Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion JM-0886
Issued April 06, 1988
Re: Constitutionality of 2601 N. Lamar Blvd. article 342-803a, V.T.C.S., Austin, Texas 78705 which permits the sale of the assets of a bank with- out shareholder approval in certain circumstances
Cites: CN §1.17
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TEE
ATTORNEY
GENERAL
OF TEXAS
April 6, 1988
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
Opinion
No. JM-886
Commissioner
Texas Department
of Banking
Re:
Constitutionality
of
2601 N. Lamar Blvd.
article
342-803a,
V.T.C.S.,
Austin,
Texas
78705
which permits
the sale
of
the assets of a
bank with-
out shareholder
approval
in
certain
circumstances
(RQ-1252)
Dear Mr. Littlefield:
You ask our
opinion about
the constitutionality
of
article
342-803a,
V.T.C.S.,
a recent addition
to the Texas
Banking
Code.
You note that the provision
is designed
to
facilitate
so-called
"open bank assistance"
schemes under-
taken by the Federal Deposit
Insurance
Corporation
(FDIC)
to prevent
the closure
and liquidation
of failing banks in
Texas.
An "open bank assistance"
transaction
permits
the
FDIC to undertake
a variety
of measures
to prevent
the
outright
closure of a bank insured by it, including
making
contributions
to a prospective
purchaser
who may buy
the
assets
of
a
failing
bank.
See
aenerally
12
U.S.C.
51823(c).
Article
342-803a
provides:
Sec. 1.
The
board
of
directors
of
a
state
bank,
with
the
approval
of
the
Commissioner,
may cause the bank to sell all
or
a
substantial
portion
of
the
bank's
assets without
shareholder
approval
if:
(1)
the Commissioner,
through
examina-
tion, finds that the interests
of depositors
and creditors
of
the
bank
are
seriously
jeopardized
because
of the bank's
insolvency
or imminent
insolvency
and that
it is
in
the best
interests
of the
depositors
and
creditors
that certain assets of the bank be
sold: and
p. 4331
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 2
(JM-886)
(2)
the Federal
Deposit
Insurance
Cor-
poration
or
its
successor
has
expressly
consented
to
and approved
the
transaction
and has agreed to provide
assistance
to
the
prospective
buyer
under 12
U.S.C.
Section
1823(c) or a comparable
provision
of law.
Sec. 2.
A sale under
this article
must
include an
assumption
and promise
by
the
buyer to pay or otherwise
discharge:
(1)
all of
the
bank's
liabilities
to
depositors;
(2)
all of
the bank's
liabilities
for
salaries
of
the bank's
employees
incurred
before the date of the sale; and
(3)
the obligations
incurred
by the Com-
missioner
and
fees and
assessments
due
to
the Department
arising
out of the
supervi-
sion of the bank or the sale.
Sec. 3.
This article does not affect the
right of the Commissioner
to take any
other
appropriate
action
permitted
by
[articles
342-801a
or 342-8031
or any other
provision
of this code.
V.T.C.S.
art. 342-803a.
You relate that the FDIC is reluctant
to
participate
in assistance
schemes undertaken
pursuant
to
this
pro-
vision because
of unspecified
concerns
about the constitu-
tionality
of article
342-803a.
Accordingly,
you seek
our
advice on the following
questions:
(1)
Does article
342-803a violate
any of
the
applicable
substantive
or
procedural
requirements
of the
due process
clauses
of
the
United
States
Constitution
or
any
similar provisions
of the
Texas
Constitu-
tion?
(2)
Does article
342-803a
violate
the
impairment
of
contracts
clause
of
Article
One of the United States Constitution
or any
similar provision
of the Texas Constitution?
7.
p. 4332
P
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 3
(JM-886)
(3)
What are
the nature
and extent
of
the
banking
commissioner's
powers
to
regulate
state
banks,
particularly
those
banks
that
are
insolvent
or
imminently
insolvent?
