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Attorney General Opinion JM-0912
Issued June 01, 1988
Re: Expungement of criminal Dimmitt, Texas 79027-2689 convictions under certain provisions of the Texas Code of.Criminal Procedure
Cites: CR §143A, CR §55.02, CR §22, PE §152
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THE
ATTORNEY
GENERAL
OF
TEXAS
June 1, 1988
-
P
Honorable Jimmy F. Davis
opinion No. JR-912
Castro County District Attorney
Castro County Courthouse
Re: Expungement of criminal
Dimmitt, Texas
79027-2689
convictions
under
certain
provisions
of the
Texas
Code of.Criminal
Procedure
(RQ-1325)
Dear Mr. Davis:
You ask:
1. Under Article
45.54, Texas
Code of
Criminal Procedure, as amended by S.B.
1422,
is a Justice
of the Peace Court prohibited
from expunging
its own records or must
an
affected individual file suit in a District
Court under Article
55.01, Texas
Code of
Criminal Procedure?
2. Under Article
45.54, Texas
Code of
Criminal Procedure, as amended by S.B.
1422,
does a conviction result for purposes of the
Texas
Driver's
License
law under
Article
668733, Section 22, whenever the procedures of
Article
45.54,
Texas
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, are applied
to a traffic
offense
in the Justice of the Peace Court?
3. Should the Texas Department of Public
Safety record a conviction in the applicable
driver's license records of an individual who
has been
placed
under
the
terms
and
obligations of Article
45.54, Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, as amended by S.B.
1422,
since a dismissal and/or expungement
could
result within 180'days or thereafter?
Article
45.54 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure
provides in pertinent part:
p. 4550
Honorable Jimmy F. Davis - Page 2 (JM-912)
1. Upon conviction of the defendant of a
misdemeanor punishable
by fine only,
other
than a misdemeanor
disposed of by Section
143A, Uniform
Act Regulating
Traffic
Highways
(Article 6701d, V.T.C.S.),l
tit:
justice may suspend
the imposition
of the
fine and defer final disposition of the case
for a period not to exceed 180 days.
[Section (2) sets forth conditions that the
justice may
require
the defendant
to meet
during the deferral period.]
3. At the conclusion
of the deferral
period,
if the defendant
presents
satis-
factory evidence
that he has complied
with
the requirements
imposed,
the justice
may
dismiss
the
complaint.
Otherwise,
the
justice may reduce the
fine assessed or may
then
impose the fine assessed.
If
the
complaint is dismissed, a special expense not
to exceed the amount of the fine assessed may
be imposed.
4. Records relating to a complaint
dis-
missed as provided by this article
may
be
expunged under Article 55.01 of this code.
In your first question you inquire whether a justice of
the peace may expunge the court's own records under
section
(4) or, in the alternative, whether a defendant is required
to file suit in district court under
article 55.01 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
Chapter 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
addresses
the matter of expunction of criminal records.
Article 55.01
lists circumstances under which an individual is entitled to
have
"all records
and
files relating
to the
arrest
expunged."
Article
55.02 sets forth the procedure
for
expunction.
The language in section l(a) of article
55.02
1. Section 143A of article 6701d, V.T.C.S.,
provides
that when a person is charaed with a misdemeanor under
this
act, the court may defer proceedings to allow the person
90
days to present evidence that he has successfully
completed
a defensive driving course.
dismiss the charge.
Upon compliance the court shall
-\
p. 4551
Honorable Jimmy F. Davis - Page 3 (JM-912)
appears to prompt your question
relative to the court's
possessing jurisdiction
to hear an expunction
petition.
-/-
Section l(a) states:
A person who is entitled to expunction
of
records and files under this chapter mav file
an x
D rt
dis&ictacotrt
oetition for exnunction
in a
for the countv in which he was
srested(.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Autumn Hills Centers. Inc., 705 S.W.2d
181
(Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ), the venue
and jurisdiction of's court to hear expungment cases was an
issue raised on appeal of
that cause.
In Autumn Hills
the
court stated:
In their second point of error, appellants
argue that the expunction of the criminal
records was invalid because the Harris County
court did not have jurisdiction to hear the
case. Article 55.01 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure ar nt
the riaht to exounae
all
records re1ati.n: to an arrest under
certain
conditions.
Article
55.02 delineates
the
procedure to be followed bv those who meet
the recuirements
of 55.01.
