Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion KP-0308
Issued April 24, 2020 · request RQ0352KP
Re: Whether a local governmental entity under an emergency declaration has the authority to prevent an owner of a second home from occupying that property or limiting occupancy of housing based on length of the occupancy’s term
Cites: GV §418.001, GV §418.261, GV §418.108, GV §418.004, HS §81.082, CN §1.19, CN §4.2
The Attorney General's page · official PDF
May 8, 2020
The Honorable Dade Phelan
Chair, Committee on State Affairs
Texas House of Representatives
Post Office Box 2910
Austin, Texas 78768-2910
Opinion No. KP-0308
Re:
Whether a local governmental entity under an emergency declaration has the
authority to prevent an owner of a second home from occupying that property or limiting
occupancy of housing based on length of the occupancy’s term (RQ-0352-KP)
Dear Representative Phelan:
You ask two questions related to local governmental entities’ authority to regulate
occupancy during emergency declarations.1 Certain provisions within the Government Code
provide governmental entities with additional authority during times of disaster to address
emergency situations. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 418.001–.261. Related to your question, the
Legislature authorized the presiding officer of a governing body of a municipality or county to
declare a local state of disaster. Id. § 418.108(a); see id. § 418.004(6). Once a local state of
disaster has been declared, the “county judge or the mayor of a municipality may control ingress
to and egress from a disaster area under the jurisdiction and authority of the county judge or mayor
and control the movement of persons and the occupancy of premises in that area.”
Id.
§ 418.108(g). They may also “order the evacuation of all or part of the population from a stricken
or threatened area under the jurisdiction and authority of the county judge or mayor if the county
judge or mayor considers the action necessary for the preservation of life or other disaster
mitigation, response, or recovery.” Id. § 418.108(f). In addition to these general emergency
powers, chapter 81 of the Health and Safety Code authorizes local health authorities to impose
temporary communicable disease control measures, including, among other actions, restriction,
isolation, and quarantine. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.082(a)–(b), (f).
Claiming authority under these emergency powers, some counties and municipalities in
Texas have declared local disasters due to the spread of the disease COVID-19 and issued orders
1See Letter from Honorable Dade Phelan, Chair, House Comm. on State Affairs, to Honorable Ken Paxton,
Tex. Att’y Gen. at 1 (rec’d Apr. 24, 2020) (“Request Letter”), https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/
opinions/51paxton/rq/2020/pdf/RQ0352KP.pdf.
The Honorable Dade Phelan - Page 2
restricting the occupancy of certain residential properties. While you do not ask about any specific
local order, your questions address the extent of local authority in this regard during a declared
disaster. In particular, you ask whether a local governmental entity operating under an emergency
declaration may “prevent an owner of a second home from occupying their property” or “limit
occupancy of housing based on length of the occupancy’s term.” Request Letter at 1.
Your first question involves fundamental rights protected by the United States and Texas
Constitutions. “Private property ownership is a fundamental right in the United States.” Hearts
Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. 2012). The “right of property”
includes the “right to use and enjoy” the property “in a lawful manner and for a lawful purpose.”
Id. at 476. And the right “to lease property is a fundamental privilege of property ownership.” See
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215 (1923) (noting that “essential attributes of property”
include “the right to use, lease and dispose of it for lawful purposes”); see also Zaatari v. City of
Austin, No. 03-17-00812-CV, 2019 WL 6336186, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 27, 2019, no
pet.) (holding city ordinance banning short-term rentals of single-family residences not owner
occupied was unconstitutional infringement on property rights).
The Texas Constitution provides: “No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty,
property, privileges or immunities . . . except by the due course of the law of the land.” TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 19. Similarly, the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States,” U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, and “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” id. amend. XIV, § 1.2 These provisions
ensure that both Texans and residents of other states can equally use and enjoy property for lawful
purposes; they further protect property owners against arbitrary interference by the government.3
See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (recognizing federal Privileges and Immunities
Clause prohibits discriminating legislation against non-residents, gives non-residents free ingress
into and egress from other States, and ensures non-residents are treated equally under the law
among State residents, including when acquiring or using property (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869))); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977)
(noting Texas due-course clause requires both procedural and substantive due course). When a
governmental entity infringes upon a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause,
courts will “examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the
extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.” Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 71 (1981).
2While the Texas and federal Constitutions differ in that Texas refers to “due course” rather than “due
process,” Texas courts regard these terms as without substantive distinction unless and until a party demonstrates
otherwise. See University of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995) (citing Mellinger
v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S.W. 249, 252–53 (1887)).
3In addition to due process concerns, a local order restricting occupancy only for owners of second homes or
property owners utilizing their homes for short-term rentals raises significant Equal Protection concerns. However,
such questions are currently the subject of pending litigation and are therefore not appropriate for the opinion process.