Can the banking
commissioner
use
his regulatory
powers to effectuate
the sale
of
a
bank's
assets
without
judicial
or
shareholder
approval
if he
finds that
the
interests
of depositors
or
creditors
are
seriously
jeopardized
because
of the
bank's
insolvency
or imminent
insolvency,
and
that
it is in the best interest
of depositors
and
creditors
that certain assets be sold?
We assume that your last
question
is limited to
the
scope of the commissioner's
power over "failing"
banks
in
the limited circumstances
specified
by the legislature
in
article
342-803a.
Article
342-803a
furnishes
a
concise,
complete
description
of the banking
commissioner's
powers
to effectuate
transactions
designed
to prevent
"failing"
banks from
becoming
"failed"
ones.
We
note
that
in
addition
to article
342-803a,
the Bankings Code provides
a
"complete
system of laws governing
. . . banks" and
vests
the banking
commissioner
with the authority
to insure
a
strong banking
system for
Texas by expeditiously
winding
up the affairs
of a
failed bank.
V.T.C.S.
art.
342-101.
See also
Skillern,
Closina
and Licuidation
of Banks
in
Texas, 26 SW. L.J. 830 (1972).
The powers of the banking
commissioner
have been
set
out by the legislature
in the Banking Code of 1943,
Title
16, V.T.C.S.
Among the
more important
of these
powers
is the power to
close insolvent
banks.
Article
342-803
provides
that whenever
the commissioner,
through
examination,
finds that the interests
of depositors
and
creditors
of a state
bank
are seriously
jeopardized
through
its insolv;
ency or imminent
insolvency
and that it is to
the best
interest
of
such
depositors
and
creditors
that
the bank
be closed
and
its
assets liquidated,
he may close and liquidate
the bank, unless
its board of directors
close
the bank and place it in his hands for ligui-
dation.
. . .
V.T.C.S.
art. 342-803.
A bank
is insolvent
when it
is
unable to pay
its obligations,
including
the demands
of
depositors,
as they come
due.
&8
V.T.C.S.
art.
342-803
p. 4333
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 4
(JM-886)
?
and cases decided
thereunder.
The Banking
Code sets forth
in detail
the duties
which the
commissioner
of
banking
must discharge
with
regard to banks
closed for
liguida-
tion.
V.T.C.S.
arts. 342-803
to 342-808.
You note that article
342-803a
provides
an
important
mechanism
to facilitate
the
state's efforts
to prevent
a
~~failing~~ institution
from becoming
a "failed"
one.
YOU
define a "failing"
institution
as one which is l*imminently
insolvent
and
whose
failure is
highly
probable."
YOU
relate that the
financial
condition
of
these
institutions
weakens
gradually
until
an
insolvency
is
produced
and the institution
is closed.
The
transition
from a
failing institution
to
a
failed one takes from
six to twelve
months
and
the
institution's
value
steadily
deteriorates
as it gets closer to failure.
You state
that
the new
powers
granted
to
the
banking
commissioner
by article
342-803a
permit the
commissioner
to prevent
the outright
closure
of banks by
facilitating
arrangements
which
include
the
sale
of
a
failing
bank's
"healthy"
assets
to
a
new
entity
which
also
agrees to assume some of
the selling bank's
liabilities,
as specified
in the
statute.1
The statute
does
not,
however,
permit the
Banking Commission
to act
unilater-
ally; a sale
of assets
under article
342-803a
can
take
place a
if the Federal
Deposit
Insurance
Corporation
has expressly
consented
to and approved
the
transaction
[for the sale of assets]
and has
agreed to provide
assistance
to the prospec-
tive buyer under 12 U.S.C.
Section
1823(c)
or a comparable
provision
of law.
1.
Article
342-803a
does not
require
the
purchasing
entity to
assume
claims
of
subordinated
creditors
or
claims
of
stockholders.
See
V.T.C.S.
art.
342-804a.
Because the article
requires
only
a
partial
assumption
of
liabilities,
the
consummation
of
a
sale
of
assets
transaction
under
article
342-803a
may in
practice
be
insufficient
to save a failing bank from insolvency.
p. 4334
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 5
(JM-886)
V.T.C.S.
art. 342-803a,
51(2).
