Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion JM-1163
Issued April 23, 1990
Re: Authority of a non-res- 1110 San Jacinto ident property and casualty Austin, Texas 78701-1998 insurance agent to transact certain business in Texas
The Attorney General's page · official PDF
.
THE
ATTORNEY
GENERAL
OF TEXAS
April 23, 1990
Honorable Paul T. Wrotenbery
Opinion No.
JM-1163
Chairman
State Board of Insurance
Re: Authority of a non-res-
1110 San Jacinto
ident property and casualty
Austin, Texas
78701-1998
insurance agent to transact
certain
business
in Texas
(RQ-1834)
Dear Mr. Wrotenbery:
You ask several questions
regarding activities
of a
non-resident property and casualty insurance agent:
Assuming the policies in question were under-
written by an authorized insurer,
contained
the proper counters.ignatures and were written
at the correct rates, we ask your opinion
as
to the following:
1.
May
a
non-resident
property
and
casualty insurance agent who acts as an agent
for a corporation domiciled in another
state
enter the state to sell insurance to Texas
residents who are corporate affiliates?
MaY
such agent who
acts as an agent
for a
franchiser
enter the state .
to sell
insurance to Texas
residents who' have the
right to use
the
franchise's
name
and
products?
2. When the initial solicitation occurred
in another state and subsequent contacts
by
telephone
or mail are incidental
to the
initial contact, may a non-resident
property
and casualty insurance agent make
subsequent
contacts with a resident of this state
for
the purpose of completing an insurance trans-
action?
3. When the non-resident . . . agent who
sold the original insurance policy calls
a
Texas resident asking the insured whether
he
wishes to renew his policy, is such act a
p. 6141
Honorable Paul T. Wrotenbery - Page 2
(JM-1163)
direct solicitation prohibited
by the
stat-
ute?
We assume that by non-resident
property and casualty
insurance agent you mean a @'licensed non-resident
insurance
agent" as provided
for in article 21.11 of the
Insurance
Code.
Article 21.11, prior to 1955, made
no provision
for
"licensed
non-resident
insurance
agents"
but
simply
prohibited resident licensed property and casualty insurance
agents from paying commissions
to non-resident
agents
or
other unlicensed persons.
In 1955, the legislature
amended
article 21.11 to permit
"local recording agents" to divide
commissions
on
policies
"originatedl*
by a
"licensed
non-resident insurance
agent,"
and wcovering
property
or
persons in this state."
H.B. 103, Acts 1955, 54th Leg., ch.
209, at 605.
Under article
21.14, section 3, a "local
recording agent" must be a resident of this state.1
Article
21.11 as amended defines and provides for the licensing
of
non-resident agents, who must be licensed by, and residents
of, states which
do not prohibit residents
of this
state
from acting as insurance agents within.2
Article 21.11 continues:
1. Article 21.14, section
3, subsection
b, makes
an
exception for local recording agents residing
in towns
on
the state line.
2. The emergency provision
in section 2 of the
1955
enactment indicates that the purpose of the amendment was to
place Texas in a reciprocal relation with other states,
the
laws of which
restricted
division
of commissions
with
non-resident
agents
to
agents
from states
permitting
division of commissions with their resident agents:
The fact that many
other States issue licenses
to
Non-Resident
Agents
and
permit
the division
of
commission on a retaliatory
basis, makes it possible
for a Recording Agent of Texas to obtain a Non-Resi-
dent Agent's
license
in these
States
and thereby
citizens of Texas having property located
in these
States are prevented from having the services of their
own Recording Agents of Texas for such risks,
creates
an emergency . . . .
.
--.
p. 6142
Honorable Paul T. Wrotenbery - Page 3 (JM-1163)
The issuance
of a Non-Resident
Agent's
license
shall
be
for the
purpose
of
permitting a Local Recording Agent of Texas
to divide commission with an agent of another
State on insurance
covering
property
persons in this State placed with or throui:
a Local Recording Agent,
and to permit
an
agent of another state, who qualifies and
is
licensed as a Non-Resident Agent, to inspect
and service
such risks
in Texas,
which
license shall be subject to the same
fees,
qualifications, requirements and restrictions
as apply to Local Recording
Agents of this
State, except that an office shall not be
maintained in this State by a Non-Resident
Agent and all such insurance transacted shall
be through licensed Local Recording Agents as
provided
in Article
21.09 of the
Texas
Insurance Code . . . .
