Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion KP-0291
Issued September 09, 2019 · request RQ0304KP
Re: Whether a school district may purchase real property outside its boundaries for the purpose of constructing and operating a school
Cites: ED §11.167, ED §174.205, ED §6.051, ED §8150.110, ED §11.151, CN §7.3, ED §45.00l, ED §45.105
The Attorney General's page · official PDF
KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
The Honorable Isidro R. Alaniz
49th Judicial District Attorney
Post Office Box 1343
Laredo, Texas 78042
The Honorable Marco A. Montemayor
Webb County Attorney
1110 Washington Street, Suite 301
Laredo, Texas 78040
·Dear Mr. Alaniz and Mr. Montemayor:
March 9, 2020
Opinion No. KP-0291
Re: Whether a school district may purchase
real property outside its boundaries for the
purpose of constructing and operating a school
(RQ-0304-KP)
In this consolidated response, we address the question each of you asked regarding whether
the Laredo Independent School District (the "District") may purchase land outside of its
boundaries for the purpose of building and operating a middle school. 1 As you explain, the District
determined that the current campus and facilities of Cigarroa Middle School are "no longer suitable
or able to handle the present needs of its students," but the District is unable to locate suitable
property for building a replacement campus within its boundaries. Alaniz Letter at 12. The District
did locate land suitable for a middle school campus for sale just outside its geographic territory
within the boundaries of a neighboring school district. Id at 2; see also Montemayor Letter at 2.
While state law permits a district to "operate a school or program, including an extracurricula~
program, or hold a class outside the boundaries of the district," you question whether this
authorization encompasses the acquisition of land and the construction of a school campus outside
district boundaries. TEX. EDUC. CODE§ 11.167; see also Alaniz Letter at 2; Montemayor Letter at
2.
Independent school districts "possess only· such powers and privileges as have been
expressly or impliedly conferred upon them." Wasson Interests, Ltd v. City of Jacksonville, 489
S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tex. 2016). The primary objective in construing statutes that confer such
authority "is to give effect to the Legislature's intent," for which a "statute's plain language is the
· most reliable guide." Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019). Courts also
consider a statute as a whole, and "should not give one provision a meaning out of harmony or
1See Letter from
Honorable Isidro
R.
Alaniz, Dist.
Att'y, Webb & Zapata Ctys., 49th
Jud. Dist., to Honorable Ken Paxton, Tex. Att'y Gen. at I (Aug. 30, 2019) ("Alaniz Letter"); and Letter from
Honorable Marco Montemayor, Webb Cty. Att'y, to Honorable Ken Paxton, Tex. Att'y Gen. at I (Sept. 9, 2019)
("Montemayor Letter"), https://www2.texasattomeygeneral.gov/opinion/requests-for-opinion-rqs.
The Honorable Isidro R. Alaniz
The Honorable Marco A. Montemayor
Page 2
inconsistent with other provisions, although it might be susceptible to such a construction standing
alone." Lira v. Greater Haus. German Shepard Dog Rescue, Inc., 488 S.W.3d 300, 304 (Tex.
2016).
Section 11.167 of the Education Code authorizes a district to "operate" a school outside of
its boundaries. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.167. The Education Code does not define the word
"operate." Courts generally give statutorily undefined terms their ordinary and common meaning,
for which courts may consider dictionary definitions, judicial constructions, and other statutory
definitions. Colo.· Cty. v. Staff, 510 S.W.3d 435, 448 (Tex. 2017). The word "operate" means to
"manage and run" or to be "managed and run in a specified way." NEW OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY 1229 (3d ed. 2010); see also Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 427 S.W.3d 547,
551 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (adopting dictionary definition of "operate" in the
context of an airport).
