Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion JM-0074
Later treatment: Affirmed by LO-95-62 (from the Attorney General's list of opinions overruled, modified, superseded or withdrawn)
Cites: TX §6.06
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JIM MATTOX
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General
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An Equal
OppOrtUnitYI
Affirmative
Action
EmP~oVef
The Attorney
General of Texas
September 19, 1983
Honorable James W. Smith, Jr.
Frio County Attorney
P. 0. Box V
Pearsall, Texas
78061
opinion No. JM-74
Ik: Whether penalties established
by section 6.06(e) of the Tax Code
for late payment of taxing entity
assessments may be rescinded
Dear Mr. Smith:
You ask us two questions regarding section 6.06(e) of the Tax
Code. This section governs the method by which taxing units pay to
the appraisal district their portions of the appraisal district’s
expenditures as allocated by section 6.06(d), Tax Code.
Section
6.06(e) of the Tax Code provides the following:
Unless the governing body of a unit and the chief
appraiser agree to a different method of payment,
each taxing unit shall pay its allocation in four
equal payments to be made at the end of each
calendar quarter, and the first payment shall be
made before January 1 of the year in which the
budget takes effect. A payment is delinquent if
not paid on the date it is due. A delinquent
payment incurs a penalty of 5 percent of the
amount of the payment and accrues interest at an
annual rate of 10 percent.
If the budget is
amended, any change in the amount of a unit’s
allocation is apportioned among the payments
remaining. (Emphasis added).
Your first question is:
If one taxing entity is allowed to pay without
penalty and interest, should any other penalty and
interest paid by
another taxing entity be
refunded?
Your second question is:
If payments are accepted without payment of
penalty and interest, what other recourse would
--
p. 316
Honorable James W. Smith, Jr. - Page 2
(JM-74)
the Frio County Appraisal District have for
collecting due funds?
We answer your first question in the negative, because we conclude
that the appraisal district is without authority to waive or rescind
the penalty and interest to any taxing unit which tenders a delinquent
payment. Because we answer your first question in the negative, we
deem it unnecessary to answer your second question.
Under settled nrincinles of law. the imnosition of uenalties
falls within the poiice
power of the iegislature. Waters-Pierce Oil
Company v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 107 (1909); First Texas~P!
cudential
Insurance Company v. Smallwood, 242 S.W. 498, 505 (Tex.
, Civ. App. -
Beaumont 1922, no writ). Moreover, remission by general statute of
penalties which have accrued and are due political subdivisions is
constitutional. Jones v. Williams, 45 S.W.2d 130, 137 (Tex. 1931).
But, in this instance remission cannot be accomplished, because there
is no statutory provision permitting it. At no place in the code is
the appraisal district given the authority to rescind or waive the
penalty and interest imposed by section 6,06(e) of the Tax Code.
Generally, the powers of such governmental agencies as counties,
townships, and school districts are more strictly construed than those
of incorporated municipalities. Tri-City Fresh Water Supply District
No. 2 of Harris County v. Mann, 142 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1940). For
examule. a county has no nowers or duties exceut those which are
.
clearlv set forth and defined bv the constitution and the state
statutes.
y v. City of Marshall,
Harrison Count
253 S.W.2d 67, 69
(Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1952, writ ref'd); Wichita County v.
Vance, 217 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1949, writ
ref' n.r.e.). See also Miller v. El Paso County, 150 S.W.Zd 1000
(Tex. 1941). Analogously, we hold that an appraisal district can
exercise only those powers and duties which are clearly set forth in
the constitution and statutes of this state.
Therefore, absent
specific statutory authority, we conclude that an appraisal district
is without authority to rescind or waive the penalty imposed by
section 6.06(e) of the Tax Code.
SUMMARY
An appraisal district is without authority to
rescind or waive the penalty and interest imposed
by section 6.06(e) of the Tax Code upon taxing
units which are delinquent in paying their
allocation
of
the
appraisal
district's
expenditures.
JIM
MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
.
.
Honorable James W. Smith, Jr. - Page 3
(JM-74)
TOM GREEN
First Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. RICHARDS
Executive Assistant Attorney General
Prepared by Jim Moellinger
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
Rick Gilpin, Chairman
Jon Bible
David Brooks
Colin Carl
Jim Moellinger
Nancy Sutton
p. 318
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.