It is in this c,ontext that
you ask
us
to
address the
FDIC's
concerns
about
the
constitutionality
of
the
sale of
assets
procedure
set
forth in article
342-803a.
I.
A.
Article
XVI, section
16,
of the Texas
Constitution
provides,
in pertinent
part:
Sec. 16.
(a)
The
Legislature
shall
by
general
laws, authorize
the incorporation
of
state banks
and savings
and loan
associa-
tions and
shall
provide
for
a
system
of
State supervision,
regulation
and control
of
such bodies
which will
adequately
protect
and
secure
the
depo~sitors
and
creditors
thereof.
This provision
permits
the legislature,
by general
law, to
authorize
the creation
of corporations
with banking
and
discounting
privileges
and to provide
for the control
and
supervision
of such corporations
by the state.
Pursuant
to this constitutional
grant of legislative
authority,
the
Texas Banking Code of 1943
provides
a complete
system of laws governing
the organization,
operation,
supervision
and
liquidation
of
state
banks,
and
to
the
extent indicated
by
the context,
governing
private banks and
national
banks
domiciled
in this State.
. . .
V.T.C.S.
art. 342-101.
The Banking Code specifically
commits
the
management
of all
of the
affairs
of
a banking
corporation
to
the
directors
of the banking
corporation
elected by the share-
holders,
unless
the
shareholders
have
adopted
by-laws
providing
otherwise.
V.T.C.S.
art. 342-409.
Unlike
the
Texas Business
Corporations
Act, nothing
in the
Banking
Code requires
that shareholders
approve
the sale of
all,
or substantially
all, of the banking
corporation's
assets.
Comnare
Bus. Corp. Act art. 5.10 (A)(3) (two-thirds
vote
of shareholders
required
for sale of all, or substantially
all, of the assets of a non-banking
corporation
outside
of
the
regular
course
of
business).
The
provisions
in
article
342-803a
of the Banking Code for a sale of
assets
p. 4335
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 6
(JM-886)
based solely on the approval
of the directors
are
consis-
tent with the Banking
Code's overall
commitment
of author-
ity to directors
elected
by the shareholders
rather
than
to the shareholders
themselves.
In the context
of
the question
under discussion,
it
is important
to note that
the provisions
of the
Business
Corporations
Act
do
not apply
to
banking
corporations
unless the
Banking
Code
is silent
with regard
to
some
matter
of
corporate
governance
provided
for
in
the
Business
Corporations
Act.
Bus. Corp.
Act
art.
9.14,
5 (A) - Where the Banking
Code is silent, the provisions
of
the Business
Corporations
Act will apply,
to the
extent
that they are not inconsistent
with the provisions
of
the
Banking
Code.
u.
The
provision
in
the
Business
Corporations
Act
requiring
shareholder
approval
for the sale of all of
the
assets of a corporation
outside
of the regular
course
of
business
is in conflict
with the provisions
of the Banking
Code, which leave
such decisions
generally
in the
hands
of the directors.
Article
342-409
of the
Banking
Code
requires
that
the directors,
and not
the
stockholders,
make decisions
about the management
of the bank, unless
a
banking
corporation#s
by-laws
provide
otherwise.
Article
342-803a
is consistent
with the Banking Code generally
in
committing
a decision
about whether
to sell
all of
the
assets of the
bank corporation
to
the directors.
Since
the Banking
Code
commits
authority
over
bank affairs
to
directors
rather than shareholders,
the provision
in
the
Business
Corporations
Act. requiring
shareholder
approval
for the sale of all of the assets of a corporation
outside
of the regular
course of business
does not apply to
sales
of bank
assets
such
as those
contemplated
in
article
342-803a
of the Banking
Code.
See aenerallv
Robertson
v.
State ex rel. William
H. Clement,
406 S.W.Zd 90 (Tex. Civ.
APP. -- Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(Banking
Code
of 1943 provides
a complete
system of laws governing
the
organization
of
banking
corporations:
when
the
Banking
Code is specific
about some aspect of the management
of
a
banking
corporation,
it
operates
to
the
exclusion
of
provisions
in the Business
Corporations
Act).
