Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion JM-0857
Issued February 16, 1988
Re: Whether a taxing unit that contracts with a private attorney pur- suant to section 6.30 of the Tax Code may impose the additional penalty of 15 percent authorized by section 33.07 of the Tax Code in an instance in which the section 6.30 contract provides that the delinquent tax attorney will be com- pensated by a percentage of less than 15 percent
Cites: TX §6.30, TX §33.01, TX §33.07, TX §33.48
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THE
ATTOR-VEY
GENERAL
OF
TEXAS
February 16, 1988
Honorable Gary Garrison
Ector County Attorney
Room 218, Courthouse
Odessa, Texas
79761
Honorable Billy Ray Stubblefield
Williamson County Attorney
P. 0. Drawer 1139
Georgetown, Texas
78627
,-
Opinion.No. (.I+857)
Re:
Whether
a taxing
unit that contracts with
a private
attorney pur-
suant to section 6.30 of
the Tax Code may impose
the additional
penalty
of 15 percent authorized
by section 33.07 of the
Tax Code in an instance
in which
the section
6.30 contract
provides
that the delinquent tax
attorney
will be com-
pensated by a percentage
of less than
15 percent
(RQ-984)
Gentlemen:
You request an opinion on the authorized expenditure
of penalties
imposed pursuant to section
33.07 of the
Tax Code, which
permits
taxing units
to provide
that
delinquent ad valorem
taxes incur "an
to defray
costs of collection" if
additional penalty
the taxing unit has
contracted with an attorney under section 6.30 of the Tax
Code.
See aenerally
Attorney
General
Opinion
JM-285
(1984) (discussing circumstances under which section 33.07
penalty may be applied to delinquent taxes).
Section 6.30
of the Tax Code provides in part:
(a) The county attorney or, if there
is
no county
attorney, the district
attorney
shall represent
the county
to enforce
the
collection
of delinquent
taxes
if
the
commissioners court does not contract with a
private attorney as provided by Subsection
(c) of this section.
.
.
.
.
p. 4145
Honorable Gary Garrison
Honorable Billy Ray Stubblefield
Page 2
(JM-857
(c) The governing body of a taxing
unit
may contract with any competent attorney
to
represent the unit to enforce the collection
of delinquent
taxes.
The attornev's
com-
pensation is set in the contract. but the
total amount
of ComDensation
Drovided
may
not exceed
20 Dercent
of the
amount of
delinouent
tax,
Denaltv.
and
interest
collected.
(Emphasis added.)
Tax Code 56.30; see also Attorney General
Opinion JM-135
(1984) (neither county attorney
nor city attorney
may
enter into a contract
pursuant to section 6.30(c)
of the
Tax Code).
Section 33.01 of the Tax Code establishes the penalty
and interest imposed on delinquent taxes.
Section 33.07
of the Tax Code authorizes the additional
penalty
as
follows:
I
(a) A taxing unit or appraisal
district
may provide, in the manner required by
law
for official action by the body, that taxes
that remain delinquent on July 1 of the year
in which
they become delinquent
incur an
additional
Denaltv
to
defrav
costs
of
collection
if the unit or district
or
another unit that collects taxes
for the
unit has contracted with
an attorney
pur-
suant to Section 6.30 of this code.
The
amount of the Denaltv mav not exceed
15
percent of the amount of taxes, Denaltv, and
interest due.
.
.
.
.
(c) If a penalty is imposed pursuant
to
this section, a taxing unit may not recover
attorneyIs
fees in
a suit to
collect
delinquent taxes
subject
to the penalty.
(Emphasis added.)
Tax Code 533.07.
Mr. Stubblefield informs us that some attorneys who
have applied to collect delinquent
taxes for Williamson
County have proposed
that the county
impose the full 15
percent penalty under section
33.07 of the Tax
Code, but
compensate them only at the rate of 12.5 percent, with the
county retaining 2.5 percent
to defray
its own costs
of
p. 4146
Honorable Gary Garrison
Honorable Billy Ray Stubblefield
Page 3 m-857)
collecting the delinquent taxes.