Article 21.09 prohibits insurance companies
authorized
to do business
in Texas from allowing
any non-resident
person, agent,
firm, or corporation
to issue
insurance
policies on persons or property located in this state except
through local recording agents, with certain exceptions
not
relevant to your concerns.
The above-quoted
language
of
article 21.11 authorizing licensed
non-resident agents
to
"inspect and service risks"
in Texas, and the reference
earlier in the article to such non-resident agents
dividing
commissions
with
local recording
agents
on
policies
1'originated8q
by non-resident
agents,
indicates
that
the
legislature
contemplated
that non-resident
agents
could
perform some acts which would constitute "doing an insurance
business in this
state." See Ins. Code art. 1.14-1,
§ 2
(describing what acts
constitute
"doing an
insurance
business
in this
state").
However,
subsection
(c) of
article 21.11 specifically provides:
Nothing
contained
herein
shall be
con-
strued . . . to permit any person or firm who
holds
a Non-Resident
Agent's
license
as
authorized herein to engage in any form of
direct solicitation of insurance within
this
State.
It is apparent that the
focus of your concern in your
questions is whether
the activities
described
constitute
"direct solicitation" by a non-resident agent in violation
of the above-quoted language
of article 21.11.
"Solicita-
tion" as used in article
21.11 is not statutorily
defined.
The ordinary meaning
of %olicitation"
is the
"act or an
p. 6143
Honorable Paul T. Wrotenbery - Page 4
(JM-1163)
instance of soliciting."
@USolicitll ordinarily
means
to
"make petition to," "entreat, If or "approach with a request."
See Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary
(9th ed.
1983).
From the contexts of the term's usage in other provisions of
the Insurance
Code,
it appears
that
"solicitation
of
insurance" is distinct
from negotiating, writing,
signing,
or executing policies.
See. e.a. Ins. Code art.
1.14-1,
5 2(a)(6) (doing business
of insu;ance
defined to
include
l*solicitation, negotiation, procurement, or effectuation
of
insurance"); &
art. 21.14, 5 2 (a t'local recording
agent"
is a person authorized
inter alia "to solicit business
and
to write,
sign,
execute,
and
deliver
policies
of
insurance").
The word
"direct" in the language of article
21.11
prohibiting
"direct
solicitation"
refers,
we think,
to
solicitation
of insurance
business
not done
through
a
resident
Texas
local recording
agent,
authorized
under
articles 21.09 and 21.14.3 As previously mentioned, article
21.09 prohibits an insurer authorized to do business in this
state
from allowing
any non-resident
to issue,
etc.,
policies of insurance on property or persons located in this
state except
through
regularly
licensed
local
recording
agents. Article 21.14 provides that a local recording agent
is a person
authorized "to solicit business, write;
sign,
execute, and deliver
policies."
Comnare
Ins. Code
art.
1.14-2,
5 2(a) (2)
(l'surplus lines"
license
limited
to
acceptance of business through a regularly "licensed surplus
lines agentI' and shall not authorize
surplus lines agency
"to transact
business
directly
with
the applicant
for
insurance").
Though a licensed non-resident
property and casualty
insurance agent may not under article
21.11 make
"direct
solicitations" of insurance in this state, other language in
3. Article
21.14 also provides
in section
2 for
licensing of *'solicitorsI'
who
"engage in the business
of
soliciting insurance on behalf of a local recording
agent."
In determining
that wsolicitationV' by non-resident
agents
must be done throuah
local recording
agents, we mean
to
include scenarios
wherein the solicitation done
Vhrough"
local recording
agents
is actually
performed
by
such
solicitors acting on the former's behalf.
