Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion JM-1049
Issued May 23, 1989
Re: Whether real property Stephen F. Austin Building belonging to the Permanent 1700 North Congress Avenue School Fund is exempt from Austin, Texas 78701 property taxes when it is leased to a private business
Cites: TX §ll.ll, TX §25.19, ED §10, ED §18, ED §11.11, ED §2, ED §6, ED §12
The Attorney General's page · official PDF
May 23, 1989
Honorable Garry Mauro
Opinion No. JM-1049
Commissioner
General Land Office
Re: Whether
real
property
Stephen F. Austin Building
belonging to the
Permanent
1700 North Congress Avenue
School Fund is exempt
from
Austin, Texas
78701
property
taxes when
it is
leased to a private
business
(RQ-1408)
Dear Mr. Mauro:
You ask five questions regarding
the taxability
of
certain interests in real property comprising
part of the
permanent school fund, specifically, the interest
retained
by the state when it has leased land to private
businesses.
Your request
is prompted
by the
following
two
fact
situations.
First, in September 1986, the state acquired
title in fee simple absolute
to two tracts
of land
in
Tarrant County
for the use and benefit of the permanent
school fund. At the time that the state acquired title, you
leased both tracts on behalf of the permanent school fund to
a Texas corporation.
A commercial strip shopping center
is
located on one tract: no improvements are located on the
second tract.
The permanent school fund owns only the real
property; it owns none of the improvements located thereon.
The Texas corporation
to which you
leased the first tract
owns the improvements and, in turn, has subleased the tract
to the occupants of the stores.
In October of 1987, Tarrant
County and an independent school district located in Tarrant
County sent tax statements
to the General
Land Office,
imposing ad valorem taxes on the real property but not on
the improvements.
The second situation
you ask'about
involves the tax-
ability of coastal
and upland lands that are dedicated
by
statute to the permanent
school fund. Pursuant to chapter
33 of the Natural Resources Code, the School Land Board,
of
which you are a member, has the authority to grant easements
for private
use of coastal
and upland public
land and
leases for use by public entities.
It is your understanding
P. 5442
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 2
(JM-1049)
that local taxing units intend to impose ad valorem
taxes
against easement holders that engage in private
businesses
(such as oil and gas pipelines
and commercial
marina
operations) based upon the property values of the permanent
school fund property encumbered by the easements.
You contend that both the permanent
school fund land
leased to a private
business enterprise,
as well
as any
leasehold interest encumbering it, is exempt from property
taxation.
In other words, you contend
that both the real
property in the hands
of the state and the leasehold
interest in the hands of the private lessee are exempt
from
property taxation.
In the alternative, you contend that, if
the permanent school fund land that is leased to a private
business enterprise
is taxable, then only the leasehold
estate is taxable
to the private
business enterprise:
YOU
contend that the real property itself is not taxable to the
state.
You first ask:
Does TEX. CONST. art. VIII, 52 and art. VII,
~$5, in conjunction
with Tex. Tax Code Ann.
§ll.ll(a)
(Vernon 1982), exempt
Permanent
School Fund property from ad valorem,property
taxes even though leased to a private
busi-
ness enterprise?
We conclude that the state's
interest in land that is part
of the permanent
school fund is exempt from ad valorem
taxation, even if the state has leased the land to a private
concern to be used for a private purpose.
Article VIII,
section
1, of the Texas
Constitution
provides in relevant part:
"All real property and tangible
personal property
in this State . . . shall be taxed
in
proportion to its value, which
shall be ascertained as may
be provided by law." Article
VIII, section 2, provides
in
relevant part that
"the legislature may, by general
laws,
exempt
from taxation
public property
used
for
purposes."1
public
Pursuant
to article VIII,
section
2, the
1. Article XI, section 9, of the Texas
Constitution,
by its terms, exempts
"property
of counties,
cities
and
towns, owned and held only for public purposes,
. . . and
(Footnote Continued)
P. 5443
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 3
(JM-1049)
legislature enacted section 11.11 of the Tax Code, governing
the taxation of public property:
(a) Except as provided by Subsections (b)
and (c) of this section,
property owned
by
this state or a political subdivision of this
state is exempt from taxation if the orouerty
is used for DubliC oUrIJOSeS.2
(b) Land owned by the Permanent
Univer-
sity Fund is taxable for county purposes.
