Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion JM-1256
Issued December 11, 1990
Re: Imposition of fees on motor fuels under House Bill 504, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1033, at 4156
Cites: TX §9, TX §153.006, TX §153.007, TX §1, TX §2, TX §3, TX §4, TX §and
The Attorney General's page · official PDF
.
,
December
11, 1990
Honorable
Bob Bullock
Comptroller
of public
opinion
No.
JM-1256
Accounts
L.B.J. Building
Austin,
Texas
78774
Re: Imposition
of fees on motor
fuels
under
House
Bill
504,
Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1033,
at 4156
(RQ-1904)
Dear Mr. Bullock:
You ask
about the
proper construction
of House
Bill
504, which was enacted by
the 71st Legislature
and
9
overns
the sale of certain mixtures
of gasoline
and alcohol.
The
bill requires
that the comptroller
administer
and enforce
a
program
of
labelling
pumps
through which
fuel
containing
ethanol
or methanol
is sold.
You appear to
ask whether
the imposition
of the
fee
authorized
by subsection
(c) of
section 9 of article
8614,
V.T.C.S.,
may reach only dealers that deliver
or sell
motor
fuels containing
ethanol
or methanol
or whether
it may reach
all dealers
that deliver
or sell motor fuels, regardless
of
whether
those fuels contain
ethanol
or methanol.
However,
because
both subsections
(b) and (c) of section
9
authorize
the imposition
of fees, we will address both subsections.
We conclude
that a fee authorized
by subsection
(b)
of
section
9 of the act may reach all persons
required
to
hold
a permit as a distributor
of motor fuels under chapter
153
of the Tax Code for
whom services
are performed
under
that
subsection.
We
further conclude
that the
additional
fee
authorized
by subsection
(c) oft section
9 of
the act
may
reach only those
dealers who
deliver
or
sell motor
fuels
containing
ethanol
or
methanol
in the
amount specified
in
the article.
1.
Codified
as article
8614, V.T.C.S.
p. 6692
Honorable
Bob Bullock
- Page 2
(JM-1256)
Section
9 of article
8614, V.T.C.S.,
the section
with
which you are concerned,
provides
the following:
(a)
The comptroller
may
adopt rules
not
inconsistent
with this Act for the regulation
of the sale of motor fuels containing
ethanol
and methanol.
(b)
The cq(@troller
bv rule
mav
imnose
fees for
testina.
insoection.
statement
or
record
forms,
sale
of
sians.
or
the
performance
of OthgE-Services
nrovided
in t&
stration
of this Act.
(c)
Jn add&ion
to the fees authorized
by
Subsection
(b)
of
this section
troller
bv
rule
may
impose
a'
the
comp-
fee
to
be
collected-on
a
periodic
basis determined
by
the
comptroller
from
each
distributor,
supplier,
wholesaler,
and jobber who deals in
a motor fuel subiect to reaulation
under this
&g.
The comptroller
by rule shall prescribe
the form for reporting
and remitting
the fees
imposed by and under this section.
(d)
The fees' and
penalties
imposed
by
this Act or by a rule of the comptroller
made
pursuant
to this Act shall be subject to
the
provisions
of
Chapter
111
and
Sections
153.006,
153.007,
and
153.401,
Tax
Code,
except to the
extent those
sections
are
in
conflict
with this Act.
(e)
The total
amount of
fees
collected
pnder this Act
mav not exceed
the costs
of
mnisterina
and enforcina
the orovisions
of
this Act.
(f)
Th
fees collected
under this section
mv
be use: onlv
for the a&&nistration
and
enforcement
of
this Act
bv the
comntroller
and shall be
deoosited
in the
C
Dt
ller's
Ooeratina
Fund 062.
(Emphasis adEd.;
We turn first to subsection
(b).
There can be no doubt
that the fee authorized
by subsection
(b)
of
section
9
of
the act reaches every person required
to hold a permit as
a
distributor
of motor fuels under chapter
153 of the Tax Code
P. 6693
Honorable
Bob Bullock
- Page 3
(JM-1256)
for whom
services
are
performed
under
that
subsection,
regardless
of
whether
the
fuel thus
distributed
contains
ethanol
or
methanol.
Sections
1 and
2 of
article
8614,
V.T.C.S.,
taken
together,
confer
explicit
authority
on
certain
specified
public officers~ or their authorized
agents
to test 5~y motor fuel sold in the state.
