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Attorney General Opinion JM-1202
Re: Inquest procedures San Marcos, Texas 78666 under chapter 49 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
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THE
ATTORXEP
GENERAL
OF
TEXAS
Honorable Charles W. Chapman
Criminal District Attorney
Opinion No. JR-1202
Hays County Courthouse, Suite 208
Re:
Inquest procedures
San Marcos, Texas 78666
under chapter 49 of the
Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure
(RQ-2051)
Dear Mr.
Chapman:
You ask a number
of questions
relative
to inquest
procedures under subchapter A of chapter 49 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
Subchapter A is applicable to deaths in
a county that does not have a medical examiner.
YOU advise
that your
questions
are prompted by the decision
of a
justice of the peace to hold an "inquest hearing"
following
-
an earlier determination at an lVinguest*'
as to the causes of
death.
You ask:
(1)
In the event the Justice of the
Peace has conducted
the inquest and made
a
determination, is that determination
final
with regard
to Articles
49.04 and 49.05?
Can, in other words, there be a hearing after
an inquest has been conducted?
(2)
If the Justice
of the Peace has
made a determination under Article 49.05 and
a subsequent
inquest hearing
is held under
Article 49.14, and a jury's determination
is
different than that of the Justice
of the
Peace, which is the prevailing determination?
Does the hearing jury or another Justice
of
the Peace have the right to amend the finding
of the original Justice of the Peace?
(3)
May the Justice of the Peace who
has made the initial determination be called
as a witness in the subsequent jury hearing
to testify as to her knowledge of the death
scene and the death scene investigation?
P- 6361
Honorable Charles~ W. Chapman - Page 2
(JM-1202)
(4)
If so, may the Justice
of the
Peace then recuse
herself from presiding
to
be a witness
in the 'matter and request
another available
justice of the peace
(in
the same county) to preside over the hearing?
(5)
Since the Justice
of the Peace,
under Article
49.05(3),
can conduct
inquest 'at any other place determined to i:
reasonable by the justice,' may the place
be
located in an adjacent county? What, if any,
are the geographical limitations on the place
for the inquest or inquest hearing?
(6)
Article
49.14(d)
provides
that
the inquest hearing may be public or private.
If it is private,
may the Justice
of the
Peace make it 'selectively private:' that is,
permitting the
family of the deceased
to
observe the hearing, for example, but no one
else other than the jurors, herself, and the
state#s attorney?
You have provided
us with the background
information
that prompted
your questions.
A father, mother, and two
children, a boy and a girl, died in their home during
the
early morning hours of March 4, 1990, in Euda, Hays
County.
Under the circumstances you have related, an lqinguestl' was
required
under
article
49.04 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
The
justice
of the peace
in the precinct
conducted
an ~~inguest** that
resulted
in the
justice
requesting Dr. Robert
Bayardo, Medical
Examiner of Travis
County, to perform autopsies
on the four deceased
persons.
See Code Crim. Proc. art. 49.10.
Following the autopsies,
Dr. Bayardo made findings that the mother and two children
came to their
deaths as the result of gunshot wounds
and
that the father's death was the result of a gunshot
wound,
self-inflicted.
You have
furnished us with
the autopsy
reports that reflect
in detail the procedures employed
in
the examination and the conclusions reached by the medical
examiner.
YOU advise
that the justice
of the peace's
inquest findings correspond with the conclusions reached
in
the autopsy reports.
On March 23, 1990, the justice of the
peace filed death
certificates reflecting
that the mother
and two children died of gunshot wounds.
On March 29, 1990,
the justice filed a death certificate
for the father
that
-.
P. 6362
Honorable Charles W. Chapman - Page 3 (JM-1202)
found the
cause
of
death to
be. gunshot
wounds,
self-inflicted.1
You relate that on April
15, 1990, the remains of the
father and son were removed from the cemetery at the request
of the next of kin of the father. See Health 8 Safety
Code
5 711.004.
Autopsies were performed on their remains by the
Bexar County Medical Examiner,
Dr. Vincent
J. M.
Dimaio.
You have been advised
that Dr. Dimaio concluded
that
it
would be necessary for him to have the benefit of further
evidence before he could reach a decision.