In other contexts, the Legislature expressly authorized various
governmental bodies both to acquire land and to construct and operate certain properties on the
land. See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE§ 174.205(a) (granting a commuter rail district the authority
to "purchase any interest in real property to acquire, construct, or operate a commuter rail facility
(emphasis added)); TEX. TAX CODE§ 6.051(a) (authorizing an appraisal district to "purchase or
lease real property and . . . construct improvements as necessary to establish and operate the
appraisal office or a branch appraisal office" (emphasis added)); TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE
§ 8150.110 ( a) (permitting an imperial redevelopment district to "construct ... operate, maintain,
[or] acquire real property interests for ... a sports and community venue facility (emphasis added)).
In contrast, the Legislature's limited use of the word "operate" with reference to a school district
in section 11.167 suggests that it means something separate from the acquisition of real estate for,
or the construction of, a building. We assume the Legislature's choice of words was intentional,
and we do not read additional language into the statute. See FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of
Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 884-85 (Tex. 2000) (relying on the principle of statutory construction that
the Legislature knows how to enact laws effectuating its intent); Silguero, 579 S.W.3d at 59 (a
court "may not impose its own judicial meaning on a statute by adding words not contained in the
statute's language"); In re HS., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018) (stating that when analyzing
statutes, courts "accept[] that lawmaker-authors chose their words carefully, both in what they
included and in what they excluded"). Thus, a court would likely conclude that section 11.167
does not expressly permit a school district to purchase land outside of its boundaries for the purpose
of building and operating a middle school.
This construction is supported by a school district's general authority to acquire real
property for the purpose of constructing schools. Subsection 1 l.151(a) of the Education Code
authorizes school trustees "in the name of the district [to] acquire and hold real ... property." TEX.
EDUC. CODE § 11.151 ( a). On its face, this provision does not limit the acquisition ofland to real
property located in the district. However, article VII, section 3 of the Texas Constitution permits
the Legislature to "authorize an additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all
school districts for the further maintenance of public free schools, and for the erection and
equipment of school buildings therein."
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, section 45.002 authorizes an independent school district to "levy, assess, and collect
annual ad valorem taxes for the further maintenance of public schools in the district." TEX. EDUC.
The Honorable Isidro R. Alaniz
The Honorable Marco A. Montemayor
Page 3
CODE§ 45.002 (emphasis added); but see id. § 45.105(c) (providing that local school funds from
district taxes and other specified sources may be used for various purposes, including "buying
school sites, buying, building, repairing, and renting school buildings, including acquiring school
buildings and sites by leasing through annual payments with an ultimate option to purchase"
without reference to their location). Similarly, section 45.001 of the Education Code authorizes
school districts to "issue bonds for ... the construction, acquisition, and equipment of school
buildings in the district" and "the purchase of the necessary sites for school buildings." Id.
§ 45.00l(a)(l)(A), (C) (emphasis added). The constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing
the construction and maintenance of school buildings generally contemplate that such buildings
would be located on land within the boundaries of the school district.
Briefing submitted in response to this request argues that section 11.167 implies authority
for an independent school district to buy land and construct a school outside of its geographic
boundaries.2 School districts have implied authority to perform acts reasonably necessary to carry
out their expressly-granted duties. Geffert v. Yorktown lndep. Sch. Dist., 290 S.W. 1083, 1084
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1927); see also Thompson v. Elmo lndep. Sch. Dist., 269 S.W. 868,870 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1925, no writ) (stating that a school district's implied powers are those "essential"
to its declared objects and purposes, "not simply convenient, but indispensable," and noting that
any doubt as to the power is resolved against it). The expressly-granted authority in section 11.167
is to "operate a school or program, including an extracurricular program, or hold a class outside
the boundaries of the district." TEX. Eouc. CODE § 11.167. Thus, to find implied power for a
school district to buy land and construct a school outside its boundaries, it must be reasonably
necessary, and not just convenient, for a school district to take those actions in order to operate a
school outside its boundaries.
