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Attorney General Opinion JC-0011
Issued March 08, 1999
Re: Whether a school district may require minimum “poverty level wage” in contracts with district
Cites: GV §7
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March 8,1999
The Honorable Ren& 0. Oliveira
Chair, Committee
on Ways & Means
Texas House of Representatives
P.O. Box 2910
Austin, Texas 78768-2910
Opinion No. JC-0011
Re:
Whether
a school
district
may require
minimum “poverty level wage” in contracts with
district
(RQ-1196)
Dear Representative
Oliveira:
You ask us to determine whether article III, section 52 of the Texas Constitution
or chapter
2258 of the Government
Code prohibits the McAllen Independent
School District from requiring
outside contractors with the district to pay their workers a minimum
“poverty level wage” in the
performance
of contracts subject to chapter 2258. While we find no constitutional
impediment
to
a poverty level wage requirement, we conclude that chapter 2258 ofthe Government Code precludes
the district &om including such a requirement in contracts subject to the chapter. In the absence of
a constitutional
bar, it is within the power of the legislature to make adjustments in the law to meet
the concerns raised by the school district.
Because you ask about the validity of the poverty level wage requirement
in light of the
provisions
of chapter 2258, we will confine our analysis to contracts covered by that chapter.
Chapter 2258 of the Government
Code gives a worker employed on a public work the right to be
paid “not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a similar character in
the locality in which the work is performed.”
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 2258.021(a)(l)
(Vernon
1999). Chapter 2258 applies to “the construction
of a public work, including a building, highway,
road, excavation,
and repair work or other project development
or improvement,
paid for in whole
or in part from public funds
.” Id. $2258.002(a).
The public body awarding a contract must determine the local prevailing wage using one of
the methods set out in the statute and must specify the prevailing wage in any call for bids to perform
the work.
Id. 9 2258.022(a),
(c); see also Associated
Gen. Contractors v. City of El Paso, 879
S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ) (stating that law restricts public body to only
two acceptable methods for determining
prevailing wage rate). It must either (1) conduct a survey
of local wages for the type of work to be performed, or (2) use the prevailing wage rate determined
by the United States Department
of Labor in accordance
with the federal Davis-Bacon
Act, 40
U.S.C.A.
55 276a through 276a-5 (West 1996), which requires a minimum
prevailing
wage in
certain federal contracts.
TEX. GOV’TCODE ANN. 5 2258.022(a) (Vernon 1999). A contractor who
is awarded a contract with the public body may not pay its workers less than the prevailing wage for
any work performed
on the contract.
Id. 5 2258.023(a).
The Honorable Rene 0. Oliveira
- Page 2
(.Tc-0011)
The purpose ofthe statute is to protect workers from unfairly low wages, a problem described
in the emergency
clause of the bill upon its original enactment in 1933:
Sec. 7.
The fact that there is no adequate
law protecting
laborers,
workmen
and mechanics
engaged in doing and performing
work on public
works in Texas and its political subdivisions,
and the further fact that many
contractors
are taking advantage
of the present industrial
and economic
condition to beat down wages to a level far below that required to maintain
a laborer, workman or mechanic in reasonable circumstances,
and the further
fact that this condition has created a social problem demanding the immediate
attention of the legislative department
of our State create an emergency and
an imperative public necessity.
Act ofMar. 21, 1933,43d Leg., R.S., ch. 45,s 7,1933 Tex. Gen. Laws 91,93-94.
You tell us that
with this same purpose in mind, the McAllen Independent
School District wishes to require its
outside contractors to pay their workers not less than what the school district has determined to be a
“poverty
level wage”
or “living
wage,”
a wage that is higher
than the local prevailing
wage determined by the school district in accordance with chapter 2258. See Letter horn Honorable
Juan J. Hinojosa,
Texas House of Representatives,
and Honorable
Rene 0. Oliveira,
Chair,
Economic
Dev. Comm.,
Texas House of Representatives,
to Attorney
General Dan Morales
(Sept. 24, 1998) (on file with Opinion Committee).
We assume for purposes of this opinion that the
proposed poverty level wage is above the prevailing wage properly determined by the district using
one of the two methods stated above. The prevailing wage in the McAllen area, you explain, is well
below the average Texas wage for construction
work and is not enough to allow a worker to live
above the federal poverty level. Id. For example, you tell us that the average construction
worker
in the Rio Grande Valley area of Texas earns $6.25 per hour, while the Texas average is $11.46 per
hour. Id.
You first ask whether a minimum poverty level wage requirement in school district contracts
is prohibited by article III, section 52 of the Texas Constitution.
Article III, section 52(a) prohibits
the legislature from authorizing any political corporation or subdivision ofthe state “to lend its credit
or to grant public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual, association or corporation
whatsoever.”
A similar provision in article III, section 51 states that “[tlhe Legislature
shall have
no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant ofpublic moneys to any individual,
association of individuals,
municipal or other corporations whatsoever.”