Consequently,
in
the
ordinary
situation,
article
342-803a
cannot
possibly
impair
any of
the "rightsl'
of
shareholders
guaranteed
under either federal or state law,
because
shareholders
in
banking
corporations
have
no
**right** to approve the sale
of the assets of the
corpor-
ation in
the
situation
specified
in
article
342-803a,
p. 4336
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 7
(JM-886)
unless they
have
reserved
that
right
in
a
corporate
by-law.
Only when the shareholders
have reserved
through
a by-law
the right ~to
approve the
sale of
the
assets
of the bank do
questions
about
the constitutionality
of
article
342-803a
arise.
B.
The by-laws
of a
corporation
are a contract
between
the
corporation
and
its
shareholders.
Ainsworth
v.
Southwestern
Drug Corooration,
95 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1938)
(citing Texas law).
Both the federal and state
constitu-
tions prohibit
the impairment
of contracts
by the
state.
U.S. Const., art.
I, section
10,
clause 1.
U.S.
Const.
amend. 14; Tex. Const. art. I,
516.
In this case, it
is
important
to
determine
whether
the
legislature's
determination
in article
342-803a that the directors
of
a
banking
corporation
may sell
all of
the assets
of
the
corporation
without
shareholder
approval
impermissibly
impairs the contract
rights of shareholders
who, by
means
of a corporate
by-law,
have reserved
the right to
approve
such transactions.
Ordinarily,
rights
are
governed
by
the
law
that
existed
at the
the time the
rights vested.
Lanuever
Miller,
76 S.W.2d 1025
(Tex. 1934).
Subsequent
legisl::
tion that impairs
vested contract
rights is
unconstitu-
tional. Id.: Travellers'
Insurance
Comnanv v. Marshall,
76
S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. 1934).
S
,
Colleae
v.
Woodward,
17 eX'
a., Trustees
of Dartmouth
(4 Wheat.)
518
(1819)
(charters
granted
to
corporations
by
state
are
constitutionally
protected
contracts).
In the case of banking
corporations
created
under the
general
authority
granted
by
the
constitution
to
the
legislature,
a somewhat
different
analysis
of the issue of
an unconstitutional.
impairment
of
a
contract
must
be
pursued.
Every charter granted
to a banking
corporation
by the state is subject to the following
reservation:
The rights, privileges,
and powers conferred
by this [Banking] Code
are held subject
to
the right of the legislature
to amend, alter
or reform the same.
V.T.C.S.
art. 342-302.
See also Bus. Corp. Act. art. 9.12.
Without
this
specific
reservation,
we believe
that
article
342-803a
would be considered,
under Texas law,
to
work an unconstitutional
impairment
of a contract
between
p. 4337
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 8
(JM-886)
,
the shareholders
and the
corporation,
where
the
share-
holders
have reserved
the right, by means of a by-law,
to
vote to approve the sale of all, or substantially
all,
of
the assets of the
banking
corporation.
Tex . Const . art.
I, 516; Travellers'
Insurance
Co., m.2
Both the charter
of a corporation
and the legislative
act creating
it become part of the contract
between
share-
holders,
Shanken
v. Lee
Wolfman.
Inc., 370
S.W.2d
197
(Tex. Civ. App.
- Houston
1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.),
and
all relevant
constitutional
and statutory
laws are
incor-
porated
as a part of the corporate
charter
(which controls
the by-laws
bf
the
corporation).
Baw
‘V.
Lone
Star
Buildina
8
Loan Association
71 S.W.2d
863, 867,
1934) see also wner
v. Sohthwestern
Sav.
(Tex.
and Loan Ass'n
'of Houston,
320 S.W.Zd 164 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin
1958),
aff'd in Dart, rev'd in Dart, 331 S.W.Zd 917 ( Tex.1960).
The
legislature's
reservation
of
authority,
in
article
342-302,
to alter the Banking
Code, is
sufficient
to permit the state to alter the relationship
between
the
state and the
banking
corporation,
and the
relationship
between
the
banking
corporation
and
its
shareholders,
without
violating
any constitutional
prohibitions
against
the
impairment
of
contracts.