You both ask whether the
penalty imposed and collected
under section 33.07 may be
used to defray the taxing unit's
costs
of collecting
delinquent taxes, or whether the penalty may
only be used
to compensate
the attorney
who contracts
to collect
delinquent taxes pursuant to section 6.30 of the Tax Code.
The answer to your
question depends on whether
"costs of
collection" in section
33.07 refers only to the cost of
contracting with an attorney pursuant to section 33.07, or
whether it includes costs incurred by the county.
Before addressing
your specific
question, we point
out that the
15 percent
figure represents the maximum
penalty that may be imposed by a taxing unit.
A taxing
unit may
impose a section
33.07 penalty
of a lesser
percentage.
In addition, the taxing unit may
change the
amount of penalty from year to year, if it does so "in the
manner
required
by law for official
action
by the
body. . . ." Tax Code
533.07(a).
Thus, by referring in
this draft to the "15 percent penalty," we do not intend
to negate the taxing unit's power
to set an amount less
than 15 percent and to change the amount of penalty from
year to year.
Turning to your question,
we will
first examine
former statutory
provisions,
to establish some of the
circumstances under which
section 33.07 of the Tax
Code
was enacted.
See Gov't
Code
5311.023 (construction
of
statutes in a code). The provisions you inquire about are
found in the Property Tax Code, which was
adopted in 1979
and codified as Title I of the Tax Code.
Tax Code 31.01;
B
Acts
1979, 66th Leg., ch. 841.
Section 33.07 was
added to the Property
Tax Code in 1981, in a
bill
which
adopted a series of amendments to the Property
Tax Code.
u
H.B. No. 30, Acts
1981, 67th Leg., 1st C.S.,
ch. 13,
at 168.
Before the Property
Tax Code was adopted,
former
article 7335, V.T.C.S., authorized the commissioners court
to contract with a private attorney
to enforce or assist
in the enforcement
or
the collection
of any delinquent
State
and county
taxes
for a percent
on
the
taxes, penalty
and
interest
actually
collected. . . .
Acts 1923, 38th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 13, at 37;
Acts
1923,
38th Leg., 3d C.S., ch. 21, at 182. Former article 7335a,
V.T.C.S., provided that the compensation under
a contract
p. 4147
Honorable Gary Garrison
Ro;zr;blT$-F5;fr Ray Stubblefield
to collect delinquent taxes could not be more than 15 per-
cent of the amount
collected.
Acts 1930, 41st Leg., 4th
C.S., ch. 8, at 9.
These provisions
also
school districts.
applied
to
Bell v. Mansfield Indenendent
School
District, 129 S.W.2d 629
(Tex. 1939). Articles
7335 and
7335a, V.T.C.S.,
were
revised
and
recodified
as
subsections 6.30(c) through 6.30(e)
of the Tax Code, and
the total compensation payable
to the attorney
under the
contract was increased, so that it now "may not exceed 20
percent of the amount of delinquent
tax, penalty,
and
interest collected."
Under
former law, there
was
no
requirement that the compensation be paid
from delinquent
tax COlleCtiOnS.
Morrison v. Lane, 157 S.W.2d
466 (Tex.
Civ. APP.
- Beaumont
1941, no writ);
see aenerallv
Attorney General Opinion WW-217 (1980).
provide
in its
The county had to
budget
for the
contract
compensation.
Morrison v. Lane, sunra.
attorney's
Fifteen percent of the amount collected
constituted
an absolute limit on the amount that could be paid
to an
attorney under contract
pursuant to former
articles 7335
and 7335a, V.T.C.S.
Attorney
General
Opinion
O-4004
(1941) concluded
that the attorney contracting
with
a
school district could not make claims in excess
of the 15
percent limit to pay
for stationery,
stamps, and other
similar items used
in collecting
delinquent taxes.
The
opinion stated as follows:
It is manifest
that unless
the school
district pays
for the stationery,
stamps,
etc., the tax attorney must provide
such
items.
It is also manifest
that
if the
tax attorney
receives
15% of the amount
collected
plus a payment
for the above
mentioned items he will
receive more
than
15% of the amount collected,
the maximum
amount allowed by law.