Section
2 of
the
act provides:
In order to determine
compliance
with
the
standards
and
for the
enforcement
of
rules
adopted under Sections
3, 4, and
5 of
this
Act, the comptroller
of public accounts
or an
authorized
representative
of the comptroller,
any law enforcement
officer
at the
direction
of
a
prosecuting
attorney,
or the
attorney
genera.1 may test anv motor fuel sold in
this
state, with or without
a complaint
about
the
fuel.
(Emphasis
added.)
Subsection
(2)
of
section
1
of
the
act
provides:
"\Motor
fuel' has
the meaning
given that
term by
Section
153.001(17),
Tax Code."2
That subsection
of
the Tax
Code
provides:
"'Motor
fuel*
includes
gasoline,
diesel
fuel,
liquified
gas,
and
other
products
that
are
usable
as
propellants
of a motor vehicle."
Thus, since every licensed
distributor
is subject to
testing,
inspection,
a,
every
licensed
distributor
may
be subject to
the subsection
0)
fee, regardless
of whether
the motor
fuel so
distributed
contains
ethanol
or methanol.
However,
imposition
of a
fee
under subsection
(b)
is limited to
those distributors
for
whom services
are performed
under that subsection.
We turn now
to subsection
(c).
Three arguments
have
been
adduced
in
support
of
the
construction
that
the
subsection
9(c)
fee reaches
all
dealers
of
motor
fuels,
regardless
of
whether
those
fuels
contain
ethanol
or
methanol.
We find none of the arguments
convincing,
First, it is emphasized
that the underscored
phrase
of
subsection
(c) of section 9 permits
a fee to be imposed upon
"each distributor,
supplier,
wholesaler,
_
and
jobber
who
2.
Section
153.001
was
amended
during
the
71st
Legislature:
subsection
(17) was renumbered
subsection
(16).
Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 168, 5 2, at 550.
p. 6694
Honorable
Bob Bullock
- Page 4
(JM-1256)
deals in a motor fuel gubiect
to reoulatio
under this Act."
(Emphasis
added.)
It is
argued that
al? dealers
of
all
motor fuels are "regulated"
under the act, because
the motor
fuel
of
all
distributors,
suppliers,
wholesalers,
and
jobbers
is subject to
testing under section
2.
Therefore,
it is argued,
the act by its terms permits
the imposition
of
the subsection
9(c)
fee on
&&
distributors,
suppliers,
wholesalers,
and
jobbers
of
motor
fuels.
At
issue
is
whether
such
persons
are
"regulated*@
under the
act.
We
agree that all dealers
of motor fuel are subject
to testing:
we do not agree that
that factor, standing
alone,
supports
the assertion
that
all motor fuel
dealers
are "subject
to
regulation"
under the act.
Generally,
the term Vegulate"
has been defined
to mean
I.
to fix, establish
or control;
to adjust
by
rule method or established
mode; to direct by
rule or restriction:
to subject to
governing
principles
or laws.
;
nv
U
Passaic,
308 A.2d ZO, is 63 (N.J. 1973); see also Farmina
of
ton
River Co. v. Town
Plan & Eonina
Comm#n of Farminaton,
197
A.2d 653 (Conn. 1963); Iowa PO er & Liaht Co.
Hiahwav
Comm'n
construe
test&
117
N.W.2d 415
(Iowa
1962):'
Iowa
State
We
do
not
in this
instance
to
comprise
a
part
of
"regulation.@*
Rather,
we
construe
positive
testing
for
ethanol
and
methanol
gasoline
mixtures
to
constitute
a
prerequisite
that must
be met in
order for the
regulatory
provisions
of the act to be triggered.
Even
a
cursory
reading
of
the
act
supports
the
assertion
that VegulationV1
is limited only to those dealers
who sell
motor fuel
containing
ethanol
or methanol.
For
example,
the caption
of House Bill 504 described
the bill as
an act "relating
to the sale of certain mixtures
of gasoline
and alcohol;
providing
penalties."
Section
11 of the
act,
governing
the effective
date of the bill, provides:
This act takes
effect January
1, 1990,
and
applies
only
to
deliveries
or
sales,
as
applicable,
pf motor fuels containina
ethan 1
pr methanol
that occur on or after that datt.
(Emphasis
added.)
Sections
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the act refer only to those
motor fuel dealers
selling
motor fuel containing
a
certain
P. 6695
Honorable
Bob Bullock
- Page 5
(JM-1256)
specified
mixture
of ethanol or methanol.
