Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion JM-0123
Issued December 30, 1983
Re: Play Cameron County enforce building regulations enacted to restrict developwnt in flood- prone areas by prohibiting provisions of utility service to mu-complying atructurae
Cites: WA §17, WA §18, WA §16.311, WA §16.319
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The Attorney
General of Texas
December 30, 1983
JIM MAllOX
Attorney General
714 Jackeon. Suile 700
,Dallar. TX. 75202-4506
2w742-Sv44
SW Broadway. malt. 312
Lubbock. TX. 704013479
Sow747-52Ss
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4202 N. TwUh, Sult.8
McAllen. TX. 7Sm~~.
512MS2.4S47
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200 MaIn PIaz& Suulte 4w .:_
San Antonlo, TX. 7820527s7
512/2254191
An Equal Opwftunltyl
Afllrmatlre Actlon EmpIoyar
P
Eouorablc
Reynaldo
S. Cantu
Criminal
District
Attorney
Cameron County
Rail of Justice
974 E. Xarrison
Street
Brovusville,
Texas
70520
Opinion No. JM-123
Re:
Play Cameron County enforce
building
regulations
enacted
to
restrict
developwnt
in flood-
prone
areas
by
prohibiting
provisions
of
utility
service
to mu-complying
atructurae
Dear Mr. Cantu:
You have
requested
an Attorney
General
Opinion
on a question
arising
from the following
facts:
Since
the passage
of Cameron County’s
building
regulations
in
1971,
the
county
has been denying
building
permits
to
those
individuals
vhose
subdivisions
and lots
do not meet, tbe regulations
established
by the county
under federal
and state
- enablrng
regialation
through
the
Eederal
,Plood
Insurance
Program.
Various
utilities
-have
,been
,cooperating
with
the county
In slso
not providing
service
‘,~ to
those
households
which
have .,~ not
receIved~bullding
permits
from the county.
.' :
Recently;‘houever.‘questions
have arisen
ae to
whether
or not the utilities
can deny service
to a
‘household
just
because~the
county
has not giveu
it
‘a
building
permit.
Our
discussions
vith
the
utilities
have
not
resolved
this
issue.
and we
have agreed
to seek an Attorney
General’s
Opinion
as to whether,or
not Cameron County
can prevent
a
utility
from
providing
service
to
an individual
who has been denied
a building
permit
for
failure
to comply with
the county's
building
regulations.
We will
first
consider
whether
the utilities
may voluntarily
deny
service
under the facts
given.
Article
144612,
section
58(a),
V.T.C.S..
the
Public
Utility
Regulatory
Act,
provides
that
p. 519
Ronorable
Reynaldo S. Cantu - Page 2
(~~-123)
[t]he
holder
of
any
certificate
of
public
convenience
and
ueceeeity
shall
serve
every
consumer
within
its
certlflcdrea
and
shall
render
continuous
and adequate
service
within
the
area.
(Emphasis
added).
Certificates
of
convenience
and
necessity
are
issued
to
public
utilities
pursuaot
to
sections
49-62
of the Public
Utility
Regulatory
Act.
The
public
utilities
in
question
provide,
for
example,
electricity,
water,
sewage
disposal
and natural
gas.
V.T.C.S.
art.
1446~.
$3(c).
Unless
the
commission
issues
a certificate
that
the
convenience
and necessity
mill
not be adversely
affected,
the
holder
of a certificate
shall
not discontinue
service
except
for:
(1)
non-payment
of charges;
co
nonuee;
or
(3)
other
similar
reasons
in the usual
course
of
business
V.T.C.S.
art.
1446~.
158(b).
Any discontinuance
of
service
must
be
subject
to conditions
prescribed
by the commission.
Id.
‘?
The commission
has promulgated
a rule
permitting
any utility
to
decline
to serve
an applicant
until
he has complied
vith
the state
and
municipal
regulations.
Rule
052.02.04.043(a)
codified
at
16 T.A.C.
123.33.
Ewaver,
municipality
is
defined
as
a “city,
incorporated
- village
orYi%m;“.
.”
-2
d
052.01.00.012
codified
at “F6 T.::.
yil.2.
-‘--
i@ude
a
county.
Rule
The commission’e
rule
052.02.04.043(a)
also
permits
the
utility
to decline
service
to
an
applicant
who has not
complied
with
the utility’s
approved
rules
and
regulations
filed
with
the coam~ission
or an spplicant
whose equipment
is hazfrdous
or of such character
that
satisfactory
service
cannot
be
given.
Thus.
the
utility
may
voluntarily
deny
service
to
au
applicant.
for
the
reasons
set
out
in
the
co=ission
rule.