Attorney General Opinion O-4004 (1941).
Thus, at the time section
33.07 of the Tax Code was
adopted, no particular source
of funds was
designated to
pay the private attorney's compensation under section 6.30
of the Tax
Code.
The
legislature
was,
moreover,
presumably aware that compensation for the attorney might
include payment
for his expenditures for supplies
and
other items which could not strictly speaking be described
as attorney
fees. See Attorney
General Opinion
O-4004
(1941).
p. 4148
-
P
Honorable Gary Garrison
Honorable Billy Ray Stubblefield
Page 5
(JM-857)
Section 33.07 of the Tax Code provides for
an additional
nenaltv
to defrav
costs
of
collection
if the unit
or district
or
another unit that collects taxes
for the
unit has
contracted
with
attorney
pursuant
to Section
6.30 ofanthis
code.
(Emphasis added.)
Tax Code 933.07(a).
This penalty
provides funds to pay
some or all of the attorney's compensation under a section
6.30 contract.
The additional penalty may be imposed upon
a delinquent taxpayer
only if the taxes are going
to be
collected by a private
attorney pursuant to section 6.30
of the code. This condition for imposing
the additional
penalty suggests that
funds realized
from collecting
it
must be applied to payment of the attorney's compensation.
This reading of section 33.07(a) is supported by sub-
section (c) of that statute, which provides as follows:
If a penalty is imposed pursuant to this
section,
a taxing unit may not recover
attorneyIs
fees in
a suit to
collect
delinquent taxes subject to the penalty.
Tax Code,
533.07(c).
The section 33.07 penalty may be
seen as a substitute for court-ordered attorney fees, with
the advantage that the taxing unit determines
the amount
of penalty
up to the 15 percent maximum,
and that the
penalty can be collected even
if the case does not go to
court.
See.
a
Tax Code
533.48(a)(4)
attorney's feeseappkoved by the court).
(reasonable
Section 33.48 of the Tax Code provides
for the costs
and expenses that a taxing
unit may recover in a suit to
collect a delinquent tax:
(a) In addition to other costs
authorized
by law, a taxing unit is entitled to recover
the following costs and expenses in a suit to
collect a delinquent tax:
(1) all usual
court costs,
including
the cost of serving process:
(2) expenses of foreclosure sale:
(3) reasonable
expenses,
subject
to
approval by the court, that are incurred by
.-
p. 4149
Honorable Gary Garrison
Honorable Billy Ray Stubblefield
Page 6 (m-857)
the taxing
unit in determining the name,
identity, and location of necessary parties
and
'
procuring
necessary
descrittions of the property on
legal
which
a
delinquent tax is due; and
(4) reasonable attOrnSV*S
fSSS
aDDrOVed
bv the court and not exceedina 15 nercent
of the total amount
of taxes.
nenalties,
and interest adiudaed due the unit.
.
.
.
.
(cl
Fees collected for attorneys and other
officials are fees of office, extent that fees
for contract attornevs
reoresentina a taxinq
unit that
is joined or intervenes
shall be
aonlied
toward
the
comoensation
due
the
attornev
under
the
contract.
(Emphasis
added.)
Tax Code 533.48. The attorney's fees authorized
by sub-
section (a)(4) of section 33.48 may not be recovered
if
the taxing
unit
imposes a penalty
pursuant to section
33.07 of the code.
Subsection
(c) of section
33.48
provides that fees for contract attorneys shall be applied
toward the contractual compensation
rather than
supple-
menting it. See aenerally Attorney General
Opinion ME-67
(1979) (contract entered
into under
former article
7335
and 7335a, V.T.C.S., does not permit
contract attorney to
receive attorney fees in connection with motion to compel
answers to interrogatories).
The provisions of section
33.48 support the view that there is an equivalence
of
purpose between the section 33.07 penalty,
court-ordered
attorney fees, and compensation
payable
to the private
attorney under a section 6.30 contract.
There
is support
in the legislative
history
of
section 33.07 that the penalty it authorizes
is to be
allocated only to the compensation payable
to an attorney
under a section 6.30 contract.
