Texas law on any date › Attorney General opinions
Attorney General Opinion GA-0496
Issued June 28, 2006
Later treatment: Modified by statute Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 395.022(b) (from the Attorney General's list of opinions overruled, modified, superseded or withdrawn)
Re: Education Code section 11.168 and its effect on an independent school district’s authority to build or pay for inhastructum for new schools within the district
Cites: ED §11.168, LG §395.01
The Attorney General's page · official PDF
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG
ABBOTT
December-22,2006
The Honorable Jim Pitts
Opinion No. GA-0496
Chair, Committee one Appropriations
Texas House of Representatives
Post Office Box 2910
Austin, Texas 78768-2910
Re:
Education
Code section
11.168 and its
effect
on an independent
school
district’s
authority to build or pay for inhastructum
for
new schools within the district
(RQ-0503-GA)
Dear Representative
Pitts:
You ask about Education Code section 11.168’ and its effect on an independent
school
district’s authority to build or pay for infrastructure for new schools within the district.2
You inform us that in October 2005 voters in the Etis
Independent
School District (the
“District”) approved a bond package authorizing the District to construct a new junior high school
and 11 th- and 12th-grade center. Request Letter, supra note 2, at 1. You also inform us that the
voters approved the proposition with the understanding
that a portion of the bond money would be
used for infrastructure
improvements
to land not owned or leased by the District that will provide
sufhcient water, sewer, and roadway upgrades to serve the new school development.
See id The
District is apparently concerned,
however, that using bond money for this purpose will violate
Education Code section 11.168.
Section 11.168 of the Education Code provides that
[t]he board of trustees of a school district may not enter into
an agreement
authorizing
the use of school district employees,
property, or resources for the provision of materials or labor for the
‘There are two sections 11.168 in the Education Code. In your request, you quote t?om section 11.168 that was
added by House Bill 1826 during the Seventy-ninth Legislature’s regular session. See Act of May 27,2005,79tb Leg.,
R.S., ch. 979, 5 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3286, 3286. Thus, in this opinion, our reference to Education Code section
11,168 is to this one.
‘Letter i?om Honorable Jim Pitts, Chair, House Committee on Appropriations, to Honorable Greg Abbott,
Attorney General of Texas (June 21, 2006) ( on file with the Opinion Committee, also mailable
at
http:i/w.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter].
~The Honorable Jim Pitts - Page 2
(GA-0496)
design, construction,
or renovation of improvements
to real property
not owned or leased by the district.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. 4 11.168 @‘emon 2006). This provision was adopted during the Seventy-
ninth Legislature’s regular sessio$
it has not been construed by a court or this office;
Given the language in section 11.168, you first ask whether section 11.168 prohibits a schools
district from paying impact fees imposed by a municipality to help fund water, sewer, and roadways
necessary to serve new school development,
when those improvements
will not be made on land
owned or leased by the district. See Request Letter, supra note 2, at 1. Chapter 395 of the Local
Government Code authorizes political subdivisions, including municipalities,
to impose impact fees
against new development
“in order to generate revenue for funding or recouping the costs of capital
improvements
or facility expansions necessitated by and attributable to the new development.”
TEX.
Lot. GOV’T CODE ANN. 3 395.001(4) (V ernon 2005); see generally id. $5 395.001-.082.
And the
infrastructure
improvements
for which an impact fee may be assessed against a school district for
new school development-we
are tolddo
not usually occur on district property but rather “along
city
or state highway rights-of-way.“4
Thus, you ask us to construe Education
Code section
11 .168 relative to Local Government
Code chapter 395.
In construing a statute, we must give effect to the legislature’s intent. See TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. $5 311.021, ,023 (Vernon 2005); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 960 (Tex.
1999). To do so, we must first attempt to construe statutes according to their plain language, reading
the language according to the rules of grammar and common usage+nless
it has acquired a technical
meaning. S~@TEX.GOV’TCODEA~.
$311.011 (Vemon2005);Inre
Canales, 52 S.W.3d698,702
(Tex. 2001).