Any notice required by Section 25.19 of this
code [Notice of Appraised Value]
shall be
sent to the State Property Tax Board, and the
board shall appear in behalf of the state
in
any protest or appeal relating to taxation of
Permanent University Fund land.
(c) Agricultural
land or grazing
land
owned by a county
for the benefit of public
schools under Article VII, section 6, of the
Texas Constitution
is taxable
for all pur-
poses.
The county shall pay the taxes on the
land from the revenue derived from the
land.
If revenue from the land is insufficient
to
pay the taxes, the county shall pay the bal-
ance from the county general fund.
(d) Pronertv owned bv the state that
is
not used
for wublic nurnoses
is taxable.
Prowertv owned bv a state aaencv or institu-
tion is not used
for DUbliC ourooses if the
(Footnote Continued)
all other property
devoted
exclusively
to the use and
benefit of the public . . . from taxation . . . ;'I
This
section is self-executing.
Because the last clause has
never been
construed
to apply to property owned by the
state, we need not discuss the cases involving counties
and
cities that rely upon this provision.
2.
The Texas Supreme Court has construed the relevant
language
of article
VIII,
section
2,
of the
Texas
Constitution to require
exclusive
use by the political
subdivision in order that it receive exempt status.
Leander
IndeD. School Dist.
v. Cedar Park Water SUDD~V Corp.,
479
S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1972).
p.
5444
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 4
(JM-1049)
prowertv is rented or leased for comoensation
to a orivate business
enternrise to be used
by it for a wurwose
not related
to the
performance of the duties
and functions
of
the state aaencv
or institution
or used to
provide
private
residential
housing
for
compensation to members
of the public
other
than students
and employees
of the state
agency or institution owning
the property,
unless the residential use
is secondary
to
its use
by an
educational
institution
primarily for instructional
purposes.
Any
notice required by Section 25.19 of this code
shall be sent to the agency or institution
that owns the property,
and it shall
appear
in behalf
of the state
in any protest
or
appeal related to taxation of the property.
(e) It is provided, however,
that pro-
perty that
is held or dedicated
for the
support,
maintenance,
or
benefit
of
an
institution of higher education as defined by
Section 61.003(7), Texas Education Code, but
is not rented or leased for compensation to a
private business enterprise to be used by
it
for a purpose not related to the performance
of the duties and
functions of the state
or
is not rented or leased to provide
private
residential housing to members of the public
other than
students
and employees
of the
state is not taxable.
(Emphasis added.)
By the terms
of subsection
(d), it might
appear that the
state's interest in the Tarrant
County lands you ask about
are taxable
to the state,
since both are
leased
for
compensation to a private business enterprise to be used by
it for a purpose
not related to the performance
of the
duties of the School Land Board.
You contend, however, that
leasing such property
for compensation that will inure to
the benefit of the permanent school
fund is precisely
the
public purpose
for which
the permanent
school
fund was
created and that, therefore, the state is exempt from ad
valorem taxation
on such property.
We agree with your
assertion.
Before we discuss specifically the questions you
submit, we first will present
some background
information
regarding the taxation of the various constitutional
school
funds in Texas.
P- 5445
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 5
(JM-1049)
Article VII of the~Texas
Constitution governs
public
education on both the ublic elementary and secondary school
and university levels. I: Sections
10 through 18 of article
VII set forth the provisions
regarding
university
level
education: sections 1 through 8 of article VII set forth the
provisions regarding public elementary and secondary
school
education.
Article
VII, section
11, creates
a permanent
university
fund, comprising,
inter alia, certain
lands
dedicated for such purposes, as well as the proceeds derived
from the sale thereof: interest derived from the
investment
of the proceeds
of the sale of such lands
is usually
referred to as the "available university fund." Article VII
was amended in 1930 by the addition of section 16(a), which
provides that all land mentioned in sections 11, 12, and
15
of article VII, then belonging
to the University of Texas,
shall be subject to taxation for county purposes to the same
extent as lands privately
owned.4
See also Tax
Code,
§ 11.11(b).
