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Attorney General Opinion JM-0199
Cites: WA §51.146, WA §2, WA §3
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JIM MATTOX
Attorney
General
Supreme
Court Building
P. 0. BOX 12548
Austin, TX. 78711.2548
5121475-2501
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An Equal Opportunity/
Affirmative
Action Employer
The Attorney
General of Texas
Auglst 31, 1984
Honorable Charles Evr.ns
Chairman
Opinion No. .JM-199
Committee on House !Klministration
Texas House of Reprcxientatives
P. 0. Box 2910
Austin, Texas
787fi!l
Ik: Statutory regulation of a
water district's construction
contracts
Dear Representative Ibans:
You have asked i:he following questions:
1. Is there any reason under case law or the
statutes 0'7 constitution why section 51.146 of the
Texas Wal:c!r
Code does not require the Tarrant
County W,%:er Control and Improvement District
Number One to retain ten percent of the estimated
amount of any construction contract covered by
section 51.146 until at least
fifty percent of the
work has Daen completed satisfactorily?
2. Does article 6252-5b in any manner relieve
the dist.c:lct
of its obligations under section
51.146 of the Texas Water Code?
We know of no reason why the district In question is not required
by section 51.146 elf the Water Code to retain ten percent of the
estimated amount of a construction contract until at least 50 percent
of the work has been completed satisfactorily. We believe that
article 6252-5b does not relieve the district of its obligations under
section 51.146.
The Tarrant Ccs,nty Water Control and Improvement District Number
One is created und#+ the provisions now codified as chapter 51 of the
Texas Water Code ar.C pursuant to article XVI, section 59 of the Texas
Constitution. Acccsxdingly, since 1971, the construction contracts of
the district have teen governed by chapter 898 of the Sixty-second
Legislature, which &as codified as section 51.146 of the Water Code in
1973. Section
51.146
reads,
in pertinent part, as follows:
p. 875
Honorable Charles Evans - Page 2 (JM-199)
551.146. Payments Under Construction Contract
(a) The distr:lct shall pay the contract price
of such contracts LLS hereinafter provided.
.
.
.
.
(c) In making such progress payments, there
shall be retained 10 percent of the estimated
amount
until fin&l completion and acceptance of
the contract work. However, if the directors, at
any time after 50 percent of the work has been
completed, find zhat satisfactory progress is
being made, they may authorize any of the
remaining progress payments to be made in full.
In 1981, the legislatucs enacted article 6252-5b. V.T.C.S., which
requires that retainage in contracts between a governmental entity and
a prime contractor be deposited in an interest bearing account for the
benefit of the contractor. The Tarrant County Water Control and
Improvement District Number One ia a governmental
entity within the
meaning of the act. Sec. l(A). Retainage under the act is the part of
a contract payment withha!:.d
by a governmental entity to secure
performance of the contract. Sec. l(D).
Section 2 of the act provides that
[inI
any
contract providing for retainage of
greater than five! percent of periodic contract
payments, the gclx.ernmental
entity shall deposit
the retainage in ;m interest-bearing account, and
Interest earned ~1 such retainage funds shall be
paid to the prirlc!
contractor upon completion of
the contract.
It is a well settled I,cle of statutory construction that
statutes
dealing with the same general subject are considered in pari materia
though they contain no reE,:rence to each other and were enacted at
different sessions of the legislature. C.A. Dunham Co. v. McKee, 57
S.W.2d 1132, 1135 (Tex. C:i(r.
App. - El Paso 1933, writ ref'd). It
also is well settled that statutes in pari materia are to be read and
construed together in arrivj.ng
at the intention of the legislature and
must be harmonized, if pour:ible, so as not to destroy the effect of
either statute. Calvert- v- Fort Worth National Bank,-356 S.W.2d 918,
921 (Tex. 1962); Lingner v. Haley, 277 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Civ. App.
- Amarillo 1954, writ dismissed). We believe that section 51.146 and
article 6252-56 are not i,n conflict with each other. When read
together, section 51.146 mandates that the water control and
p. 876
.
.
Honorable Charles Evans - Page 3 (JM-199)
improvement district retain ten percent of the estimated amount of a
construction contract
until Einal completion and acceptance of the
contract work, or until at l.east fifty percent of the work of the
project is complete and the &rectors, on determining that progress is
satisfactory, authorize payment to be made in full, and article
6252-5b requires that the retainage prescribed by section 51.146 be
deposited in an interest bealr:.ng
account with both the retained amount
and the interest earned on that amount to be paid to the contractor.
Section 3 of article ti252-5b excepts from its provisions a
contract executed before August 31. 1981, a contract with a price
estimated to be less than $41)0,000,
a contract by the State Department
of Highways and Public Tran:;portation, and, until June 1, 1983, a
contract by a political subdvision funded by certain bonds pursuant
to sections 49-c, 49-d, or 49-d-l of article III of the Texas
Constitution or pursuant to chapter 54 of the Texas Water Code.
Except for a contract in an amount less than $400,000, none of those
exceptions in article 6252-5b
applies to currently executed contracts
of a water development and improvement district created under chapter
51 of the Water Code and article XVI, section 59 of the constitution.
A brief submitted with )'our questions also discusses whether the
district should deposit the funds withheld in accordance with section
51.146 in an interest bearing account that segregates those funds from
other funds of the
district. As introduced, House Bill No. 1815 of
the Sixty-seventh Legislature, which enacted article 6252-5b, would
have required that the reta:lnage in question be deposited in a state
or national bank, savings and loan association, or credit union
pursuant to a trust agreement which designated the financial
institution to serve as escrow agent and to invest the retainage in
the manner prescribed by the original bill. As finally passed, House
Bill No. 1815 requires only that the governmental entity "deposit the
retainage in an interest-bturing account." We believe that if the
legislature intended that the retained funds be deposited in a
separate interest bearing account that segregates the retainage from
other funds of the district, the legislature would have said so. The
courts freouentlv have ouotami the statement that "if narliament does
not mean what it-says, it mll:rt
say so." Railroad Commission of Texas
v. Miller, 434 S.W.2d 670, fi;'2
(Tex. 1968); Brazes River Authority v.
City of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 59, 109 (Tex. 1961). We conclude that a
district that deposits fund!; withheld pursuant to section'
51.146
with
the district's other funds in an interest bearing account complies
with the plain language of section 2, article 6252-5b.
SUMMARY
Construction contracts of water control and
improvement districts are governed by both the
provisions of section 51.146 of the Texas Water
p. 877
Honorable Charles Evans - Page 4
(JM-199)
Code, which specifies the retainage of funds in
construction contracts, and the provisions of
article 6252~Sb, ‘I.T.C.S., which requires that
such retained funds be deposited in an interest
bearing account, with the interest earned on the
retained funds tc be paid to the contractor on
completion of the contract.
Very I truly yourj
LJlh/h
JIM
MATTOX
--
Attorney General of Texas
TOM GREEN
First Assistant Attorney Getwral
DAVID R. RICHARDS
Executive Assistant Attorney General
Prepared by Nancy Sutton
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
Rick Gilpin, Chairman
David Brooks
Colin Carl
Susan Garrison
Jim Moellinger
Nancy Sutton
p. 878
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.