FRENCH
Chief of Staff
MURTAZA F. SUTARWALLA
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER
Chair, Opinion Committee
BECKY P. CASARES
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.