Sections 2 and 6 of article VII create two distinct
types of trust funds in what has been termed a dual
system
for public
elementary and secondary education;
section
2
dedicates state-owned
land to a state
"perpetual
school
3. Additionally, article VII, section 9, of the Texas
Constitution
dedicates
all lands then granted
for the
benefit of the "Lunatic, Blind, Deaf and Dumb, and Orphan
Asylums" to create
a permanent fund for their
support,
maintenance and improvement.
4. The
"Interpretive
Commentary"
to article VII,
section 16(a), declares the purpose behind the adoption
of
the 1930 amendment:
Due ~to the policy of the Board of Regents
withholding the university lands from sale in
spite of Art. 7, § 12 of the constitution,
some of the poorer counties contained
large
areas of untaxable land. In order to assist
these counties this amendment was adopted
in
1930.
See also 2 Braden, The Constitution
of the State of Texas:
An Annotated and Comparative Analysis, at 551-52 (1977).
p. 5446
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 6
(JM-1049)
fund,l15 while
section 6 grants certain
lands to counties
also for the benefit of the public schools. -2
Braden,
suwra, at 530-31.
Income derived from the state
"permanent
school fund" is designated by article VII, section 5, as the
"available school
fund." Section
6 creates what
is, in
effect, a system of permanent
school funds for the various
counties, with the
income derived
from permanent
county
school
fund
investments
dedicated
to
each
county's
"available school fund." Article VII was amended in 1927 by
the addition of section 6a (and, subsequently, in 1972 by
the addition of 6b), which specifically
makes taxable
for
all except
state purposes
those lands set aside
for the
county permanent school funds.6 See Tax Code, 4 11.11(c).
5. The terminology
used to designate
the
fund is
confusing:
section 2 refers to it as the "perpetual
school
fund".and "perpetual public
school fund:" section 4 refers
to it as the "public free school fund;" and section 5 labels
it the
"permanent school
fund." The Texas Supreme
Court
long ago opted
for the appellation of section 4, stating
that sections
2 and 5 provided
that certain
funds and
property constituted
a "public free school
fund."
y&r&
County v. Board of School Trustees, 65 S.W. 878 (Tex. 1901).
The endowment
has been enlarged
from time to time by
statute, which designates
it the "permanent school
fund."
Educ. Code 5 15.01.
By your use of the phrase
"Permanent
School Fund
land," we understand
you to mean
that real
property dedicated
by section
2 of article VII, whose
components have been added to by amendment to section
15.01
of the Education Code.
6. The
"Interpretive
Commentary"
to article
VII,
section 6a, sets forth the reason for the amendment:
Article
11, Section
9 of the
Texas
Constitution exempts from taxation
'property
of counties, cities, and towns owned and held
for public
purposes.'
In 1888, the Texas
Supreme Court held that no tax could be
levied on a lease-holder of school lands:
t*County school lands, when leased to raise an
available school
fund, are as exclusively
devoted to the use and benefit of the public
as they would
be if covered with
school-
(Footnote Continued)
P. 5447
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 7
(JM-1049)
Therefore,
land
comprising
the
state
permanent
university fund is taxable
for county purposes only.
Land
comprising
the permanent
school
funds of the
various
counties is taxable
for all, except state, purposes.
YOU
ask about the taxability
of lands comprising neither
the
permanent university fund nor the various county
permanent
school
funds, but rather
those comprising
the
state
permanent school fund: Neither
the Texas Constitution
nor
the Tax Code specifically
addresses
the
issue of the
taxability of such lands. Nor has any Texas court case or
attorney general opinion addressed the issue.
For two reasons we conclude that, under the provisions
of section 11.11 of the Tax Code, those lands set aside by
article VII, section
2, of the Texas Constitution for the
benefit of the public
free schools are exempt
from ad
valorem taxation, even in the event that they are leased for
compensation to private business enterprises to be used
for
purposes not related to the performance
of the duties
and
functions of the School
Land Board.
Moreover,
even
if
section 11.11 of the Tax Code fairly could be construed
as
requiring the taxation of permanent school
fund land, we
construe article VII, section
5, of the Texas
Constitution
as forbidding it.
First, we do not construe section 11.11 of the Tax Code
to require the taxation of permanent school fund land.