There is an exception in section 2 of article 21.14 for
various kinds
of nonprofit
societies,
associations,
and
other institutions described there.
p. 6144
Honorable Paul T. Wrotenbery - Page 5 (JM-1163)
that article indicates that he may "originatel' policies
of
insurance.
Construing
these provisions of article
21.11
together, we are of the opinion that they contemplate
that
the non-resident agent may work up a proposal for providing
property or casualty insurance from the insurer-principal he
represents
to prospective
clients
L&I
"originatel' a
policy) but that contacts
with prospective
clients
for
purposes of proposing they buy such insurance must be made
through a Texas local recording
agent (i.e., no
"direct
solicitationw).
In response to your first question
-- whether a non-
resident property and casualty insurance
agent, acting
as
agent for a non-Texas
domiciliary corporation,
may enter
Texas
to sell
insurance
to Texas
resident
corporate
affiliates, or whether
such agent acting
for a franchiser
may
enter Texas
to sell insurance
to Texas
resident
franchisees -- we think
it follows
from the foregoing
discussion that such non-resident
agent may enter Texas
to
sell such
insurance
so long as the contacts
with
the
prospective
clients,
be
they corporate
affiliates
franchisees or others,
for purposes of proposing they bzc
such insurance,
are made
through a Texas local recording
agent.
In your second question you outline a scenario in which
the non-resident agent's lBinitial contacts" are made out-of-
state, but
"subsequent
contacts . . . for the purpose
of
completing
the transaction"
are made by the agent by
telephone or mail, presumably while the prospective
clients
are located in this state. We think that the answer to your
second question would depend on the facts of the particular
case.
If the
UVsubseguent contactstl could be accurately
characterized as "solicitations,"
they would be prohibited
by article
21.11 unless made through
a local recording
agent.
For example, if a "subsequent contact" consisted of:
"1 spoke at the convention of corporate
affiliates
you
attended in St. Louis about insurance
programs.
I can
offer, and I am phoning you now, to ask whether you would be
interested in one of those programs"
-- such
"subsequent
contact8' would
probably be characterized as a prohibited
"direct solicitation It under article 21.11.4
4. Article 1.14-1 of the code provides
in section
3(b):
In respect to the insurance of subjects resident,
(Footnote Continued)
p. 6145
Honorable Paul T. Wrotenbery - Page 6
(JM-1163)
We do not think that the fact that such
18subseguent
contact" is made by mail or telephone takes such contact out
of the article's prohibition on "direct solicitation" if the
prospective client is located in this state at the time
of
the contact.
Article
1.14-1, section
2(a), in describing
which acts "effected by mail or otherwise" constitute
doing
an insurance business in this state, specifically
provides
that "the venue of an act committed by mail is at the point
where the matter transmitted by mail is delivered."
We
see
no reason why a telephone
contact from out-of-state to a
prospective client
in this state should be treated
dif-
ferently than a contact by mail.
In your third question
you ask whether a non-resident
agent's telephoning a Texas
resident, presumably while
the
latter is in Texas,
asking whether
the latter wishes
to
renew a policy the non-resident agent had initially sold to
him, constitutes
a "direct
solicitation'* under
article
21.11. Again the facts of the t.he particular case -- for
example, provisions, if any, in the original contract
re-
garding renewals -- might have a bearing on the determina-
tion whether such contact
is a "direct solicitation"
under
article 21.11. We would
observe, however, that absent
any
mitigating factors, the non-resident
agent's
asking
the
Texas client, by telephone, mail,
or in person, to enter
into a new contract
for a policy,
would
appear
to be
*qsolicitation,l'
which if not done through a local
recording
agent would
be
"direct"
and therefore
in violation
of
article 21.11.
Concededly, article 21.11 does provide
that
licensure of non-resident agents
is for the purpose,
inter
alia, of permitting such non-resident agents to '*inspect and
service . . . risks in Texas."
