Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion JM-0065
Issued August 17, 1983
Re: Whether a county may con- tribute funds to a privately owned hospital
The Attorney General's page · official PDF
The Attorney
General of Texas
August 17, 1983
JIM MA rTOX
Attorney
General
Supreme
Court
Building
P. 0. BOX 12546
Austin.
TX.
78711-2548
5121475-2501
Telex
910/674-1367
Telecopier
5121475.0266
1607
Main
St., Suite
1400
Dallas,
TX.
75201-4709
2141742-6944
4624
Alberta
Ave..
Suite
160
El Paso.
TX.
79905-2793
9151533~3484
1220
Dallas
Ave..
Suite
202
Houston,
TX.
77002-6986
7131650-0666
806
Broadway,
Suite
312
hbbock.
TX.
79401-3479
8061747-5238
4309
N. Tenth.
Suite
B
McAllan,
TX.
76501-1685
5121662-4547
200 Main
Plaza,
Suite
400
San
Anlonio.
TX.
78205-2797
512/225-4191
A” Equal
OpportunityI
Affirmative
Action
Employer
Honorable Harold R. Schmidt
Mason County Attorney
Courthouse
Mason, Texas
76856
Opinion No. JM-65
Re: Whether a county may con-
tribute funds to a privately
owned hospital
Dear Mr. Schmidt:
You have asked if Mason County may provide funds for the general
operating expenses of a hospital that is owned and operated by a
private, non-profit corporation.
You have also inquired about the
extent and manner in which the county may compensate a privately owned
hospital for the care of indigents and for services associated with
the operation of a volunteer county ambulance program.
Mason County
does not have a county hospital, a hospital authority, or a hospital
district.
We believe that the county may not make a donation or gift
of its funds to a privately
owned hospital’s
general
operating
expenses, but the county may contract with a hospital to perform
services of functions that the county is authorized to provide.
It is well established that a county may not make a contribution
of public funds to a facility owned and operated or controlled by a
private, non-profit corporation.
Tex. Const. art. III. 952; art. XI,
§3.
See Attorney
General
Opinions NW-329
(1981); MW-36
(1979);
H-1189, H-1123
(1978); H-520
(1975); H-397
(1974); M-661
(1970);
WW-630 (1959). However, it also is well established that a county may
contract with private
corporations
and others
to carry out its
statutory duties to provide for public or governmental purposes.
See
Attorney General Opinions H-1123 (1978); H-912 (1976); H-675 (1975);
H-127 (1973); M-843 (1971); M-605 (1970); C-334, C-246 (1964).
A county commissioners
court has only the powers
that the
constitution
and statutes
have conferred
on it.
Therefore.
the
authority of the commissioners
court to make a contract on the
county’s behalf is strictly limited to the power conferred either
expressly
or by
reasonable
implication
by
the constitution
and
statutes.
See Tex. Const. art. V, §18; Canales v. Laughlin, 214
S.W.2d 451,453
(Tex. 1948); Anderson v. Wood, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1085
(Tex. 1941); Attorney General Opinions MW-329 (1981); H-1280 (1978);
H-912 (1976); H-367 (1974); C-772 (1966); WW-630 (1959); V-173 (1947).
p. 279
Honorable Harold R. Schmidt - Page 2 (JM-65)
Since a county may contract with a private corporation to perform
services that the county is authorized to perform itself, a primary
issue 1s whether the county has authority to perform the specific
service.
Without
that authority,
an expenditure
by
the county
constitutes a donation of the county's funds in violation of the
constitution.
See Attorney General Opinions MW-329 (1981); H-1123
(197%); H-127 (1973). You mention the responsibility of the county to
provide for the care of indigents and services associated with an
ambulance program.
It is well established
that the county must
provide necessary medical care for its indigents.
V.T.C.S. art. 2351,
$11; V.T.C.S. art. 443%; Attorney General Opinion MW-33 (1979).
We
believe that it also is well established that a county may provide
ambulance service pursuant to its power regarding public health.
Se*
V.T.C.S. art. 4418f; Attorney General Opinions H-976 (1977); M-845
(1971); M-806
(1971); M-385 (1969).
See also V.T.C.S. art. 2372t.
Article 4418f. V.T.C.S., grants to the commissioners court of any
county "the authority to appropriate and expend money from the general
revenues of its County
for and in behalf
of public health and
sanitation within
its County."
The authority
conferred
by that
statute on the commissioners
court to expend the county's general
revenues for public health and sanitation is general in its scope.
Since article 4418f provides no detailed direction
to guide the
commissioners court in the exercise of this power, it must be guided
largely by its sound discretion.
Prior opinions of this office
interpreting article 4418f have approved funding by the county of
numerous services that the commissioners courts have determined would
aid the sick or deal with public health or sanitation problems,
including
ambulance
services,
county health units, public health
clinics,
outpatient
medical
treatment,
preventive
units,
garbage
disposal, storm sewer connection to a county hospital, and control of
noxious aquatic weed.
Attorney General Opinions H-1280 (197%); H-912
(1976); M-806
(1971); M-385
(1969); C-772
(1966); O-5670
(1944);
0-2580-A
(1940).
The factual determination
of specific conditions
that create a threat to public health and sanitation within the
meaning of article 4418f should be made by the commissioners court.
When the commissioners court is granted a power or charged with a
duty, it has implied authority
to exercise
broad discretion
to
accomplish the intended purpose.
Anderson v. Wood, supra; Madison
County v. Wallace, 15 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1929).
The terms and
conditions of a contract, such as whether a contract should provide
for payment of a specified amount or reimbursement
of documented
expenses. can be determined by the commissioners court in light of the
facts known to it.
However, it is not our opinion that the authority of a county is
unbridled with respect to the terms of a contract to provide for
indigents or public health.
The extent of the county's expenditure
p.
280
Honorable Harold R. Schmidt - Page 3 (JM-65)
under such an agreement cannot contravene the limitations of article
III, section 52 of the Texas Constitution.
The commissioners court
may not expend county funds in a manner that amounts to a virtual
donation.
In return for its expenditure, the county must receive an
adequate consideration. such as a oublic benefit or a service the
co&y
has a duty to provide.
See'Sullivan v. Andrews County, 517
S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. Cl". App. 71
Paso 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Llano County v. Knowles, 29 S.W. 549, 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no
writ).
We believe that such a contract should indicate clearly that a
public purpose is being served.
SUMMARY
A county may not donate county funds for the
operating
expense
of
a
privately
owned
and
operated
hospital
but
may
contract
with
the
hospital to perform services that the county is
authorized to provide.
The commissioners court
has discretionary authority to determine the terms
and conditions for such a contract that provide
for adequate consideration to the county and do
not contravene the limitations of article III,
section 52 of the Texas Constitution.
I
Very truly your ,
.
J-k
JIM
MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
TOM GREEN
First Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. RICHARDS
Executive Assistant Attorney General
Prepared by Nancy Sutton
Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
Rick Gilpin, Acting Chairman
Jon Bible
David Brooks
Colin Carl
Jim Moellinger
Nancy Sutton
p. 281
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.