By
the very terms
of subsection
11.11(a) of the Tax Code,
subsections (b) and (c) of section 11.11, which require
the
taxation in certain instances
of permanent university
fund
(Footnote Continued)
houses;
and the constitution
forbids the
taxation of the means
through which
such
lands may be made to yield a revenue, without
sale, as fully as does it forbid the taxation
of the lands. Forbidding the taxation of the
lands, it forbids the taxation of an estate
less than fee, whether imposed on the county
or its lessee."
(Daugherty v. Thompson,
71
T. 192, 9 S.W. 99)
In order to permit such taxation,
except
for state purposes, Sec. 6a was added to the
Constitution in 1927.
See also 2 Braden, m,
at 533-34.
P- 5448
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 8
(JM-1049)
land and land comprising the various county permanent school
funds, serve as exceptions
to the general principles
set
forth in subsections
(a) and (d).
The express mention
or
enumeration of one person,
thing, consequence, or class
is
tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.
State v.
Mauritz-Wells Co.,
175 S.W.2d
238
(Tex. 1943); Ex carte
McIver, 586 S.W.Zd 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). We conclude
that the express inclusion of subsections (b) and (c), which
indicates the intention
of the legislature
to require
the
taxation of certain specified
state-owned land as provided
by the Texas Constitution, likewise indicates the
intention
of the legislature not to require the taxation of permanent
school fund land.
Second, we agree with your assertion that the sale or
lease of land dedicated
by article VII,
section 2, of the
Texas Constitution,
with the proceeds
from such sale or
lease becoming part of the permanent school
fund, is the
precise public purpose for which such land was dedicated
in
the first instance.
Even a cursory reading of the relevant
provisions of article VII of the constitution makes it clear
that the legislature
that proposed those
sections and the
voters who adopted them did not intend, not that the land
itself would be used for educational
purposes, but
rather
that the income derived from its sale or lease would be so
used. The
establishment
of such a fund in the Texas
Constitution impresses upon the fund the nature of a public
purpose.
Absent specific constitutional language
requiring
taxation, the state's
interest in such dedicated lands
is
tax exempt.
Subsections (a) and (d) of section 11.11 of the code,
taken
together,
provide
the following:
(1) that
all
property owned by the state or a political subdivision
is
exempt from taxation if the property is used for a public
purpose; (2) that property so owned that is not used for a
public purpose is taxable: and,
(3) that property so owned
that is rented
or leased
for compensation to a private
business enterprise
to be used by it for a purpose
not
related to the performance of the duties and functions
of'
the political
subdivision, except under certain
specified
exceptions, is not used for a public purpose and therefore
is taxable.
If the legislature had
intended that land owned by
either the permanent university
fund, the various
county
permanent school funds, or the permanent
school fund fall
within the ambit of
(3) above
(or, more
specifically,
subsection
(d) of section
ll.ll),
it would
have been
P. 5449
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 9
(JM-1049)
unnecessary to include subsections (b) and
(c) in section
11.11, making land owned by the permanent university
fund
and by the various county permanent
school funds taxable.
The very terms
of subsection (d) ordinarily would
require
the taxation of such dedicated lands.
If the legislature
had assumed
that such dedicated
lands would
be taxable,
subsections (b) and
(c) would
be mere
earlier amendments adding section 6a and
suf;;z;a;z and the
article
VII would have been unnecessary.
The legislature is never
presumed to do a useless act. H unter v.
corr,.
, 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981): State v. Citv of Dallas,
319 S.W.Zd 767 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1958), aff'd,
State
v. Citv of Austin,
331 S.W.Zd 737 (Tex. 1960). Had the
legislature intended
that permanent
school fund lands be
taxable, it is reasonable
to assume that
it would have
so
provided.
Finally, when construing section 11.11 of the Tax Code,
we must presume that the legislature
intended
compliance
with the Texas Constitution.
Gov't Code, g 311.021(l).
The
legislature could not have intended that section 11.11 of
the Tax Code be construed to require the state's interest in
permanent school
fund land that is leased to a private
business enterprise be taxed, because to do so would violate
subsection (a) of section 5 of article VII. That subsection
provides in relevant part:
"Except as provided
by this
section, no law shall ever be enacted appropriating any part
of the permanent
or available
school' fund to any other
purpose whatever
. . . .@I This subsection has been
con-
strued to prevent the use of any proceeds for any purpose
not specifically authorized.
gg, e.q., Greene v. Robison,
8 S.W.2d 655
(Tex. 1928) and companion cases: Jerniaan
v.