However, in view
of the
article's explicit
prohibition
on "direct
solicitation,"
we think that whatever
scope the
language
"inspect
and
service . . . risks" has, if solicitation is involved,
such
solicitation may not be done directly,
but must rather
be
done through
a Texas local recording
agent in order
to
comport with the provisions of article 21.11.
Finally, we note that though you do not raise in your
request
any constitutional
issues with
respect
to the
(Footnote Continued)
located or to be performed
within this
state
this
section shall not prohibit
the collection of premium
or other
acts performed
outside of this
state
by
persons or insurers authorized to do business in this
state provided
such transactions
and insurance
con-
tracts otherwise comply with statute.
P. 6146
Honorable Paul T. Wrotenbery - Page 7
(JM-1163)
application of the article
21.11 prohibition
on direct
solicitation by non-resident
agents, a brief submitted
to
this office in response to your request argues that those
provisions must be construed in light of the U.S.
Constitu-
tion's guarantees of free speech
(first amendment),
equal
protection (fourteenth amendment), and that "the citizens of
each state
shall be
entitled
to all privileges
and
immunities of citizens in the several states" (article IV,
section 2, clause 1).
See. e.a
McKinnev v. Blankenshiu
282 S.W.Zd 691 (Tex. 1955) (sta&e
will not be
interpreted
so as to render it unconstitutional if by any reasonable
construction it may be held constitutional).
The above-mentioned brief
relies principally on three
federal court cases in arguing that a prohibition on direct
solicitation by non-resident property and casualty insurance
agents would violate
the federal constitution.
In Metro-
go
ita
7,
470 U.S. 869
Li e
(1985) the
Supreme Court considered whether
Alabama's imposition of a
higher gross premium tax on out-of-state insurance companies
than on domestic ones violated the equal protection
clause.
The Court noted that in Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State
Bd.
gf Ecualization of California, 451 U.S. 648 (1981), they had
considered it
now established that, whatever the extent
of
a State's
authority
to exclude
foreign
corporations from doing business within
its
boundaries, that authority
does not justify
imposition of more
onerous taxes
or
other
burdens on foreign corporations
than those
imposed on domestic corporations, unless
the
discrimination between
foreian and domestic
cornorations bears a rational relation to a
leaitimate state nurnose.
(Emphasis added.)
Ward at 875.
The Court
in Ward
found that under
the
circumstances there the purposes of the Alabama statute,
as
argued by the state -- promotion
of domestic business
and
investment in Alabama assets5
-- were not legitimate
state
purposes justifying, under the Equal Protection clause,
the
discriminatory
tax, and remanded
the case
for further
proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.
5. The Alabama statute provides
for reduction of the
tax rate differential
for out-of-state insurance
companies
investing in Alabama
assets and securities.
See Ward
at
-
-I
870.
P. 6147
Honorable Paul T. Wrotenbery - Page 8 (JM-1163)
In sv.,
760 F.2d 33
(1st Cir. 1985) the
first circuit
court of appeals
ruled that
Puerto
Rico's
licensing provisions
for insurance
consultants
requiring
that they be Puerto
Rico residents violated the privileges
and immunities clause (article IV, section 2, clause 1, U.S.
Constitution).
The court noted,
citing Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S.
385 (1948), that "the privileges and
immunities
clause is not an absolute."
Garcia, at 38.
Discrimination
against
nonresidents
is
permitted where:
(i) there is a substantial reason for the
difference
in treatment;
and
(ii) the
discrimination practiced against
nonresi-
dents bears a substantial relationship
to
the State's objective . . . . In deciding
whether the discrimination
bears a close
or substantial relationship to the State's
objective, the Court has considered
the
availability of less restrictive means.
.
.
.
.
In order for there to be a
'substantial
reason
for the difference
in treatment,'
nonresidents must be shown to constitute
a
'peculiar source
of the evil at which
the
statute is aimed.'
Id. (citations omitted).
The Garcia court found, however,
that
Puerto Rico has not offered
substantial
reasons for its discriminatory treatment
of
nonresident insurance consultants, nor has it
shown a substantial
relationship
between
these reasons and its discriminatory
treat-
ment of nonresidents.