You state that
about June 15, 1990, you were advised by the justice of the
peace that conducted
the **inquest* that she had
set an
"inquest hearing" for June 27, 1990. This hearing has been
continued to an indefinite date. You state that you did not
request the
"inquest hearing," and in the event
such a
hearing is held, you are going to ask for a jury.
You ask whether the justice of the peace may hold
an
l@inguest hearing"
after
findings have been made
as the
result of the ~~inguest.~~
Article 49.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines
P
"inquest@* and "inquest hearing," as follows:
(2)
'Inquest' means an investigation into
the cause and circumstances of the death of a
person, and a determination, made with
or
without a formal court hearing, as to whether
the death was caused by an unlawful act or
omission.
(3) 'Inquest Hearing'
means. a
formal
court hearing held to determine whether
the
death of a person was caused by an unlawful
act or omission and, if the death was
caused
by an unlawful act or omission,
to obtain
evidence to form the basis
of a criminal
prosecution.
1. Attorney General
Opinion H-1064
(1977) concluded
that where it is determined that an erroneous cause of death
is shown in a death certificate, the error may be corrected
in accordance with rule 51a of article 4477, V.T.C.S.,
(now
see Health & Safety Code 5 191.028) by the attachment of an
amending certificate.
p. 6363
Honorable Charles W. Chapman - Page 4 ~(JM-1202)
Article 49.05 requires
that the justice
of the peace
shall conduct
an inquest
immediately
or as soon
as
practicable after the justice of the peace is notified
of
the death.
Article 49.03 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure
states that the powers granted
and duties
imposed on the
justice of the peace are independent
of the powers
and
duties of a law enforcement agency investigating a death.
Under article 49.14 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure
an "inquest
hearing"
may be held under
the
following
circumstances:
(a) A justice of the peace conducting
an
inquest may hold
an inquest hearing if the
justice
determines
that the circumstances
warrant the hearing.
The justice shall hold
an inquest hearing if requested to do so by a
district
attorney
or a criminal
district
attorney who serves the county in which
the
body was found.
Subsection (b) allows an "inquest hearing" to be held with
or without a jury unless the district attorney requests that
the hearing be held with a jury.
We do not construe article
49.14 to provide
for a
hearing to review an earlier
determination as to the cause
of death made at the inquest. We believe the provisions
of
article 49.14 are to be utilized when the justice of the
peace
or the
district
attorney
feel
that there
is
insufficient evidence available to make a determination
as
to the cause of death.
Evidently, the justice of the peace
felt that an article 49.14 hearing
was unnecessary at the
time she made her findings.
The conclusions as to cause
of
death in the four death certificates
is certified
to be
"on the basis
of examination
and/or investigation,
in my
opinion, death occurred at the time, date, and place due to
the cause(s) and manner as stated."
Apparently, you were
satisfied as to completeness of the investigation since
YOU
state that you did not request a hearing.
The Supreme Court of Texas in Boehme v. Sovereian
Camv
Woodmen of the World
84 S.W. 422 (1905) contrasted
an
inquest conducted
und& our statutes with an inquest
at
common law.
The court
stated that, unlike a common
law
coroner's
inquest,
our statutes
provide
no means
for
traversing the finding, "nor is any method whatever
secured
for the correction
of an erroneous
finding."
See
78
A.L.R.Zd 1219 Coroner's ,Inouest. Under
our statutes
an
-,
p. 6364
Honorable Charles W. Chapman - Page 5 (JM-1202)
inquest proceeding does not have to be public.
The hearing
at common law was public.
In refusing to admit the
results
of an 'inquest finding of suicide
in a suit against
an
insurance company,
the Boehme court noted
the pit-falls
attendant to allowing
the admission
of the
results of an
inquest.
We believe the observations of the court in Boehme
may be relevant to the issue of whether to allow a justice
of the peace
to hold
a second hearing
proceeding
after
having made a decision as to the cause of death.
In Boehme,
the court stated:
The purpose of such inquest under our law
is merely to detect
preliminary steps to
supposed offender.
. . . .
crime, and to take the
secure a trial of the
Especially do we think that
it was not a
purpose of our lawmakers to make the
inquest
a means of perpetuating testimony to be used
in a civil
suit, or by the finding of the
justice to manufacture evidence for a use
in
a case between
other parties.