Finlev, 38 S.W. 24 (Tex. 1896); Attorney General
Opinions
H-881,
H-878
(1976); V-147
(1947).
We have
found no
authorization permitting
proceeds
to be expended
for ad
valorem taxation, either in the Texas Constitution or in the
Tax,~ Education, or Natural Resources Codes.
We deem
it significant
that those
constitutional
provisions that govern both the permanent university
fund
and the various county permanent school funds do not contain
restrictive language comparable to that found in section
5
governing the permanent school
fund. Moreover, we deem
it
significant that sections
6a, 6b and 16(a) of article
VII
had to be added before permanent university
land and the
lands comprising the various
county permanent school
funds
were taxed.
P- 5450
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 10
(JM-1049)
Accordingly, we answer your
first question
in the
affirmative; the state's interest
in lands owned by the
permanent school fund that are rented or leased to private
business enterprises is exempt from ad valorem taxation.
You next 'ask:
If any of the tracts mentioned above are not
fully exempt, are the leasehold estates taxed
according to Tex. Tax Code Ann. 523.13 and if
so, to what extent, if any, is the Permanent
School Fund liable for any taxes that may
be
assessed?
Section 25.07 of the Tax Code requires that
certain
leasehold and other possessory interests in exempt
property
be listed in the appraisal rolls in the name of the owner of
the possessory
interest.
Section
25.07 of the Tax Code
provides in part:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection
(b)
of this section,
a leasehold
or
other
possessory
interest
in property
that
is
exempt from taxation
to the owner
of the
estate
or
interest
encumbered
by
the
possessory interest
shall be listed in the
name of the owner of the possessory
interest
if the duration of the interest may be at
least one year.
(b) Except as provided by Subsections (b)
and (c) of Section
11.11 of this code,
a
leasehold or other possessory
interest
in
exempt property may not be listed if:
(1) the
property
is
permanent
university fund land;
(2) the property
is county public
school fund agricultural land.
Section 23.13 of the Tax Code governs the appraisal
of
such taxable leaseholds and provides:
A taxable
leasehold or other possessory
interest in real property that is exempt from
taxation
to the owner of the estate
or
interest
encumbered
by
the
possessory
interest is appraised at the market value
of
P. 5451
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 11
(JM-1049)
the leasehold or other possessory
interest.
However, the appraised value may not be
less
than the total rental paid for the interest
for the current tax year.
Sections
25.07 and 23.13 of the code and
their
predecessor statutes have been construed to provide for the
taxation of a leasehold interest
in real property, even
in
an instance
in which
the real property
is exempt
from
taxation to the owner.
See, e.a., Martin
v. Citv of
Mesouite, 590 S.W.Zd 793 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1979, Writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Irvina Indew. School Dist. v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 534 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (predecessor statute to section 23.13 of the
Tax Code specifically held to be constitutional):
Attorney
General Opinions WW-281, WW-270
(1957); O-4661 (1942).
We
conclude that, by the clear terms of sections 11.11,
25.07
and 23.13 of the Tax Code, the leasehold interests in land
comprising part of the permanent school fund are taxable
to
the owners of those interests. The permanent school
fund
itself is not liable for such taxes.
We have already
concluded that permanent school
fund
land is not taxable to the state; we know of no reason why
section 23.13 of the Tax Code does not require the taxation
of the leasehold
estate. Id.7
In such an instance,
the
permanent school fund would not be liable in the event that
the owner of the leasehold
estate fails to tender properly
any taxes imposed.
You next ask:
7. You rely principally upon Dauahertv v. Thomwson, 9
S.W. 99 (Tex. 1888) and two cases which rely upon Dauahertv,
Davis v. Burnett, 13 S.W. 613 (Tex. 1890), and Montaomerv v.
Peach River Lumber Co., 117 S.W. 1061 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909),
in suwoort of the nrooosition
that a leasehold interest
in
exempt-land
is
aiso-
exempt.
