Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion JM-0853
Issued February 08, 1988
Re: Whether House Bill No. 83, Committee Acts 1987, 70th Legislature, Texas State Senate P. 0. Box 12068 p;;riEts a judge ,from re- a probationer to Austin, Texas 78711 make any payment to a crime stoppers organization
Cites: CR §351.901, CR §3f, CR §which, CR §6
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P
February 8, 1988
Honorable Chet Brooks
Opinion No. .I%853
Chairman
Health and Human Services
Re: Whether House Bill No. 83,
Committee
Acts 1987, 70th Legislature,
Texas State Senate
P. 0. Box 12068
p;;riEts
a judge ,from re-
a
probationer
to
Austin, Texas
78711
make any payment to a crime
stoppers organization
Dear Senator Brooks:
You ask three questions
prompted by a recent amend-
ment to the Adult Probation Law, article 42.12 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.
The enactment, House
Bill No. 83,
related primarily to the continuation of the Adult Proba-
tion Commission,
but also amended
article 42.12.
Acts
1987, 70th Leg., ch. 939, at 6289. The bill added section
6(e), which reads as follows:
(e) A court may not order a probationer
to make any payments as a term and condition
of probation, except for fines, court costs,
restitution of the victim, and other
terms
and conditions
expressly
authorized
by
statute.
Attorney General Opinion JM-307 (1985) concluded that
article 42.12 authorizes a judge to require a probationer
to make a payment to a private crime stoppers program as a
condition of his probation when the condition bears
a
reasonable relationship to the treatment and rehabilita-
tion of the accused and the protection of the public.
YOU
express concern
about the effect of section
judge's authority to
6(e) on a
impose this condition
of probation.
Thus, you ask the following questions:
1. Is the 'may notI language used in the
bill [H.B. No. 831 specific enough to pro-
hibit
ordering
payments
to local
crime
stoppers programs?
p. 4127
Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 2 (JM-853)
2. Since crime stoppers
was created
by
the
legislature
and
is
authorized
by
statute, is it a \condition[ ] expressly
authorized by statute' as mentioned in House
Bill No. 83?
3. May a court
offer a probationer
the
choice of making a donation to a local crime
stoppers organization in lieu of part or all
of a community
service condition of proba-
tion?
your first question may be answered in the affirma-
tive. Although section 6(e) does not specifically address
donations to crime
stoppers
organizations,
it plainly
prohibits the ordering
of payments as a condition
of
probation except for those payments specified
in section
6(e) or expressly
authorized by statute.
The provision
operates as a blanket
prohibition, subject to the stated
exceptions.
It
was
therefore
unnecessary
for
the
legislature to specify
the prohibited payments.
Article
42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, moreover,
does
not authorize
payments to crime stoppers
programs as a
condition of probation.
Neither does section
351.901 of
the Local
Government
Code
(formerly
article
2372bb,
V.T.C.S.), which authorizes county commissioners courts to
donate money to crime stoppers organizations,
or article
4413(50), V.T.C.S., which
establishes the Crime
Stoppers
Advisory Council.
Also,
statutory provisions
that
are
negatively expressed, such as section
6(e), must
neces-
sarily be construed as mandatory.
E.Q., Citv of Uvalde v.
Burnev, 145 S.W.
311, 312 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio
1912, no writ):
Attorney General
Opinion JM-501
(1986).
Thus, viewed simply
as a problem of statutory
construc-
tion, the
language of section 6(e) is broad enough
to
prohibit
the ordering
of payments
to crime
stoppers
organizations as a condition of probation.
-\
your second question
is whether
donations to crime
stoppers programs
may be required
as a condition
of
probation pursuant
to section
6(e) since such programs
are, in your words, "created by the legislature and . . .
authorized by statute."
Our answer to your first question
makes it clear that section
6(e) does not envision
the
kinds of payments you inquire about.
A crime
stoppers
_,
program is not created by statute: rather, it is
a nrivate.
nonorofit oraanizatioq
that
is
operated on a local or a statewide
level,
p. 4128
Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 3
Of-8531
,-
,-
that
accepts
and expends
donations
for
rewards
to persons
who report
to
the
organization
information
about
criminal
activity, and that forwards the
information
to the appropriate
law enforcement
agency.
(Emphasis added.)
Local Gov't
Code
5351.901(a).
See also V.T.C.S.
art.
4413(50), 51 (defining "local crime stoppers program" as a
nprivate, nonprofit
organization . . . operated on less
than a statewide level," etc.).
