Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion JM-0368
Issued October 22, 1985
Re: Whether a ticket-vending computer terminal which merely dispenaes.tickets is a "gambling device" 'under chapter 47 of the Penal Code, and related questions D& SAator ibusy: Pea ask whethw the PAT-2000, a tickat-veading computer terminal is a "gadlius dev!r:e" uader sections 47.01(3) and 47.06 of.the Texas Peuslr code. Pou.also ask whether subsections .(a):.&.(b) of 47.06, whickSet forth'thr! elements of~the 'crime of possession-of a "gsmbliug device," are unccau~titutionally vague. ;.i; (' '. Sectlon'47.06 provides, in part: . y. ~'(a): 1~' persou cumlts au offen.se'~~.if he kuowiugl~r ~.owus,
Cites: PE §47.01
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JIM MATTOX
Attorney Getma
supmme cowl suihiing
P. 0. Box 12949
Atmtln. TX. 797ll- 2548
51214752991
Telex Slow74.1297
1-r
512/4750289
4924 Albmte Ave. Stdtb 10
ElP4SO.T% -
91615939484
Uoo N. Tenlh, Sulto S
MeAllenn.
lx. 7s5o1-1(185
51-7
2ooMalnPleza,sune400
San Anlonlo, lx 7aw-2797
612@29.4191
: !
The Attorney General of Texas
October 22, 1985
Honorable Oscar Hauey
chsirmeu
Committee on Jurisprudence
Texas State Senate
P. 0. Box 12068
Amstin. Texas 78711
Opiuiou R0.~'&368
Re:
Whether a ticket-vending
computer terminal which merely
dispenaes.tickets
is a "gambling
device"
'under chapter 47 of the
Penal Code, and related questions
D&
SAator ibusy:
Pea ask whethw the PAT-2000, a tickat-veading
computer terminal
is a "gadlius dev!r:e"
uader sections 47.01(3) and 47.06 of.the Texas
Peuslr
code. Pou.also ask whether subsections
.(a):.&.(b) of 47.06,
whickSet forth'thr!
elements of~the 'crime
of possession-of
a "gsmbliug
device," are unccau~titutionally
vague.
;.i; (' '.
Sectlon'47.06
provides, in part:
.
y.
~'(a):
1~' persou cumlts au offen.se'~~.if
he
kuowiugl~r
~.owus, mauufactures;~ ttaasfers;~ or
poasesseu any gambling de+ice that he .knWs is
designed for gambl&ng purposes or snp'equip&at
that.~
he knows is designed as a subassembly or
esseatia:t
part of a gambling device.
(b) A person comlts an offense if. with the
intent 1.0 further gsmbling, he knowingly.
owns,
marmfaCtw:es.
transfers coumerc%all~,
or p?asesses
any altered gambling equipment 'that'
he knows is
designed for gambling purposes ore any equipment
that he knows is daslgaed as a subassembly or
eseeutisl part of such device.
Section 47.01(9) provides:
'GembLLng device' means,
any mechanical ctitri-
Vance that for a consideration
affords the player
an opportunity to obtain~aaytbing of value. %he
award OF which is determined by chance, even
though r.ccompanied
by some skill. whether or not
the prim is' automatically paid 'by the ~'con-
trivance.
p. 1689
Howrable Oscar Mausy - Page 2 (~'~-368)
Application of these provfsioua depeuds upon the physical
characteristics
of the prtuticular
object or device ia question.
See Attorney General Opiafaas MI-168 (1980); E-1153 (1978); H-940
v77).
Syatech PAT-2000 computer tennluals
are kucwu as "transaction
processing equipment." Tt.e technical information submitted to us
shows that they record transaction
Information
and distribute
tickets.