See Bryan v. Cano, No. 4:20-cv-00025-DC-DF (W.D. Tex. filed Apr. 10, 2020); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No.
KP-0118 (2016) at 2 (declining to opinion on a question subject to pending litigation).
The Honorable Dade Phelan - Page 3
Here, both the Texas and United States Constitutions prohibit government action that
unlawfully discriminates on the basis of residence. Yet government action may prevent a property
owner from occupying property so long as that restriction has some real or “substantial relation”
to the exercise of the State’s police power and is not “beyond all question, a plain, palpable
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 784 (5th Cir.
2020) (quotation marks omitted) (recognizing state authority to implement emergency measures
during a public health disaster only if those “measures have at least some ‘real or substantial
relation’ to the public health crisis and are not ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of
rights secured by the fundamental law’” (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31
(1905))); Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (Tex. 1921) (requiring preservation of public
health, safety, comfort, or welfare to be “the real object and purpose” of government action
depriving a person of property, lest such action be “a clear and direct invasion of the right of
property”). Thus, limited circumstances may exist that create a state interest sufficient to warrant
restricting occupancy of private property due to a disaster, or property owners’ ability to lease their
property to another. Whether a certain regulation violates due process is a question that a court
must decide after determining the relevant facts. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0526 (2007) at 6.
However, in addition to due process concerns, the Governor’s Executive Orders issued
pursuant to the COVID-19 disaster declaration are relevant to addressing your questions. The
Governor declared a state of disaster in Texas due to COVID-19 on March 13, 2020.4 The
Legislature authorized the Governor, upon declaring a disaster, “to issue executive orders,
proclamations, and regulations and amend or rescind them.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 418.012. The
Governor’s executive orders, proclamations, and regulations have the force and effect of law. Id.
Pursuant to that authority, the Governor has issued multiple executive orders, proclamations, and
other statements, relating to the COVID-19 disaster declaration, including Executive Order GA
21,5 which addresses the provision of essential and reopened services.
Executive Order GA-21 provides that it supersedes “any conflicting order issued by local
officials in response to the COVID-19 disaster, but only to the extent that such a local order
restricts essential services or reopened services allowed by this executive order . . .”. Exec. Order
GA-21 at 6. Executive Order GA-21 adopts as essential “everything listed by the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) in its Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce.”
Id. at 3. That DHS Guidance includes as essential “residential/shelter facilities and services,”
which encompasses the “the leasing of residential properties to provide individuals and families
with ready access to available housing.”6
4See Governor of the State of Texas, Disaster Proclamation (Mar. 13, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/
files/press/DISASTER_covid19_disaster_proclamation_IMAGE_03-13-2020.pdf.
The Governor extended the
disaster declaration on April 12, 2020.
See Governor of the State of Texas, Disaster Proclamation (Apr. 12, 2020),
https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-extends-disaster-declaration-for-covid-192.
5Exec. Order GA-21 (May 5, 2020), https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/govdocs/Greg%20Abbott/2020/GA-21.pdf.
6U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Advisory Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure
Workers During COVID-19 Response (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Version_3.0_
CISA_Guidance_on_Essential_Critical_Infrastructure_Workers_4.pdf.
The Honorable Dade Phelan - Page 4
To the extent a local order restricts essential services allowed by Executive Order GA-21,
the Governor’s executive order supersedes those restrictions. Exec. Order GA-21 at 6. Thus,
Executive Order GA-21 prohibits a local governmental entity, acting under the authority of its
emergency powers, from issuing an order that limits occupancy of housing based on length of the
occupancy’s term.
The Honorable Dade Phelan - Page 5
S U M M A R Y
The Texas and United States Constitutions prohibit
government action that unlawfully discriminates on the basis of
residence. They also ensure citizens receive due process and that
the government does not act arbitrarily. To the extent a local
ordinance restricting access to or limiting occupancy of private
property exceeds these boundaries, it is unconstitutional.
In addition, the Governor declared a state of disaster in
Texas due to COVID-19 on March 13, 2020 and issued executive
orders related to the provision of essential services. Executive Order
GA-21 supersedes any conflicting order issued by local officials in
response to the COVID-19 disaster to the extent that such a local
order restricts essential services, such as obtaining residential
housing. GA-21 therefore prohibits a local governmental entity,
acting under the authority of its emergency powers, from issuing an
order that limits occupancy of housing based on length of the
occupancy’s term.
Very truly yours,
K E N P A X T O N
Attorney General of Texas
JEFFREY C. MATEER
First Assistant Attorney General
RYAN L. BANGERT
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
RYAN M. VASSAR
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER
Chair, Opinion Committee
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.