The fiscal note to House
Bill No. 30 of the 67th Legislature, First Called Session,
stated as follows:
Some increase
in revenue to taxing
units
would result
from the
increase in penalty
and interest rates on delinquent taxes
and
from allowing
the taxing
unit to
impose
additional penalty on delinquent taxes of up
to 15% for attorney's fees, if delinquent on
p. 4150
Honorable Gary Garrison
Honorable Billy Ray Stubblefield
Page 7 (m-857)
July 1 and if the unit has contracted with a
delinquent tax attorney.
Fiscal Note on file in Legislative Reference
Library for
H.B. No. 30, 67th Leg., 1st C.S. (July 17, 1981). This
document refers to the section
imposed "for attorney's
33.07 penalty as being
fees," thus
that the penalty
is
supporting the view
contracting attorney.
applied solely to compensate
the
A Texas court,
bring a class
in considering whether taxpayers could
action to recover section 33.07
which they had paid, repeatedly
referred to the
penalties
section
33.07 penalties
as "attorney
fees," and
"attorney
fee
charges."
See Salvaaaio
v. Houston
Indenendent
School
District, 709 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.]
1986, writ dism'd).
For example, the court
in Salvaaaio
characterized the penalty as *'§33.07 attorney
imposed to cover the collection of
fee charges
the delinquent taxes."
709 S.W.2d
at 308.
The court thus assumed
that the
penalty was allocated to the contract
attorney's costs of
collection.
Even though the court was not addressing the
issue before
us, its assumption
as to the use of the
section 33.07 penalties demonstrates the reasonableness of
construing "costs of collection"
to refer to the cost of
having a private attorney collect delinquent taxes.
We conclude that the penalty
imposed and collected
under section 33.07 of the Tax Code may not be spent to
defray costs
of collection
incurred by a taxing
unit
itself. The penalty payments must go
attorney with whom
the taxing unit
to compensating the
has contracted
to
collect its delinquent
taxes. The taxing unit need not
impose the
full 15 percent
penalty
authorized.
That
figure is a maximum, and the statute
does not compel
a
taxing unit to pay an attorney more than his services are
worth.
In drafting the contract, the taxing
unit has the
opportunity to include specific
terms on the "costs of
collection" which the attorney will absorb.
If a taxing unit does not contract with
an attorney
under section 6.30 of the Tax Code, the delinquent taxes
are collected by the attorney
who ordinarily
represents
it, and the taxing unit has to pay
for all costs
of tax
collection.
unit to
Section 33.07 of the code permits the taxing
shift to the delinquent
taxpayer the cost of
compensating the outside attorney with whom
it contracts.
We have
found no evidence
that the legislature
also
intended the delinquent
taxpayer
to absorb the taxing
unit's collection
costs over and above the attorneyrs
p. 4151
Honorable Gary Garrison
Honorable Billy Ray Stubblefield
Page 8 (Jk-857)
compensation under
a section
6.30 contract.
Statutes
imposing penalties are to be strictly construed.
Hatch v.
Davis, 621 S.W.2d
443 (Tex. App.
- Corpus Christi
1981,
writ ref'd n.r.e.);
w
Attorney
General Opinion
JM-285
(1984) (discussing applicabilty of section 33.07 penalty).
Accordingly, we advise you that the penalty imposed
and
collected under section 33.07 of the Tax Code may not be
used to defray
the taxing units'
costs
of
delinquent taxes.
collecting
SUMMARY
Pursuant to section 33.07 of the Tax
Code, a taxing unit that has contracted with
an attorney
to collect
delinquent
taxes
under
section
6.30 of the Tax Code
is
authorized to impose a penalty not to exceed
15 percent against
delinquent taxpayers
to
cover
the attorney's
compensation.
The
taxing unit may
not apply any part of the
penalties collected under
section 33.07 to
any additional costs of collection which
it
incurs but must use all of the assessed
penalties solely to compensate the attorney
with whom it contracted.
JIM
MATTOX
-
Attorney General of Texas
MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General
JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Susan L. Garrison
Assistant Attorney General
?
p. 4152
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.