In a case discussing
the
history of the predecessor statutes to section 23.13 of the
Tax Code, the Supreme
Court of Texas declared,
inter alia,
that Dauaherty
is no longer controlling
on the
issue.
Philliws Chemical
co. v. Dumas
Indew. School
Dist.,
316
S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1958), rev/d on other arounds, 361 U.S. 376
(1959).
p- 5452
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 12
(JM-1049)
If a leasehold estate is subject to taxation,
and the lease is terminated or forfeited
for
failure to comply with the lease agreement,
what party remains liable for the payment
of
taxes?
If the tract of land is subsequently
leased to another
entity, does the
tax
liability continue to encumber the property
or does it remain a personal liability of the
previous lessee?
The person
owning the possessory
interest when
the
assessment is imposed is the person who remains liable
for
any unpaid taxes.
Section 32.01 of the Tax Code governs the
creation of tax liens and provides:
On January
1 of each year, a tax lien
attaches to property to secure the payment of
all taxes, penalties, and interest ultimately
imposed for the year on the property, whether
or not the taxes are imposed in the year the
lien attaches.
The lien exists in favor of
each taxing unit having power
to tax the
property.
Section 32.07 of the Tax Code governs in an instance in
which the person who owned a taxable interest in property
when the tax liability
was imposed no longer owns such an
interest:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection
(b)
of this
section, property
taxes
are the
personal obligation of the person who owns or
acquires the property on January 1 of the
year for which the tax is imposed. A nerson
is not relieved of the obliaation because
he
no lonaer owns the wroaertv.
(Emphasis
added.)
Section 32.07 of the code and its predecessor
statutes
have been construed
to preclude
the
imposition
on
a
purchaser of land that was subject to a lien for taxes
and
penalties
of personal
liability
for those taxes
and
penalties.
Citv of San Antonio v. Toewwerwein, 133 S.W. 416
(Tex. 1911): Attorney General Opinions V-441 (1947): O-6293
(1944); O-5062 (1943). By the clear terms of section
32.07
of the Tax Code, the person in whose
name the possessory
interest is listed remains personally liable for any unpaid
taxes, penalty, and interest. We note, however, that the
taxable interest in the property
is itself subject to sale
P* 5453
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 13
(JM-1049)
for the satisfaction
of unpaid
taxes validly
assessed
against it, whoever might have been its owner when the taxes
originally accrued.
Tax Code
5 32.01; Attorney
General
Opinions MN-523 (1982); H-1108 (1977).
You next ask:
If leasehold estates are subject to taxation
by the authority
of Tex.' Tax Code Ann.
511.11(d)
and
925.07(a),
are
easements
granted by the School Land Board also taxable
to the holder of the easement?
If so, what
is the value of the taxable interest?
Is the
value equal to the consideration paid for the
easement or the value of the property
encum-
bered or some other measure?
Section 33.103 of the Natural Resources Code specifies
those interests
that may be granted
by the School
Land
Board:
The board
may
grant
the
following
interests in coastal public
land for the
indicated purposes:
(1) leases for public purposes;
(2) easements
for
purposes
connected
with:
(A) ownership of littoral property;
or
(B) the operation
of a
facility
operated by an existing channel and dock
corporation that was issued articles
of
incorporation under
Chapters 13 and 14,
Title 32, Revised Statutes:
(3) permits authorizing limited continued
use of previously unauthorized structures
on
coastal
public
land
not connected
with
ownership of littoral property: and
(4) channel easements
to the holder
of
any surface or mineral interests in coastal
public
land
for purposes
necessary
or
appropriate to the use of the interests.
P-
5454
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 14
(JM-1049)
Section 33.111 of the Natural
Resources Code governs
the granting of easements by the board and provides:
(a) The board may grant easement
rights
to the owner of adjacent littoral
property
authorizing-the
placement or location of a
structure~on coastal public land for purposes
connected
with the, ownership
of littoral
property.
(b) The board may grant easement
rights
to construct
channels, wharves,
docks,
and
marinas to an existing corporation that was
issued articles
of
incorporation
under
Chapters 13 and 14, Title 32, Revised
Stat-
utes.