On its face, and as relevant here, section 11.168 prohibits a school district from entering into
an agreement authorizing the use of school district resources and employees to improve real property
not owned or leased by the district, TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. 5 11.168 (vemon
2006). Thus, for the
prohibition to apply to a school district’s use of its resources, there must be, minimally, an agreement
controlling
that use. .There is no indication in section 11.168 that “agreement”
has acquired a
technical meaning. Therefore, we look to its common meaning. The term “agreement” has various
meanings, however, and depending on its context, Texas courts use the term narrowly to refer to
formal contracts or more broadly as evidence of consent between parties. See, e.g., Circle Double
“C” Enters., Inc. v. Disco Elec., Inc., 782 S.W.Zd 299,301 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1989, no writ)~
(defining agreement as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication
from other circumstances”);
McCorkel v. Dist. Trs. of
Robinson Springs Sch. Dist. No. 76, 121
S.W.2d 1048,1052 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1938, no writ) (finding“agreement”to
be asynonym
for consent but may not necessarily be a contract). But in its broadest sense it means “harmony or
‘Act of May 27,2005,79th Leg., R.S., ch. 979 $ 1,200s Tex. Gen. Laws 3286,3X36.
%e Brief from Lydia L. Perry, Law Offices of Robert E. Luna, P.C., to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney
General of Texas, at 2 (Aug. 4, 2006) (on file with the Opinion Committee).
The Honorable. Jim Pitts - Page 3
(GA-0496)
accordance in opinion or feeling.” THENEW &FORD&bfERICANDICTIONARY
32 (2001). Therefore,
for section 11.168 to prohibit an independent
school district from paying an impact fee-again,
minimally-an
impact fee has to evidence harmony or accordance in opinion or feeling.
Turning to Local Government Code chapter 395, which authorizes impact fees, we note that
an impact fee is “a charge or assessment imposed by a political subdivision.”
TEX. Lot. GOV’T~
CODE ANN. 5 395.001(4) (Vernon 2005) (emphasis added). Indeed, the provisions
detailing how
apolitical subdivision may assess an impact fee use the term “impose.” See, e.g., id. §§ 395.01 l(a)
(“Unless otherwise specifically authorized by state law or this chapter, a
political subdivision
may not enact or impose an impact fee.“), 395.012(a) (“An impact fee may be imposed
.“).
Again, we find nothing that indicates “impose” has acquired a technical meaning, so we look to its
common meaning.
In this respect, a Texas court has reviewed the common-usage
definition of
“impose” and relied upon, among others, the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition, which defines
the term to mean “to lay on, as something
to be borne, endured,
or submitted
to; to inflict
(something) on or upon; to levy or enforce authoritatively or arbitrarily.” City ofHouston v. Richard,
21 S.W.3d 586,589 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (quotingVI1 OXFORDENGLISH
DICTIONARY 731 n.4 (2d ed. 1989)). Ultimately, the court found that “[i]n all of the definitions,
‘impose’ is associated with the act of placing a penalty or charge upon a person.”
Id. In short, to
impose something-in
this case, an impact fee-is
a unilateral action that does not involve harmony
or accordance in feeling or opinion.
An impact fee, consequently,
is not paid as a result of an
agreement.
Thus, in answer to your first question, Education Code section 11.168 does not prohibit
an independent
school district from paying impact fees imposed by a municipal corporation on the
district for the district’s new school development.
You also ask whether an independent
school district “can lease right-of-way
for needed
water, sewer and roadway improvements
which later, after construction, would be dedicated back
to the public for maintenance purposes and public use and the lease be terminated.”
Request Letter,
supra note 2, at 1. Because you ask this question in the context,of Education Code section 11.168,
we understand you to be asking whether section 11.168 prohibits an independent school district from
leasing rights-of-way on which the district will make infrastructure improvements
that will serve the
district’s new school development.
By its plain language, section 11.168 places limits on an independent
school district’s use
of its resources for the provision of materials or labor under certain circumstances.
See TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. 5 11.168 (Vernon 2006).
This provision is not relevant to an independent
school
district’s authority to acquire land and improve it5 Moreover, the provision expressly contemplates
a district’s leasing land. See id. (“to real property not owned or leased’) (emphasis added).
In
answer to your second question, then, section 11.168 does not prohibit a school district from leasing
right-of-way in order to make needed water, sewer, and roadway improvements
on such property.
‘An independent school district has authority to lease land and make improvements to it, even where the
improvements
will remain with the land upon the lease’s termination. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0321 (2005).
The Honorable Jim Pitts - Page 4
(GA-0496)
SUMMARY
Education
Code
section
11.168
does
not prohibit
an
independent
school district from paying impact fees imposed by a
municipal
corporation
on the district for the district’s new school
development.
Education
Code
section
11.168
does
not prohibit
an
independent
school district from leasing land and improving it.
RENT C. SULLIVAN
First Assistant Attorney General
ELLEN L. WlTT
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
NANCY S. FULLER
Chair, Opinion Committee
Daniel C. Bradford
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
Attorney General opinions are persuasive, not binding on courts, and answer questions of law, not fact. Text extracted from the official PDF. Not legal advice.