It provides
in
part:
Sec. l(a) A person who
is entitled
to
expunction of records and files under this
chapter may file an ex parte petition
for
expunction in a district court
for the
countv
n
hich
he
(Emphasis'addei.)
was
arrested.
Here the appellees were arrested in Galveston
County, but the expunction petition was filed
and granted
in Harris County.
Because
of
this discrepancy, the expunction is invalid.
The
riaht to exounction
is neither
a
common law nor a constitutional riaht.
Cvrus
v. State, 601 S.W.ld 776 (Tex. Civ. App.
-
Dallas
1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.);
Texas
peoartment of Public Safetv v. Failla,
619
S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana
1981,
no writ):
Annot.
11 A.L.R.4th
956
(1982).
Rather, it exists as a statutorv
orivileae
which
is aranted
and. therefore,
can be
limited bv the leaislature.
Where a cause of
p. 4552
Honorable Jimmy F. Davis - Page 4
(JM-912)
action is derived
solelv bv statute.
the
statutorv
orovisions
are
mandatorv
and
exclusive and must be COmDlied
with or the
action
is not maintainable.
Schwartz
V.
Texas Denartment of Public Safetv
415 S.W.2d
12 (Tex. Civ. App.
- Waco
1967: no writ);
Me&da
v. Texas i&icioal
Retirement
Svstem,
597 S.W.Zd 55 (Tex. Civ. ADD.
- Austin
1980,
no writ): Rowden
v. Texas-Catastroohe
ProDi
ertv Insurance
Association,
677 S.W.Zd
83
(Tex. App.
- Corpus
Christi
[13th Dist.]
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Where a statutorv
privileae exists, it lies within the Dower of
the leaislature
to desianate
a oarticular
court as the exclusive
tribunal to hear
the
matter.
'
Winaus v. Wadlev, 115 Tex. 551,
285
S.W. 1084
(1926): mha
Petroleum
Co. v.
Terrell, 122 Tex. 257, 59 S.W.2d 364
(1933).
Appellees did not adhere
strictly
to the
requirements of Section 55.02.
Aooellees
aroue that
the word
'mav'
creates
a nennissive
venue
statute.
and
therefore, the aeneral
rules of venue
allow
the oetition to be filed in the countv
where
the aonellees
resided.
Exnunction
of
a
sirnina
record
is not a common-law
riaht.
Therefore, the statutorv desianation of venue
.iS mandatorv
and
confers
exclusive
iurisdiction.
McGreaor
v . Clawson,
506
S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1974, no
writ):
Bowie
Indeoendent
Po ner v.
v
School
Dist., 627 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth
[2nd Dist.] 1982, no writ).
The second point
of error is sustained.
(Emphasis added.)
705 S.W.2d 181, 182-83 (Tex. APP- -
1985.
Houston [14th Dist.]
The holding in Autumn Hills
is
statutory privilege,
and compliance
that expunction is a
with the
statute
is
mandatory.
It follows that a petitioner seeking
expunction
under
article
55.01 must comply with
the
requirements
delineated in article 55.02 by filing a petition
in the
district court
in the county in which the defendant
was
arrested.
We do not address here any issue regarding record
retention by a governmental body.
p. 4553
.
Honorable Jimmy F. Davis - Page 5
(JM-912)
you ask whether
a conviction results
for purposes
of
section 22 of article
6687b, V.T.C.S., when the procedures
--
outlined in article
45.54 are applied.
Section
22 of
article 6687b provides the procedure for suspension of a
license to operate
a motor vehicle
following a hearing
in
which it has been determined that the holder of a license
comes within any of the provisions which may authorize
such
suspensions.
Undoubtedly,
you are
referring
to
the
provision where
by suspension
is authorized
because
an
operator comes
within the definition of a habitual
violator
as the result of the number of convictions arising over a
stated period of time.
C
In Attorney General Opinion JM-526 (1986), it was noted
that article 45.54 enables
'Ia 'justice' to make a form of
probation available to defendants convicted of offenses with
a maximum
punishment of a fine not to exceed $200,
i.e.
Class C misdemeanors."
Like our probation
statute
for
higher grades of offenses, article 45.54 provides that ppg~
conviction of the defendant the "justice"
may suspend
the
imposition of the penalty and "defer
final disnosition
of
the case."
(Emphasis added.) m
Code of Crim. Proc.
art.