If
the
Cameron County regulations
guard against
the same conditions
expressed
in the utility’s
approved
regulations
on file
with
the cotmniesion
or
if
they
prohibit
utility
hook-ups
to
applicants
with
equipment
hazardous
or unsatisfactory
because
of the danger of-being
located
in
a flood
prone area,
the utility
may voluntarily
comply with
them.
1.
Cameron County might
approach
the PUC about amending its
rule
to include
the county.
?
2.
The utility
could
seek
an amendment to
its
regulations
to
deny service
to buildings
which
lack permits
required
by local
law.
.
.
Honorable
Reynaldo
S. Csntu - Page 3
(JM-123)
If
the utility
cannot voluntarily
refuse
service
to an individual
who has
been
denied
a building
permit
for
failure
to
comply with
county
building
regulations
promulgsted
pursuant
to article
lS81e-1,
V.T.C.S.,
and sections
16.311
through
16.319
of the Texas Water Code,
you wish
to know vhether
Cameron County may prevent
the utilities
from
providing
such service.
_.-
The
Public
Utility
Commisalon
has
general
power
to
regulate
public
utilities
and to make rules
reasonably
required
In the exercise
of
this
power.
V.T.C.S.
art.
1446~.
116.
Section
17(e)
of the act
vests
in the coxw~ission
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
“electric,
water,
and
sewer
utility
rates.
operations
and
services
not
within
the
incorporsted
limits
of
a municipality
exercising
exclusive
original
jurisdiction
. . . .”
Section
18
of
the
act
vests
similar
jurisdiction
in
the
commission
over
telecommunications
utilities
in
all
areas
of
the
state.
This
latter
jurisdictional
grant
has
been
construed
broadly
to
include
“the
entire
field
of
legislative
regulatfon
of public
utilities.”
Southwestern
Bell
Telephone
Company
v. City
of Kountre.
543 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ.
App. - Beaumont 1976, no
writ).
See also
V.T.C.S.
art.
1446~. 135.
Counties
have
only
those
powers and duties
expressly
granted
or
necessarily
implied
from
statutory
and
constitutional
provisions.
Canales
v. Laughlin,
214 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.
1948);
Anderson
v. Wood, 152
S.W.Zd 1084 (Tex. 1941);
Attorney
General
Opinion
R-374 (1974).
The
commissioners
court
does
not
have
general
police
powers.
Commissioners’
Court
v.
Kaiu
S.W.2& 840 (Tei. Civ. pp.
-
Galveston
T929, writYef’d)Z
P
Article
1581e-1.
section
4.
V.T.C.S..
authorizes
counties
bordering
on the Gulf of Mexico or the tidewater
limits
thereof
to enact
and enforce
regulations
vhich
regulate,
restrict,
or
control
the
management
and
use of
land,
structures,
and other
development
in flood,
or rising
water
prone,
areas
in such
a manner as
to
reduce
the
danger
of. damage.caused
by
flood
losses.
This power and authority
may include,
but
shall
not
be
limited
to,
requirements
for
flood-proofing
of
structures
which
are
permitted
to
remain
in,
or
be
constructed
in.
flood
or
rising
water
prone.
areas;
regulations
concerning
minimum elevation
of any structure
permitted
to be
erected
in,
or
improved
in.
such
areas;
specifications
for
drainage;
and any other
action
which
is
feasible
to minfmiie flooding
and rising
water
damage.
p. 521
Honorable
Reynaldo S. Cantu - Page 4
(Jli-123)
Article
15Sle-1,
V.T.C.S.,
wss
enacted
in
1969
to
enable
coastal
counties
to qualify
for participation
in the Nations1
Flood
Insurance
Program.
Acts
1969. 61et Leg.,
ch.
720,
I1 at 2107;
Attorney
General
Opinion
E-1024 (1977).
Sections
16.311
through
16.319
of
the
Water Code authorize
a
number of
polltical
subdivisions
including
any county
“to
take
all
necessary
and reasonable
actions
to comply with
the requirements
and
criteria
of
the
National
Flood
Insurance
Program.”
Specific
powers
include,
but are not limited
to,
the following:
(1)
making appropriate
land use adjustments
to
constrict
the development
of land vhich
is
exposed
to
flood
damage
and
minimire
damage
caused
by
flood
losses;
(2)
guiding
the development
of proposed
future
construction.
vhere
practicable,
away
from
location
which Is threatened
by flood
hazards;
(3)
assisting
in minimizing
damage caused
by
floods;
. . . .
(5)
engaging
in
floodplain
management
and
adopting
enforcing
permanent
land use and .control.~ __ _
measures
consistent
with
the criteria
established
under the National
Flood Insurance
Act;
(6)
declaring
property,
when such is the case,
to be in violation
of local
laws,
regulations,
or
ordinances
vhich
are
intended
to
discourage
or
otherwise
restrict
land
development
or occupancy
in flood-prone
areas
and notifying
the
secretary,
or whomever he designates,
of such property;
.