Section 351.901(a) of the
Local Government
Code and article
4413(50),
V.T.C.S.,
acknowledge
the existence
of private
crime
stoppers
programs
and authorize
certain
forms of governmental
assistance
to local programs.
Though
these
statutes
bestow official imprimatur
upon crime stoppers
organiza-
tions, they do not establish
conditions
of probation
requiring
or allowing
payments
to a
crime
stoppers
organization.
Accordingly,
requiring a donation to such aa
probation
condition
program
cannot, in the
absence of a more
specific statutory mandate, be said to
be a "term and condition expressly authorized by statute."
Before
answering
your
final question,
we
should
address an issue implicated by your first two questions --
specifically, the legislature's authority
to restrict
a
judge's discretion in setting the terms
and conditions of
probation.
Article IV, section 11A of the Texas Constitu-
tion is cited
as the source
of the judiciary's
power to
determine and set probation conditions.
Additionally, the
expressed purpose of article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is "to place wholly within the state
courts of
appropriate jurisdiction
the responsibility
for deter-
mining . . . the conditions of probationl' in accordance
with the powers granted to the judicial
department by the
constitution.
Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12,
§l. It is
firmly established that a trial
court in setting
condi-
tions of probation
is not limited
to the conditions
specified in section 6 of article 42.12.
Tames v. State,
534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Thus, it is argued
that the
legislature
may not constitutionally
impose
restrictions on a judge's discretion to set the terms and
conditions of probation because
it usurps the powers and
functions of the judicial department.
Article
IV, section
11A contains
the
following
language:
p. 4129
Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 4 (JM-853)
The Courts
of the State
of Texas
having
original jurisdiction
of criminal
actions
shall have the power, after conviction,
to
suspend
the imposition
or execution
of
sentence and to place the defendant
upon
probation and to reimpose
such sentence,
under such conditions as the Leaislature may
prescribe.
(Emphasis added.)
The interpretive commentary
following section 11A states
that the provision
gives to the courts the clear power to sus-
pend not only the
imposition of sentence,
but also the execution of sentence, to place
the defendant on probation, and to reimpose
such sentence,
all under
conditions
D -
scribed
bv
the leaislature.
(BmphaEzs
added.)
The court's
power
to suspend sentences
and place
defendants on probation
is not
inherent.
Lee v. State,
516 S.W.2d
151
(Tex. trim. APP.
1974).
Article
IV,
section 11A is a limited
grant of clemency to the courts
by the people.
McNew v. State, 608 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978); Bx oarte Giles,
502 S.W.2d
774 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973).
Thus, the legislature may,
in its wisdom,
circumscribe a judge's power to grant probation in certain
cases without usurping
the court's powers
and functions.
m,
Rivas
v. State,
627 S.W.Zd
494 (Tex. App. - San
Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd)
(upholding
former Code Crim.
Proc. art. 42.12,
§3f(a), which
prohibited the grant
of
probation
to defendants
adjudged
guilty
of
certain
offenses).
The constitutional
power
vested
in
the
legislature to enact laws includes the right to define
crimes
and the punishment therefor.
pendv
v. Wilson, 179
S.W.Zd 269 (Tex. 1944); EX narte Granviel,
561 S.W.2d 503
(Tex. Crim. App.
1978).
Accordingly,
we believe
the
legislature may limit the terms and conditions
which may
be placed on a court's grant of probation without thereby
usurping the powers and functions of the court.
Your third question
is whether a judge may offer
a
probationer the choice
of donating
money
to a crime
stoppers organization
in lieu
of
all or part
of the
community service required
as a condition of probation.
Section 6(e) prohibits
a judge
from offering
such a
choice.
Accordingly, your third question is answered in
the negative.
-.
1
p. 4130
Honorable Chet Brooks - Page 5 0%853)
SUMMARY
Article 42.12, section 6(e) of the Code
of Criminal
Procedure (as enacted by Acts
1987, 70th Leg., ch. 939, at 6289) prohibits
the ordering of payments to a local
crime
stoppers
organization
as a condition
of
probation.
A judge may not offer a proba-
tioner the choice of making a donation to a
local crime
stoppers organization
in lieu
of all or part of a condition of probation
requiring the probationer to perform
com-
munity service.
Very truly yo
J w
kr\,
J I- M
MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General
JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Rick Gilpin
Assistant Attorney General
p. 4131
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.