Subsection
(a) of
section
9 confers
specific
authority
on the comptroller
to
adopt
rules
not
inconsistent
with
the
act
'for
the
regulation
of the sale of motor fuels containing
ethanol
and
methanol."
And finally,
subsection
(e) of section
4 of
the
act provides:
If the comptroller
determines
that certain
types
of
motor
fuel,
such
as
diesel
or
liquified
petroleum
gas, are not sold in this
state as mixtures
with alcohol
in
sufficient
quantities
to
war]: nt
recrulation
of
those
.
.
delivering
under
&is
Act,
the
comptroller
may limit
the application
of Section
3
of
this Act and this section to motor fuels sold
in sufficient
quantity
to warrant
reaulation.
(Emphasis
added.)
Language
repeatedly
used in a statute will be
presumed
to have
the same
meaning
throughout,
unless
the
context
shows
that
another
meaning
is
intended.
Paddock
v.
Siemoneit,
218 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. 1949); Greenwood
v. Citv
of
El Paso, 186 S.W.Zd 1015 (Tex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1945,
no
writ).
In
every instance
in, the act
in which
the
term
"regulateql or "regulation"
appears,
the term is limited
to
apply only to those dealers
who sell motor
fuel
containing
ethanol
or
methanol
in
the
prescribed
amounts.
The
comptroller
has no authority
to promulgate
rules
governing
the sale of motor fuels m
containing
ethanol
or
methanol:
therefore,
such transactions
are not
Vegulated"
by the act.
Second,
it is argued
that a construction
limiting
the
reach of the subsection 9(c) fee to only those dealers
whose
fuel contains
ethanol
or methanol
would have the effect
of
subverting
the purpose
for which the,act was passed.
It
is
argued that requiring
only
those dealers whose motbr
fuels
contain the requisite
amount of ethanol
or methanol
to
bear
the burden of paying the
subsection
9(c) fee will have
the
effect of creating
such economic
disincentives
that the sale
of gasoline
containing
ethanol
or methanol
would be
dis-
couraged. For two reasons,
we disagree.
We are unconvinced
that such a construction would have such an effect.
First, we do not bel,ieve that our interpretation of the
statute vi11 subvert the purpose of the act.
An examination
of the legislative
history of Eouse Bill 504 inr%icates that
the legislature
sought to require that all dealers that sell
motor fuel
containing
a~ specified
amount
of
ethanol
or
-
p. 6696
Honorable
Bob Bullock
- Page 6
(JM-1256)
methanol
must label
pumps dispensing
the
fuel so that
the
mixture will be indicated
to consumers:
in other words,
the
evident purpose
of the bill
is to protect
the consumers
of
motor fuel.
The
"Background
Information10
section
of
the
bill
analysis
for House Bill 504 provides
in relevant
part:
At this
time,
the
State of
Texas
has
no
regulations
irequiring the
labeling
of
motor
fuel pumps
at
service
stations
or
retail
outlets that
dispense
mixtures
of
gasoline
and alcohol.
s
motorist.
therefore,
Gannet determine
if the motor fuel he or
she
3
our ha&no
&tent:
has
a
substantial
alcohol
(Emphasis
added.)
Bill Analysis,
H.B. 504, 71st Leg. (1989).
The "Purpose
of
the Bill" section
of the bill analysis
states:
The purpose
of the bill is to require
dealers
selling a motor fuel mixture
of gasoline
and
alcohol
to
label the
pumps dispensing
this
fuel so that the mixture will be indicated
to
consumers .
(Bmphasis added.)
Lg,
The Y9ection by Section Analysis"
of the bill
analysis
describes
section
2 of the bill in the following
way:
Grants the Comptroller
of Public Accounts
or
an inspector
employed
by the Comptroller
the
authority
to inspect guy
motor fuel sold
in
the state of Texas.
(Emphasis added.)
XL
And second, we
do not agree
that our construction
of
subsection
9(c) will compel a result that disproportionately
burdens
those dealers who sell motor fuel containing
ethanol
or methanol.
The
act, as
it was
introduced,
contained
a
provision
limiting
any fee charged to the actual cost of the
service
to be performed.
Bill Analysis,
H.B. 504, 71st Leg.
(1989).
The
committee
substitute
Version,
inter alia,
deleted
the
provision.
Instead,
section
9
of
the
act
confers
discretion
upon
the comptroller
to allocate
costs
among the several
fees
that he can
impose, subject
to
the
limitation
that the total amount
of fees collected
may
not
exceed the costs
of administering
the
act.
