Attorney General Opinion JM-0855

February 11, 1988 Honorable Robert P. McGuill Opinion No. JM-855 Refugio County Attorney P. 0. Box 307 Re: Whether a county com- Refugio, Texas 78377 missioner may contract with his county to lease hangar space at a county airport for the purpose of operating a private business (RQ-1306) Dear Mr. McGuill: you ask the following question: May a county commissioner, directly or indirectly, contract with a county to lease hangar space at a county airport for the purpose of operating a private business enterprise for profit without violating his oath of office as set forth in section 81.002 of the Local Government Code? In asking your question, you explain that the commis- sioner would use approximately 30,000 square feet of hangar space, rented at $56.25 per year, for the operation of a private flying service. Section 81.002(a) of the Local Government Code provides: (a) Before undertaking the duties of the county judge or a countv commissioner, a person RR& take the official oath and swear in writina that the nerson will not be interested, directlv or indirectlv, in a contract with or claim aaainst the countv except: (1) a contract or claim expressly authorized by law; or (2) a warrant issued to the judge or commissioner as a fee of office. (Emphasis added.) p. 4135 Honorable Robert P. McGuill - Page 3 (JIG855) public officials, and prohibits those identified office- holders from engaging in certain activities. See 55171.001(1), 171.003, 171.004. Under the rules of statutory construction, we must, if possible; read together and harmonize two statutes that relate to the same subject. Calvert v. Fort Worth National Bank, 356 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1962); Conlev v. Dauahters of the Renublic, 156 S.W. 197, 201 (Tex. 1913); Attorney General Opinion No. JM-693 (1987). The only exception to the absolute prohibition in section 81.002 is a contract expressly authorized by law. We find nothing in chapter 171 that expressly authorizes a county commissioner to contract with the county. Another rule of statutory construction directs us to apply the more specific statute where two provisions apply to the same subject matter but cannot be harmonized. Citv of Houston v. Arnev 680 S.W.Zd 867, 874 (Tex. APP. - Houston 1984, no writ;; Attorney General Opinion Nos. M-524 (1969); WW-1127 (1961). Under that rule, we find that section 81.002 must control because that statute applies only to county judges and commissioners while chapter 171 applies to a broader group of public officials. For the above reason, we find that a county commissioner may not directly or indirectly contract with the county to lease hangar space at the county's airport. Having found that the county commissioner may not enter into such a contract with the county, we need not address the issue of whether such a contract would constitute a grant of public money or thing of value by the county in violation of article III, section 52, of the Texas Constitution. SUMMARY A county commissioner may not, directly or indirectly, contract with the county to lease hangar space at the county#s airport. Very truly yo , d-%/22;ts . JIM MATTOX Attorney General of Texas MARY KELLER First Assistant Attorney General p. 4137 Honorable Robert P. McGuill - Page 4 (JM-855) LOU MCCRKARY Executive Assistant Attorney General JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY Special Assistant Attorney General RICK GILPIN Chairman, Opinion Committee Prepared by Karen C. Gladney Assistant Attorney General -; p. 4138