.
.
.
(12)
eatlsfying
criteria
adopted
and
promulgated
by
the
department
pursuant
to
the
National
Flood Insurance
Program; and
(13)
adopting
permanent
land
use
and control
measures
with
enforcement
provisions
which
are
consistent
with
the
criteria
for
land management
and use adopted
by the secretary
. . . .
Water Code 116.315.
p. 522
Ronorable
Reynaldo
S. Cantu - Page 5
(JR-123)
Article
1581e-1,
V.T.C.S..
and sections
16.311
through
16.319
of
the Water Code must be construed
in conformity
vith
their
purpose
--
that
is.
enabling
counties
and various
other
political
subdivisions
to
qualify
for
participation
in
the
National
Flood
Insurance
Program.
See Texas Liquor
Control
Board v.
Falstaff
Distributing
Company. 369
E2d
483
(Tex.
Civ.
App. - Houston
1963.
no writ).
See also
Code
Construction
Act.
V.T.C.S..
art.
5429b-2.
13.03(l)
(in
construinn
a
statute,
a court-may
consider
the object
bo,ght~;o.b,~attained).
&The
language
and
the
purpose
of
these
statutes
do not
require
us
to
conclude
that
counties
have been given
land
regulation
powers broader
than those
necessary
and reasonable
to qualify
for the National
Flood
Insurance
Program.
Attorney
General
R-978
(1977).
in
considering
whether
counties
could
enforce
requirements
in excess
of
the minimum
necessary
to qualify
for
insurance
under
the
federal
program,
stated
as follows:
the
authorization
of . . .
[the
predecessor
of
section
16.3151
clearly
is
not
an
unconditional
grant
of
authority
for
political
subdivisions
to
enact
land
use
regulations
not
otherwise
sanctioned
by
law.
The regulations
so
enacted
must
have as their
purpose
and effect
compliance
with
the
requirements
and
criteria
promulgated
pursuant
to the National
Flood Insurance
Program.
The Public
Utility
Regulatory
Act was enacted
in 1975.
subsequent
to
article
1581e-1,
V.T.Cu
Acts
1975.
64th Leg.,
ch.
721 at 2327.
Thus,
even
if
article
1581e-1.
V.T.C.S.,
could
be
construed
to
impliedly
authorize
counties
to deny utili~ty
hook-ups
to consumers
as
a means of enforcing
land use
regulations,
that
power would have been
repealed
by the
enactment
of the Public
Utility
Regulatory
Act.
See
V.T.C.S.
art.
1446~.
1f16.
17(e),
18.
35.
58;
see
also
&
190
(express
repqal
of conflicting
laws).
The denial
of utility
connections
to non-complying
construction
in
a flood
plain
might
be a means
of
"minimizing
damage caused
by
floods."
Water Code 516;315(3).
Hovever , we do
not
believe
this
general
authorization
evinces
a
legislative
intent
to
repeal
provisions
of
the
Public
Utility
Regulatory
Act requiring
regulated
utilities
to serve
customers
within
the
certified
area
or providing
that
the Public
Utility
Commission
has exclusive
original
jurisdiction
in
unincorporated
areas
over
telec~unicationr.
water,
sewer
and
electric
utilities.
The
comaiseion,
in
the
exercise
of
its
Nle-making
power,
may define
the
limitations
on a utility's
duty
to
serve
every
customer
in its
area.
Neither
article
1581e-1
nor section
16.315
of
the
Water Code authorize
a county
to do so.
We conclude
that
a
county
may not
require
a
utility
to
deny
service
to
an
individual
or
entity
not
in
compliance
with
county
flood
control
ordinances
or regulations.
p. 523
Honorable
Reynaldo S. Cantu - Page 6 (JM-123)
SUMMARY
The
Public
Utility
Realatory
Act,
article
1446~.
V.T.C.S.,
and
present
regulations
promulgated
thereunder,
prevent
Cameron
County
from
requiring
utilities
to
deny
service
to
individuals
or
entities
not
in
compliance
with
county
flood
regulations.
b
Tot4 GREEN
First
Assistant
Attorney
General
DAVID R. RICSARDS
Executive
Assistant
Attorney
General
Prepared
by Susan L. Garrison
Assistant
Attorney
General
PROVED:
_.__
COMMITEE
Rick Gilpin.
Chairman
Jon Bible
Susan Garrison
Jim Floellinger
Fernando Rodriquez
Nancy Sutton
Very trul
yours.
cl
*i&n
/VW
Attorney
General
of Texas
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