V.T.C.S.
art.
P. 6697
Honorable
Bob Bullock
- Page 7
(JM-1256)
8614, 5 9(e).
We note that an administrative
agency,
though
vested by statute
with discretion
in
its actions,
may
not
exercise
its
powers
in an arbitrary
or capricious
manner,
and the reasonableness
of its orders is subject
to
judicial
review.
m
strial Accident
Bd.
v. O'Dowd,
303 S.W.Zd
763
(Tex. 1957)iUBrown
v. Humble Oil
61 Ref. Co<, 83 S.W.Zd
935
(Tex. 1935).
Finally,
it is argued that letters submitted
by the two
legislators
who
sponsored
the
bill
indicate
legislative
intent that
all
dealers
of motor
fuel,
not
just
those
dealers who
sell fuel
containing
ethanol
or methanol,
be
subject to
the subsection
9(c) fee.
One of
the
letters
states the following:
The words
'subject
to
regulation
under
this Act' were intended
only to exclude motor
fuels such as diesel and Liquified
Petroleum
Gas, which were not sold in combination
with
ethanol
and methanol.
It was the
intention
of the Legislature
to have this fee placed on
all distributors
of
gasoline,
in
order
to
spread the economic
effect of the regulations
across all gasoline
in the market.
Letter from Jim Horn, State Representative,
to Honorable
Bob
Bullock
(Oct. 17, 1989) (discussing
H.B. 504).
For two reasons,
we do not
conclude
that the
letters
are in any way controlling.
First, following
our receipt
of
these letters,
we
examined
the
legislative
history
for
statements
in
the public
record
that would
confirm
that
construction
of subsection
9(c).
Our search was
fruitless.
Neither
the
bill
analysis
nor
the
tapes
of
committee
hearings
contain
any reference
at all to the subsection
9(c)
fee.
Bill Analysis,
H.B. 504, 71st Leg. (1989).
Second,
determination
of legislative
intent
focuses,
not on an individual
legislator,
but on the legislature
as a
whole:
A statute
is an act of the legislature
as
an
organized
body, and expresses
the
collective
will of that body.
No single member can
be
heard to say
what the meaning
of a
statute
is.
It must
speak for and
be construed
by
itself.
p. 6698
Honorable
Bob Bullock - Page 8
(JM-1256)
Commissioners'
Court of
El Paso
C untv v.
El Pa
Sb riff's Denuties
Ass'n
620
S.Wy2d 900
Countv
AP; . - El
Paso 1981, wrii
ref'd n.r.e.).'
902 (EX.
Civ.
Sutherland
sets
forth the following
rule:
"Postpassage
remarks
by
legis-
lators,
however
explicit,
cannot
serve
to
change
the
legislative
intent expressed
prior to an act's passage.."
2A
Sands, Sutherland
Stat.
Const.
5 48.15
(4th
ed.
1984).
Therefore,
we cannot consider
the letters
submitted
by
the
bill's legislative
sponsors.
We conclude
that the fee authorized
by subsection
9(b)
of House Bill
504 reaches
all persons
required
to hold
a
permit as a distributor
of motor fuels under chapter
153
of
the Tax
Code for
whom services
are performed
under
that
subsection.
We further conclude
that the fee authorized
by
subsection
9(k) of House Bill 504 reaches
only those dealers
of motor fuel, as defined
in the act, that contain
ethanol
or methanol
in certain
specified
amounts.
SUMMARY
I
The fee authorized
by subsection
9(b) of
House Bill 504
reaches all persons
required
to hold a
permit as a
distributor
of
motor
fuels under chapter
153
of the Tax Code
for
whom services
are
performed
under that
sub-
section.
The
fee authorized
by
subsection
9(c) of
House Bill
504 reaches
only
those
dealers
of motor fuel, as defined
in the act,
that contain ethanol
or methanol.
Very truly yo
LJ At!cttk
/c;,
JIM
MATTOX
'-
Attorney
General
of Texas
MARYKELLER
First Assistant
Attorney
General
LQU MCCREARY
Executive
Assistant
Attorney
General
p. 6699
.~ ,.
.
Iionorable Bob Bullock - Page 9
(JM-1256)
I
JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant
Attorney
General
RBNEA HICKS
Special Assistant
Attorney
General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman,
Opinion Committee
Prepared
by Jim Moellinger
Assistant
Attorney
General
P- 6700
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