The PAT-2000 is capable of dispeusing a wide range of products, such
as airline tickets, euterta:iumeut
tickets, and money orders. It is
similar in function to the automatic teller machines which are mu in
use across the state. Neu,ertheless,
many of the PAT-2000 termiuals
which are. presently produced in Texas are manufactured to produce
tickets which are used in the New York State Lottery. Because the
PAT-2000 terminal contains uo data base for lottery tickets, however,
the tickets csnnot actually be dispensed until it is connected
to the
main computer in New York.
The statutory defiultiw of "gambling device" requires, among
other things, proof that the award of a th%ug of value by the device
be "determined by chance, even though accompanied by some skill."
Peual Code 147.01(3);
Attorney General Opiufous ~~-168 (1980); E-1153,
(1978). Thus. even if ths PAT-2000 wasdesigned specifically
for a
purpose, such as a lottery,,
which would copstltute au offense iu
Texae. the offenses described in subsectious (a) aud (b) of sectlou
47.06 require proof that
the machlue in question is itself a "gambling
dcvicee or subassembly
of a "gambling device" withiu the mesuiag of
eection 47*01(3). See Attomey General Opinion MW-168 (1980).
-
The foregoing descrlptioa
of the PAT-2000 demoustrates
that its
sole fuactloa is to dispenee~tickats. Ooze the temfual is connected
with the rain computer.fu New York,~
.the tickets dispensed by the
PAT-2000 will have state lottery numbers ou them. The element of
chauce, however, is added :ln au eatlrely separate process and is uot
au asseutlal element-of the product at issue. The element of chance
occurs %u the lotteig drtariag.
ticket.
not
in the transfer of a lottery
Although the ac=i :sale ore
possession of lottery tickets in
Texas is au offeuse. see Paaal Code 4547.03(a)(S),
47.07(a).
we deal
here cmly tith the Gov
question of whether the PAT-2000 ‘is a
"gsmblbg device" per se.
Cousequeutly.
based 01, .the information about the PAT-2000 sub-
mitted in couuectiou
with :rour
opinion request, we conclude that the
.esseatial
element of chaacc:
is not present in the PAT-2000 termfual.
We uote that'although
the elameut of chance may be temporarily
removed
by "disabliug" a device, this will
"gambling device."
uot prevent it from being a
is not, however,
See Attmney General Opinion E-940 (1977). This
re&t
to the case at hand because the PAT-2000
contains
PO element of chance aud~need uot be "disabled."
We do.uot believe that ,the
legislature
intended to include within
"gaubliug device,"
tickets.
a termlaal which IS capable only of dispensing
The legislature
yintended
section 47.01(3) to reach devices
p. 1690
. .
Douorable Oscar Mausy - Page 3
(JM-368)
such as slot pachiues aud roulette
vheels. See Practice Comeutary to
section 47.01 (suggest* that a "sachauical~ontrivauce"
may also be
required by the deff.nitf.on),
In light of this couclusion,
ve do not reach your second question
of whether the void-for-vzgueness
doctrine prevents application of
section 47.01(3) aud subsec:tious
(a) and (b) of section 47.06 to the
PAY-2000 terminal.
SUMMARY
A "gambling device," as defined in section
47.01(3) in coujrmctlon
with subsections (a) aud
(b) of section 4,7.06~,
does not apply to the
Syntech PAY-ZOOO,, a ticket-vending
terminal uhlch awrely dispenses tickets.
TFz
device lacks the eleawxtt
of chance essential to a
"gambling device" uuder section 47.01(3).
JIM
WATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
TCMGNNEN
First Assistant
Attorney General
DAVID B. XICDAXDS
Executive Assistant Attonwy General
RCBXXYCSAY
Special Assistant Attomey General
RICX GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Cosdttec:
Prepared by Jennifer luggs
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED:
OP7.DIONCOMMITl'gE
Rick Gilpin. Chairman
Coliu Carl
Susan Garrison
Tony Guillory
Jim Moelliuger
Jennifer Xiggs
Nancy Sutton
Sareh Woelk
p. 1691
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.