(c) Notwithstanding any provision in its
charter or articles
of incorporation to the
contrary, a corporation
described
in Sub-
section (b) of this section may only obtain
the use of or acquire property from the state
as provided by that subsection.
We understand
you to ask about the taxability
of these
easements granted by the board.
As we stated in answer to your third question, sections
23.13 and 25.07 of the Tax Code impose
tax
liability
on
"leaseholds and other possessory interests in property
that
is exempt to the owner of the estate or interest
encumbered
by the possessory
interest."
In Attorney General
Opinion
JM-59 (1983), we construed section 23.13 of the Tax Code to
require a two-step procedure:
first, there
had to be a
determination that the real property in question was exempt
in the hands
of the owner;
second,
there had
to be a
determination that the rights conferred by the owner of the
fee constitute a llpossessory interest in property."
We have
already concluded
that the real property
comprising
the
permanent school fund is exempt
in the hands of the state.
We held in Attorney General Opinion JM-59 that concession
rights in a state park for the construction and operation of
a golf course granted by the Department
of Parks
and
Wildlife was a sufficient "possessory interest" for purposes
of section 25.07 of the Tax Code. The issue is whether
an
easement granted by the board likewise
constitutes such a
"possessory interest."
‘;)
P. 5455
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 15
(JM-1049)
Section 1.04(16) of the Tax Code defines
~~possessory
interest" in the following way:
\Possessory interest' means
an interest
that exists
as a result of possession
or
exclusive use of a right to possession
or
exclusive use of a property
and that
is
unaccompanied by ownership of a fee simple or
life estate
in
the property.
However,
\possessory interest' does not include an
interest, whether of limited or indeterminate
duration, that involves a right to exhaust
a
portion of real property.
Generally, an "easement" is a right one person has to
use the land of another for a specific purpose.
Maanolia
Petroleum Co. v. Caswell
1 S.W.2d 597
(Tex. Comm'n App.
1928, judgm't adopted); Biller v. Babb, 263 S.W. 253
(Tex.
Comm'n App. 1924, judgm't
adopted).
Section 33.111 of the
Natural Resources Code specifies
the purpose for which
the
board can grant easements, i.e., "the placement or location
of a structure on coastal public land for purposes connected
with the ownership of littoral property."
By the
terms of section 33.111 of the Natural Resources Code,
cl;;:
interest
or easement
granted
is clearly
a tVpossessory
interest" for purposes
of the Tax Code.
Therefore,
we
conclude that an easement granted by the board pursuant
to
section 33.103 of the Natural Resources
Code falls within
the ambit of sections 25.07 and 23.13 of the Tax Code and iS
taxable.
Any such easement
granted must be appraised
pursuant to section 25.07 of the Tax Code.
Finally, you ask:
If any interest held by the Permanent
School
Fund is not exempt from ad valorem
taxation,
and if the Permanent School Fund has cause to
question
the notice given by the taxing
authority, the listing of the property in the
name of the Permanent
School Fund, or the
valuation of the subject property, what
is
the appropriate procedure
for the Permanent
School Fund to protest such notice,
listing,
or valuation
and to what extent would
the
Attorney General be required to represent the
Permanent School Fund in such protest?
In view of our answers to your previous questions,
we
need not answer your last question.
P. 5456
Honorable Garry Mauro - Page 16
(JM-1049)
SUMMARY
The state's
interest
in real property
comprising
the permanent
school
fund
'
exempt from ad valorem taxation, even in ttz
event that the property
is leased to a
private business
enterprise.
The leasehold
estates
in land comprising
the permanent
school fund are taxable
to the lessees.
If
such a leasehold
is terminated
and taxes
remain unpaid
in the
leasehold estate,
the
tax liability becomes a personal liability of
the lessee who possessed the leasehold estate
when the tax was imposed and the lien against
the
leasehold
estate
remains
in
force.
Easements granted by the School Land Board in
coastal and upland
public
lands that
are
dedicated to the permanent
school fund are
taxable pursuant to sections 11.11 and 23.13
of the Tax Code; such easements
must be
appraised
pursuant
to the provisions
of
section 25.07 of the Tax Code.
Very truly yo
Ll iii&L
L
JIM
MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General
JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Jim Moellinger
Assistant Attorney General
P- 5457
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.