Trustees of an independent school district "have the exclusive power and duty to govern
and oversee the management of the public schools of the district." Id. § 11.151 (b ). With regard
to the expenditure of local school funds from district taxes and other specified sources, the
Legislature authorized school districts to use such funds for various purposes, including "buying
school sites, buying, building, repairing, and renting school buildings ... , and for other purposes
necessary in the conduct of the public schools determined by the board of trustees." Id. § 45.105(c)
( emphasis added). Taken together, these provisions initially suggest that school district trustees
have the power to determine the actions reasonably necessary in a given fact situation to enable
the conduct of its public schools, whether located inside or outside the district, such that they could
claim an implied power to buy land and construct a school outside its boundaries. However, we
cannot ignore the constitutional and statutory provisions specifying that the expenditure of ad
valorem taxes and bond proceeds are for, among other things, the construction and maintenance
of school buildings "in the district" and the purchase of sites for those buildings.3 See TEX. CONST.
art. VII, § 3(e) (authorizing additional ad valorem taxation "within all school districts ... for the
2See Brief from Mr. Sigifredo Perez, III, Kazen, Meurer & Perez, L.L.P. at 3--4 (Oct. 10, 2019) ( on file with
the Op. Comm.).
3For example, one cannot use bond proceeds to construct a school building "in the district" on land outside
the district. See TEX. EDUC. CODE§ 45.00 I (a)(] )(A).
The Honorable Isidro R. Alaniz
The Honorable Marco A. Montemayor
Page4
erection and equipment of school buildings therein" (emphasis added)); TEX. EDUC. CODE
§§ 45.00l(a)(l)(A), (C) (authorizing bonds for "the construction, acquisition, and equipment of
school buildings in the district" and "the purchase of the necessary sites for school buildings"
(emphasis added)), 45.002 (authorizing ad valorem taxation for "maintenance of public schools in
the district" (emphasis added)). Given this language, we cannot predict with certainty whether a
court would conclude that section 11.167 implies the power to purchase real property outside the
district for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a school there.
What is certain is that the Legislature obligates school district trustees to "seek to establish
working relationships with other public entities to make effective use of community resources and
to serve the needs of public school students in the community." TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.1511 (b )( 1 ).
Two avenues in the Education Code exist to potentially manifest a change in school boundaries,
such that the purchase ofland and construction of the new school in question would be authorized:
one by agreement of two contiguous school districts pursuant to section 13 .231, and the other by
petition requesting detachment and annexation of territory contiguous to a school district pursuant
to section 13.051. See generally id§§ 13.231, .051. First, section 13.231 allows two contiguous
school districts to
adjust their common boundary by agreement if, at the time the
agreement is executed: (1) no child who resides in the territory that
is transferred from one jurisdiction to the other is enrolled in a
school of the district from which the territory is transferred; and (2)
the taxable value of the territory that is transferred from one
jurisdiction to the other does not exceed one-tenth of one percent of
the total taxable value of all property in the school district from
which the territory is transferred.
Id § 13.231(a). Second, section 13.051 allows a majority of registered voters residing in the
territory to be detached and annexed, or the surface owners of that property ifthere are no residents,
to request detachment from one school district to another one that is contiguous to the territory if
certain conditions are met. See id § 13.05l(a)-G) (addressing administrative requirements,
limitations based on the total taxable value of the territory and the reduction in the tax base of the
school district from which territory is _detached, geographic limitations, and dual district approval,
among other provisions). If one of the affected school districts disapproves the petition, it may be
appealed to the commissioner of education. See id § 13.051G). "In deciding the appeal, the
commissioner shall consider the educational interests of the students in the affected territory and
the affected districts and the social, economic, and educational effects of the proposed boundary
change." Id.
The Honorable Isidro R. Alaniz
The Honorable Marco A. Montemayor
Page 5
SUMMARY
A court would likely conclude that section 11.167 of the
Education Code does not expressly permit a school district to
purchase land outside of its boundaries for the purpose of building
and operating a middle school.
Given the constitutional and
statutory language referencing the construction and maintenance of
public school buildings "in the district," we cannot predict with
certainty whether a court would conclude that section 11.167
implies the power to do so.
JEFFREY C. MA TEER
First Assistant Attorney General
RY AN L. BANGERT
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER-
Chair, Opinion Committee
BECKY P. CASARES
Very truly yours,
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.