Trustees
of
Dartmouth
co11 eae, sunra, s
concurring
opinion
of Justice
Story.
See also
The
Sinkins
Fund
Cases,
99 U.S.
700
(1878);
Brundaue
V.
he New Jersev Zinc. Co,
226 A.2d 585
(1967)
See a enerally
18 Am. Jur. 2d 5083-901 Official
Comments
to
section
1.02
of
the
Model
Business
Corporations
Act
(1987); 7A Fletcher
Cyclopedia
Corporations,
553668-3690;
Gibson,
How Fixed are Class Shareholder
Riahts?,
23 Law
&
2.
The Texas
Constitution
has
been
interpreted
to
impose a
far
stricter
limit on
legislation
under
the
police power which impedes the exercise
of a pre-existing
contract
right
that
which
is
imposed
by
the
federal
constitution.
Comoare
the
decision
of the
Texas Supreme
Court in
Travellers'
Insurance
co.,
suora
(holding
a
mortgage
moratorium
unconstitutional
under
article
I,
section
16,
of
the
Texas Constitution
even
under
the
circumstances
of
a general
economic
collapse)
with
the
decision
of
the
United
States
Supreme
Court
in
Home
Buildins
&
Loan Association
v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S.
398
(1934)
(sustaining
a
similar
moratorium
against
a
challenge
under the contracts
clause).
p. 4338
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 9
(JW-886)
P
,-
-
Contemp.
Probs.,
283 (1958); Note, "Corporations
--
Stock
Alienation
Restrictions
-- Powers of Directors
to Restrict
Issued
Stock,*'
14 SW.
L.
J.
106
Vorporations:
(1960);
Note,
Alteration
of Shareholder's
Rights:
Scope
of the
Reserved
Power,"
3 Okla.
L.
Rev.
222
(1950).
Contracts,
however
express,
may
not
fetter
the
constitutional
authority
of the legislature.
not remove
their
transactions
"Parties
may
from
the
reach
of
the
dominant
constitutional
power by
making contracts
about
them."
Norman v. Baltimore
&
Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S.
240,
307-08
(1935).
Any
other
conclusion
would
alter
the
long-standing
policy,
embodied
in both
the
state
con-
stitution
and the banking
code, of placing
strict controls
upon, the operations
of banking
the public
interest.
corporations
to
protect
II.
You also
inquire whether
article
342-803a
deprives
shareholders
in banking
corporations
of their property
in
violation
of either the
United States or Texas
Constitu-
tions.
See U.S.
Const., amends.
5 and
14; Tex.
Const.
art. I, §17.
We conclude
that the statute works no
such
deprivation.
Article
I,
section
17, of
the
Texas
Constitution
provide,
in part:
No person's
property
shall be taken, damaged
or destroyed
or
applied to
without
adequate
a
public
use
compensation
being
made,
unless by the consent of such person.
. . .
We are unable to determine
how article
342-803a
could
be applied to violate
either article
I, section
17, of the
Texas Constitution,
or the
United States
Constitution's
Fifth
and
Fourteenth
Amendment
prohibitions
against
deprivation
of
property
without
"just
compensation"
or
"due process
of law.
Article
342-803a
of the Banking
Code
does not
permit the
banking
commissioner
to
order
the
directors
of banking
corporation
to sell the assets of the
corporation
in lieu of closing
it: it merely permits
the
commissioner
to approve,
and
in some ways to
facilitate,
such a sale after the directors
have approved
it in accord
with their
powers
under the
Banking
Code.
Nor
do
we
understand
that the
banking
commissioner
is granted
the
power
by
article
342-803a
to
1'coercee8
recalcitrant
directors
to
vote
to
sell
the
banking
corporation's
assets.
While the directors
of a failing bank may not
be
p. 4339
,
Mr.
Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 10
(374-886)
given to
acts
of
heroism
in
resisting
the
unpleasant
suggestions
of bank regulators,
article
342-803a
gives the
commissioner
no
power
to
force
bank
directors
to
do
anything.