Commenting
upon the impolicy
of such a rule, Chief
Justice
Hayt,
of
the Supreme
Court
of
Colorado,
says : 'In case of death
under
suspicious circumstances,
or resulting
from
accident, the rule permitting inquisitions to
be used in evidence would result
in a race
and scramble to secure a favorable
coroner's
verdict, that would influence,
and perhaps
control, in case suit should be
instituted
against
life
insurance
companies
upon
policies
of insurance,
and in cases
of
accidents occurring as a result of negligence
on the
part
of
corporations
operating
railways, street car lines, mining for coal
or the precious
metals,
et cetera.
Law
writers,
of late, have
frequently
anim-
adverted upon the carelessness
with which
such inquests are frequently conducted,
and
to allow inquisitions
to be used
in a suit
between
private
parties
upon
a cause
of
action growing
out of the death
of the
deceased,
as in this case, would
be to
introduce an element of uncertainty into the
practice, which we think would be contrary to
public policy and pernicious in the extreme.
p. 6365
Honorable Charles W. Chapman - Page 6 (JM-1202)
Germania.
win, 24 Colo. ,..:,'
43, 51 Pac. 488, 65 Am. St. Rep. 215.
Smith,
Coooeration
Between
Law and
Science
&
Scientific Proof, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 433 (1941) reviews
short-
cominas of our svstem of allowina iusticer of the peace
to
perform the fun&ion
of the coroner-at common law.2-
The justice, being an elected officer,
is
not free
from
the possibility of political
pressure, and his short term of office
does
not permit
him to accumulate experience
in
his very occasional
duties as coroner.
His
jurisdiction is ended if he believes the case
to be
suicide.
Inquest
seems
hardly
available in behalf of an accused who would
bolster his protested innocence by scientific
confirmation.
The proceeding is given
the
form of a judicial
inquiry while having
few
of its incidents.
It does not permit
of
traverse or appeal,
and the verdict
reached
is not res adiudicata.
Indeed, by the better
view,
it
'
inadmissible
subsequent hiiicide
trial and
both
on
the
civil _.
:~
-
.
in any
litigation based on the death.
The
inquest
is but
a
preliminary
device
to
gather
evidence in connection with possible criminal
proceedings, being auxiliary to and in aid of
both the examining trial and subsequent grand
jury deliberations.
. . . .
The Texas system of investigating
sudden
.,-,
death
interposes
a lay judgment
between
..
,.~
consecutive steps of a scientific inquiry
in
which time is of the essence, and oft times
the evidence is evanescent.
2. Article 49.25 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure
requires counties
having a population of 500,000 or more
(and not having
a reputable
medical school)
to provide
a
medical examiner to conduct inquests rather than justices of
the peace.
p. 6366
.
Honorable Charles W. Chapman - Page 7
(JM-1202)
The Court of Criminal Appeals in Fishbeck v. State, 225
S.W.2d 854
(1948) stated that under
articles
969
(now
article 49.09) and 927
(now article 49.08)
of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, a justice of the peace was authorized to
order the disinterment
of the deceased's
body on February
12,
1947, for the purpose of holding an inquest despite
the
fact that an inquest had been held
on June
9, 1945,
following the death
of the deceased.
The reason given
by
the justice of the peace for the subsequent proceedings
was
that the first inquest "was incomplete and inconclusive."
Article 49.09 (formerly article 969)3 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) If a body subject to investigation
under Article 49.04 of this code is interred
and an authorized oerson has not conducted an
inouest required
under this
subchapter,
a
justice of the peace may direct the disinter-
ment of the body
in order to conduct
an
inquest.
(Emphasis added.)
Article 49.08
(formerly article
927) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure states:
_~ A justice
of the peace
conducting
an
inquest may
act on information the justice
receives from any credible person or on facts
within his knowledge.
The court concluded that the portion of the justice
of
the peace's
order directing
a second
inquest and opinion
testimony given at the subsequent inquest were admissible in
a murder trial.
Courts, other than in m,
appear
to
have consistently followed Boehme
in holding that
findings
at an inquest are not admissible.
See. e.a., Armstrona
v.
-Casualtv
C OS, 357 S.W.2d
168 (Tex. Civ. App.
-
Waco 1962, no writ): Comb'ned Ame
)
0. v. McCall,
497
3. Article 969 lacks the clarity of
article
49.09.