The purpose of these and
like provisions
in our constitution
is to prevent the gratuitous application of public funds to private
individuals.
See Byrd v. City of Dallas, 6 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. 1928); Graves v. Morales, 923
S.W.2d 754,757
(Tex. App.-Austin
1996, writ denied).
But the constitution
does not bar a governmental
expenditure that benefits a private interest
if it is made for the direct accomplishment
of a legitimate public purpose.
See Byrd, 6 S.W.2d at
740. “A transfer of funds for a public purpose, with a clear public benefit received in return, does
not amount to a lending of credit or a grant of public funds in violation of article III, sections 5 1 and
The Honorable Rene 0. Oliveira
- Page 3
(.Jc-0011)
52.” Edgewood
Zndep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 740 (Tex. 1995). The payment
of
reasonable wages for work performed pursuant to a contract for the construction
of a public work
is not a gratuitous
grant of public money.
The public body receives the benefit of the workers’
service in return for payment of their wages by way of the contract.
See Byrd, 6 S.W.2d at 741
(pensions to police and tire department employees are not an unconstitutional
gratuity); Graves, 923
S.W.2d at 757 (state’s payment of state attorneys’ occupation
tax is not gratuitous because state
benefits from attorney’s employment).
Thus, we find no constitutional
bar to a minimum
poverty
level wage requirement.
You also ask us to consider, however, whether the requirement
is barred by chapter 2258 of
the Government
Code. While chapter 2258 “does not prohibit the payment to a worker employed
on a public work an amount greater than the general prevailing rate ofper diem wages,” TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. 5 2258.025 (Vernon 1999) it does not authorize a school district to require a contractor
to pay a wage greater than the local prevailing
wage.
School districts,
like other political
subdivisions
of the state, other than home-rule cities, have only those powers expressly conferred
on them by the constitution
or by statute or those necessarily
implied from the powers conferred.
See Texas Roofing Co. v. Whiteside, 385 S.W,2d699,701
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1965, writref d
n.r.e.).
Although
local school
district boards of trustees
are given broad powers
over the
management
of their affairs, see TEX. EDLJC. CODE ANN. 5 11.151 (Vernon
1996), they must
nevertheless
act within the confines of state law, see Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. DM-113 (1992) at 4.
Chapter 2258 applies to any public body awarding a contract for a public work on behalf of
the state or a political
subdivision
of the state. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. $5 2258.001(2), ,002
(Vernon 1999). It provides that a public body “shall determine the general prevailing rate of per
diem wages” and “shall specify in the call for bids for the contract and in the contract itself the wage
rates” so determined.
Id. 5 2258.022(a), (c). An officer, agent, or representative
of the state or of
a political subdivision
commits an offense if the person willfully violates or does not comply with
a provision of the chapter. Id. 3 2258.058(a).
When a power is granted and its method of exercise
prescribed, it is implied that the prescribed method excludes all others. See Foster v. City of Waco,
255 S.W. 1104, 1105 (Tex. 1923).
In our view, in enacting
the minimum
prevailing
wage
requirements
of chapter 2258, the legislature intended to preclude a public body from requiring its
contractors to adhere to any other minimum wage requirement.
The provision stating that chapter
2258 does not prohibit the payment to a worker of an amount greater than the prevailing wage rate
merely recognizes that chapter 2258 sets a floor for wages, not a ceiling. Contractors may pay their
workers more than the prevailing wage rate if they can do so and still procure the contract.
But the
McAllen Independent
School District may not require its outside contractors to pay their workers
not less than a “poverty level wage” or “living wage” in the performance
of contracts subject to
chapter 2258 of the Government
Code.
We do not question the worthiness ofthe school district’s goal ofensuring
that local workers
earn a living wage.
However, the legislature has implemented
a policy of requiring a prevailing
wage rate in contracts for the construction
of public works, and courts have construed this policy
strictly.
See, e.g., Cullipher v. Weatherby-Godbe
Constr. Co., 570 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. Civ.
The Honorable Rene 0. Oliveira
- Page 4
(JC-0011)
App.-Texarkana
1978, writ ret’d n.r.e.) (“The right of workers to receive a prevailing wage rate is
strictly a matter of statutory authorization.
This is a matter which may need legislative attention and
only that body has the authority to amend the statute which will eliminate the problem pointed out
in this case.“). It is within the power ofthe legislature to make appropriate adjustments
in the law.
As we discussed above, we see no constitutional
impediment
to including or providing for a poverty
level wage requirement.
SUMMARY
A school district may not require outside contractors with the district to
pay their workers
a minimum
poverty
level wage for work performed
pursuant
to a contract with the district governed by the requirements
of
chapter 2258 ofthe Government Code, which requires aminimumprevailing
wage in contracts for public works.
Yo
s ve
truly,
4J4?-
JO$N
CORNYN
Attorney General of Texas
ANDY TAYLOR
First Assistant Attorney General
CLARK RENT ERVIN
Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel
ELIZABETH
ROBINSON
Chair, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Barbara Griffin
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.