So long as a bank
is not in a condition
which
would permit the banking
commissioner
to intervene
in
its
management,
or to close it, see V.T.C.S.
arts. 342-801
and
803,
then
the
directors
remain
in
control
of
the
institution's
fate.
The foregoing
analysis
leads us
to
conclude
that
article
342-803a
cannot be considered
to be a species
of
"eminent
domain,"
"forced
sale,"
or
lltaking'* statute,
since it '*takes10 nothing,
and since it can
in no way
be
said
to
render
valueless
by
state
action
something
previously
valuable.
See, e.a
Attorney
General
Opinion
JW-827
(1987).
If
anything,
aiticle
342-803a
extends
a
modicum
of
hope
to
the
shareholders
of
a
failing,
imminently
insolvent
bank
that
they
may
be
able
to
preserve
something
of
their
equity
property
interests
through
a government-assisted
sale of assets sufficient
to
raise the
cash necessary
to pay all
claims against
the
bank in accordance
with the table of priorities
specified
in article
342-804a,
V.T.C.S.
The statute thus
preserves
rather
than
defeats
the
"distinct
investment-backed
expectationst'
of
stockholders,
a key
factor
mitigating
against
a "taking"
label for the provision.
Penn
Central
Transnortation
Co. v. New York Citv, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Although
the banking
commissioner
has wide powers
to
act to protect
the public welfare
by preserving
a
sound
banking
system, those powers are circumscribed
by
consti-
tutional
safeguards.
The
prohibitions
in
article
I,
section
17, of the Texas Constitution
and the constitution
forbid the state
to appropriate
the
assets of a
banking
corporation
owned by the stockholders,
either directly,
as
a prize for the state treasury,
or indirectly,
by
forcing
the transfer
of those assets to some private
party of
the
state's
choosing,
all without
payment.
Even if article
342-803a
raises threshold
questions
which trigger
the
application
of
constitutional
safe-
guards,
analysis
cannot end with a simple conclusion
that
any exercise
of power by the state to the detriment
of the
owners of a failing bank is impermissible.
Under
certain
circumstances,
property
may in
fact be
constitutionally
expropriated,
without
anv compensation
as an exercise
of
the kind of police
power --
power to protect
the
public
welfare
against
the
depredations
of
banking
corporations
-- which
the
Texas
Constitution
expressly
p. 4340
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 11
(JM-886)
reserves
to the state in Article
XVI, section
16. Attorney
General
Opinion JM-600
(1986) (and the cases cited
there-
in).
Of
course, we
acknowledge
that
the Texas
Supreme
Court holds that in certain circumstances
property
may not
be taken without
compensation,
even in the exercise
of the
police power.
Citv of
C lleae
Corooration,
680
S.W.2d 8:2
Station v.
Turtle
Rock
804
(Tex. 1984);
Citv
of
Austin
v.
Teaoue,
570
S.W.2d
389,
391
(Tex.
1978);
Attorney
General
Opinion
JM-294
(1984).
See
also
Stoebuck,
Police Power. Takinas
and Due Process,
37
Wash.
8 Lee L. Rev. 1057 (1980).
Whether
a particular
applica-
tion of
the police
power is
unconstitutional
is
always
a matter of
fact, and
the
issue must
be decided
on
a
case-by-case
basis.
Citv
of Austin
v.
Teaaue,
a;
Attorney
Genera;
CFinAo; y-827
(1987). See also
Connollv
v. Pension
&an fi
u r ntv Corooration,
475
U.S.
211
(1986).
We
are confident
that article
342-803a
is
far
removed
from being the
species of statute that
such constitutional
concerns.
engenders
The provision,
enacted
to
deal with general
distress
in the banking
industry,
merely
implements
'*a public program
that adjusts
the benefits
and
burdens
of economic
life
and . . . does not constitute
a
taking"
requiring
compensation.
Connollv
Pension
Benefit Guarantv
Coroora~~o~~
suora.
See oenerzily
Annot.