Article 969 provided:
Section 1.' When a body upon which an inquest ought to
have been held has been
interred, the Justice
may
cause it to be disinterred for the purpose of holding
such inquest.
p. 6361
Honorable Charles W. Chapman - Page 8 (JM-1202)
S.W.Zd 350
(Tex. Civ. App.
- Amarillo 1973, writ:bref?d
n.r.e.).
.-::
5 ":
..~"
The court
in Fishbeck
relied solely
on articles:-;<969
(now article 49.09) and 927 (now article 49.08) in reaching
its conclusion despite
the fact that article 969, as .-does
article 49.09, conditions
the disinterment
and inquest:,,on
there not having
been an inquest previously
held ,by,.'
a
qualified person.
Under the circumstances you have
related
a proper authority
held an inquest and ordered a medical
examiner to perform autopsies on the bodies of the deceased
persons.
To follow
Fishbeck
would
be contrary
to-: the
express provisions of article 49.09 and place no limit-asto
time or the number of inquests that might be held so lbnb‘as
the justice of the peace
had information from a-person'::.the
justice deemed credible or "facts within his own knowledge."
We believe that it was incumbent on the justice of the
peace at the inquest to make a determination as
to whether
it was necessary to hold a formal hearing in order to, make a
determination as to cause of death.
As pointed
out
in
Boehme,
death
resulting
from suspicious
circumstances
provides a setting for a race and scramble to secure
a
favorable
verdict.
It is logical to assume
that
any
decision reached following an inquest will be unsatisfactory
to some of the interested parties under such circumstances.
Undoubtedly, this would result in pressure being applied
to
a justice of the peace to hold a further proceeding in hope
that a result favorable to the persons urging such hearing
may be reached.
We believe the statement
by the court
in
Boehme that once a finding is made, there
is no means
for
traversing the finding, would be the conclusion of a.'~;IT&ritt
confronted with the scenario you have related.
.~
.
,_..,
'...i i
It must be recognized that an inquest finding i$;';notto
be equated with a final judgment rendered by a court."'!
".The
inquest hearing is held for the sole purpose of detecting
crime.
44 Tex. Jur. 3d Inouestg § 8 (1985).. The .-&&eity
granted a justice of the peace
in holding
an inquest ri's
independent of the powers
and duties of law enforcement
authorities in investigating a death.
Code Grim. pe&-?, &&.
49.03.
Clearly,
an inquest verdict does )y-& Iprec3&~ .,,
.'ia
grand jury investigation
into violations of the law.. See
Code Crim.
Proc. art. 20.01.
Nor does
it precltie ',a
district judge from conducting a court of
in#i~ljy
.1%~ xhe
judge believes
an offense
has been committed against
the
laws of this
state. Id. art. 52.01. Article.49 ;!I'5
fd):
: of
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the-:jiistficei
of
the peace shall deliver a copy of the inquest summa*
report
p. 6368
Honorable Charles W. Chapman - Page 9 ,(JM-l202)
to therdistrict clerk who
is to retain the report
to an'order of the district court.**
"subject
~.~We,?believe
that it is incumbent upon a justice of the
peace.or
the district
attorney to determine
whether
an
"inquest hearing" is necessary in making a determination
as
tocause
of death before
a finding is made following
the
Winguest.80
AS you advise, the remainder
of your questions
are
contingent on our concluding that an inquest hearing may be
ordered after a finding has been rendered at an inquest.
We
conclude that no such inquest hearing may be ordered
under
the circumstances,
and therefore
we do not address
your
remaining~ questions.
SUMMARY
The determination
of whether
an inquest
hearing is to be held must be made at the
inquest.
Subsequent
to
findings
being
rendered as to cause of death at an inquest,
a, justice
of the peace may
not order
an
i.nguest hearing.
J I,
M
MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
MARY&lX.LER
First Assistant Attorney General
Lou MC-Y
Executive-Assistant Attorney General
JUDG~:~~IE:STEAKLEY
Special &asi,stant Attorney General
RENEA lmxs
Speci:sl -&s~si.stent
Attorney General
RICK GIL@IN
Chairmqq,, ,Gpinion Committee
Prepared;by Tom G. Davis
Assistant Attorney General
p. 6369
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.