Id. at 40.
In Suureme Court of New Hamwshire v. Piuer, 470 U.S.
274,
288 (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that
New Hampshire's
bar residency
requirement
violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Art. IV, § 2, of the United States Consti-
tution. . . . A
state
may
discriminate
against nonresidents only where its reasons
are
'substantial,'
and the difference
in
P. 6148
a
.
Honorable Paul T. Wrotenbery - Page 9 (JM-1163)
h
treatment
bears a
close or
substantial
relation to those reasons. No su&
showing
has been made in this case.
As to the brief's assertion that prohibition of "direct
solicitation@@ by non-resident
property and casualty
insur-
ance agents restrains
%onmercial speech" in violation
of
the first amendment, we note that the courts, as with
the
equal protection and privileges and immunities claims
ad-
dressed in m,
m,
and m,
do not treat the
first
amendment's freedom of speech guarantee as an absolute.
In
varmacv
Bd. v. Virainia Consumer Council
425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) the court acknowledged that '~some'forms of
commercial
speech
regulation
are surely
permissible.l'
There, however,
it found the justifications
the state
of
Virginia offered for totally suppressing prescription
drug
advertising insufficient.
&;
see am
Bates v. State
Bar
f Arizona
433 U.S. 350
(1977)(discussion
of proffered
Tustifications for the Arizona Supreme Court's disciplinary
rule barring attorney advertising).
We find no cases on point as to the issues raised here.
m
dealt
with discriminatory taxation
rather than
the
sorts of restrictions
on non-resident
insurance agents
provided for in article
21.11. The SilveZ: courts addressed
restrictions on insurance consultants, who unlike insurance
agents, and as the court
specifically noted, did not
"sell
insurance either directly or indirectly."
Id.at34.
PiDer
dealt with residence restrictions on lawyers, not insurance
agents.
The Virainia Pharmacy
court expressly limited
its
holding under the first amendment as to prescription
drug
price advertising
to the profession of pharmacy. &
at
773 n.25
(observing that
Ithistorical" and "functional"
distinctions "may require
consideration of quite different
factorst' when dealing with
other professions).
Moreover,
&&88
specifically
reserved
questions
as
to
direct
solicitation of clients in its first amendment ruling on
attorney advertising.
J,& at 366.
We acknowledge that it is possible that a court,
upon
the taking
of testimony
and other
evidence as. to the
competing interests of the state and non-president agents,
could find constitutional infirmities in the prohibition
on
direct solicitation
by the latter in article 21.11.
But
resolution
of the issue whether
the state has a substan-
tial interest, or is justified, in imposing such restriction
on non-resident
insurance agents would inevitably
involve
questions of fact. We in the opinion process are unable
to
'take testimony or other evidence
and make findings of fact
r-
as a court does, and we would therefore be unable to make a
determination on the constitutionality of those provisions.
P. 6149
Honorable Paul T. Wrotenbery - Page 10 (JM-1162)
SUMMARY
Insurance
Code article 21.11 prohibits
'direct solicitation of insurance within this
state* by a licensed non-resident
property
and casualty
insurance agent.
Under
that
prohibition, such a non-resident
insurance
agent may not propose to a person located
in
this state that he buy insurance, unless such
'solicitation' is made through a Texas
local
recording agent, subject to statutory
excep-
tions. A solicitation by such a non-resident
agent from outside the state by mail
or
telephone to a person located in this
state
is a 'solicitation . . . within this
state'
within the meaning of article 21.11.
Whether
a particular contact constitutes a 'solicita-
tion' is a question of fact.
Whether the prohibition
in article
21.11
on direct solicitations by licensed non-resi-
dent property and casualty insurance
agents
violates the
constitutional
guarantees
of
freedom of speech or equal protection, or the
privileges and immunities
clause of
article
IV, would
involve questions
of fact that
cannot be resolved in the opinion process.
MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General
RENEA HICKS
'Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by William Walker
Assistant Attorney General
-.
p. 6150
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.