"Supreme
Court's views
what constitutes
within meaning
of Fifth
Amendment's
command
that
"takina."
private
property
not be
taken for
public use
without
just
com-
pensation,"
57 L.Ed.2d
1254.
P
III.
You relate that
the Federal
Deposit
Insurance
Cor-
poration
(FDIC),
whose
promise
of
assistance
to
the
purchasers
of
a
failing
bank's assets
(who
must
also
assume certain
of its
liabilities)
legally
is
required
before article
342-803a
may
be
applied by
the
banking
commissioner,
has expressed
certain unspecified
concerns
about the constitutionality
of the statute.
Because those
concerns
remain
unidentified,
we
cannot
address
them
directly,
other
than to
assume that
they may
encompass
some of the points discussed
in parts one and two of
this
opinion.
National
bank
regulators
may
rely
on
a
federal
statute which
works
in a
much
more severe
fashion
to
accomplish
certain
bank "rescue"
operations
through
the
sale of assets in a way similar to article
342-803a.
The
provision,
12
U.S.C. section
181, provides
in
relevant
part:
p. 4341
Mr. Kenneth W.,Littlefield
- Page 12
(JW-886)
Any [national
banking]
association
may
go
into liquidation
and be
closed by the
vote
of its shareholders
owning two-thirds
of its
stock.
If the liouidation
is to be effected
in whole or in Dart throuah
the sale of
its
assets to and the assumDtion
of its deDosits
and liabilities
bv another
bank. the
Dur-
chase
and
sale
aoreement
must
also
be
DDrOVed
bv
its
shareholders
gwo-thirds
of its stock unless an
owninq
emeraencv
exists and the
corDtroller
of the
Currencv
. .
sDecificallv
waives
such
reouirement
for
shareholder
aDDrova1.
(Emphasis
added.)
12 U.S.C.
5181 (Supp.
1988).
The power of the comptroller
of the currency
to suspend the
right of shareholders
to
approve
the sale
of a bank's
assets has been
sustained.
See. e.q, Minichello
v. Saxon, 266 F.Supp.
279 (D.C.
M.D.
Pa. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Minichello
v. CamD
394 F.2d 715
(3rd Cir. 1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 849, rehearino
den.,
393 U.S. 992 (1968).
We find no reported
cases
upholding
a constitutional
challenge
to this statute.
Certainly,
the
"emergency"
required
by
the
federal
statute
must
be
analogous
to the situation
in which article
342-803a
would
be applied,
namely
a
situation
in
which
a
financial
institution
finds
itself
in
a
*'failingl' but
not
yet
**failed"
condition.
Minichello
v.
Saxon,
supra.
Additionally,
unlike banking
corporations
subject
to
the
federal statute,
shareholders
in banks operating
under the
Texas Banking
Code have
no
general
statutory
right
to
approve
the sale of all of the assets of the corporation.
SUMMARY
Article
342-803a
of
the
Texas
Banking
Code of
1943,
which
permits
the
banking
commissioner
to
approve
the
sale
of
the
assets
of
a
banking
corporation
by
its
directors
in certain
situations
specified
in
the statute,
is a
constitutional
exercise
the legislature's
power
to provide
for
a
safe
banking
system.
Shareholders
'
banking
corporations
organized
under
tk:
Banking
Code have
no right
to approve
the
sale of all,
or substantially
all, of
the
assets of
the banking
corporation,
unless
they have reserved
such a right by means
of
a corporate
by-law.
The legislature
has, by
means of
its reserved
power to
amend
the
p. 4342
Mr. Kenneth W. Littlefield
- Page 13
(JM-886)
Banking Code, overridden
such by-laws
in the
case
of
banking
corporations
operating
within
the
circumstances
specified
in
article
342-803a,
V.T.C.S.
JIM
MATTOX
Attorney
General
of Texas
MARY KELLER
First Assistant
Attorney
General
LOU MCCREARY
Executive
Assistant
Attorney
General
JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant
Attorney
General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman,
Opinion
Committee
Prepared
by Don Bustion
Assistant
Attorney
General
p. 4343
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.