42.12. We believe
there
is an analogy
in convictions
utilized for the purpose
of suspension
of licenses
under
section 22 of article 668713, V.T.C.S., and convictions
used
for enhancement of punishment
for habitual offenders
under
articles 12.42 (felony) and 12.43 (misdemeanor, class A and
B) of the Penal Code.
It is "well established"
that a
conviction is not final for enhancement oft punishment
under
our habitual
offender
statutes where
there has been
a
probation granted,
deferring
or suspending
imposition
of
punishment.
&
D rte Murchison
560 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.
APP. 1978, no pzt.).
Where
probation
Crim.
is revoked
and a
penalty imposed, the judgment of conviction has then become
final
(absent appeal)
for purposes
of enhancement
of
punishment.
Ex carte Wurchison.
While
section
22 of
article 6687b does not provide any express requirement
that
convictions must be reflected in the final judgment, it is
unreasonable to think that the legislature intended that a
conviction could be utilized
under the habitual
violator
statute where there might be a dismissal or expungment
of
the case within 180 days.
Thus, when the penalty
assessed
in an article 45.54 proceeding has been deferred, such con-
viction may not be used in proving
a conviction
under
n
section 22 of article 66872, until such time as the fine has
been imposed and there is a final judgment in the case.
In
the event the complaint is dismissed
or records
of the
arrest expunged, there is nothing available for the purpose
of proving
a conviction
under the habitual
violator
I--
provisions of article 6687b.
p. 4554
Honorable Jimmy F. Davis - Page 6 (JM-912)
In your
final question,
you ask whether
the Texas
Department of Public
Safety should record
a conviction
in
its driver's
license
records
of a person
who has been
convicted of a class C misdemeanor and has had his penalty
deferred pursuant to article 45.54.
Section 152 of article
6701d requires
a judge to report a conviction
under
the
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways "within ten days
after
conviction"
to the Department
of Public
Safety.
Section 152 further provides that the department shall
keep
all such records
at its main office.
The
failure of any
judicial officer to comply with the reporting
requirement
"shall constitute misconduct in office and shall be grounds
for removal therefrom."
-,
A prior criminal record as defined by section 3(a) of
article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure includes
*Ia
probated or suspended
sentence that has occurred prior
to
trial."
The courts have held that a prior conviction
for
which
the defendant
received
a probated
sentence
is
admissible as part of the defendant's criminal record at the
punishment phase of the trial, even though the
conviction
had been set aside following the successful completion
of
probation.
Vauahn v. State, 634 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982, no pet.); Wavs v. Estell
505 F.2d 116
(5th Cir.
1974).
In Attorney
General Opinion JM-526
(1986), it was
stated that 'Ia person must be convicted before article 45.54
of the Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable."
It is our
opinion that even though the punishment
has been
deferred
,under article 45.54, the conviction should be recorded
by
the Department of Public Safety.
In the
event there
has
been a deferral of the fine under article 45.54, the records
should reflect this
fact. In the event of an expunction,
the use of the record for an
Y
purpose is prohibited
under
section (1) of article 55.03.
2. Section
(2) of article
55.03
states
that
the
petitioner
may deny the occurence
of arrest
following
expunction except as provided
in section (3). Section
(3)
states that when
a person
is under oat~h in a criminql
proceeding and
is questioned
about an arrest
where
the
records have been expunged,
he may
"state only .that the
matter in qiestion has been expunged."
-,
p. 4555
,
Honorable Jimmy F. Davis - Page 7
(JM-912)
--
SUMMARY
A person
seeking
expunction
of records
relating
to a. complaint
dismissed
under
article
45.54 of -~~
"the Code of
Criminal
Procedure must comply with the requirements
delineated in article
55.02 of the Code
of
Criminal Procedure
by filing a petition
in
the district court in the county in which the
defendant was
arrested.
When
the penalty
assessed in an article 45.54 proceeding
has
been deferred,
such conviction may
not be
used in proving a conviction under section 22
of article 6687b until such time as the
fine
has been
imposed and there
is a
final
judgment in the case.
The Department
of
Public Safety should record a conviction even
though the punishment has been deferred under
article
45.54 of
the Code of
Criminal
Procedure.
The record
should reflect
the
fact that punishment has been deferred.
Very truly yo r ,
J ‘/r~h
&
JIM
MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
MARY KELL;ER
First Assistant Attorney General
LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General
JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLKY
Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, opinion Committee
Prepared by Tom G. Davis
Assistant Attorney General
p. 4556
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.